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Abstract 
 
The problem of theatre level politico-military arrangements during peace and stability 
operations is important because the intervening actors, working in complex and often 
ambiguous circumstances, need to calibrate the application of military and political 
means as a coherent interdependent whole. This is necessary in order to build peace, 
secure viable political outcomes and hence strategic successes; however it is not easy 
in practice.  This thesis examines the hypothesis that, beyond their security-related 
tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in 
order to facilitate and sustain the local political process.  This requires military co-
operation with other relevant actors, responsiveness to political direction and the 
specific shaping of military operations to impact decisively on political outcomes.   
 
This work establishes that Western and United Nations doctrinal guidance extols 
political primacy and civil-military cooperation but does not fully explain the central 
importance of the political process, nor does it capture the potential peace building 
role of the military component.  Analysis of practice in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, 
suggests that military commanders retain a uniquely influential position and have 
generally used their military means to positively influence political progress and help 
coordinate multi-dimensional plans. On occasion, to secure momentum and fill a void, 
commanders have quietly assumed a political function.  Doctrine now needs to be 
refreshed to reflect practice.  It should explain the military role in supporting the 
political process, elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of a 
comprehensive approach to peace building and provide candid guidance on the 
difficulties to be expected where politico-military and coordination arrangements are 
incoherent.  Moreover further work is needed on the wider application of this doctrine 
by the United Nations and the preparation of civilian leaders for politico-military 
relationships.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1. Setting the scene: complex operations demand political sensitivity    
 
This study addresses ways to improve the effectiveness of global intervention 
operations through better military support to developing political solutions.  It 
draws on the British experience and practice but also considers other recent 
developments, particularly in US practice, in order to suggest ways to improve 
cooperation at the nexus of politico-military planning and action in the field.  The 
military instrument tends to be used as a ―fire blanket‖1 to manage violence and 
deal with security related problems in unstable situations, although as General Sir 
Rupert Smith points out in The Utility of Force, the Art of War in the Modern 
World,
2
 this might not necessarily be the right solution. These operations are 
commonly but not exclusively referred to as Peace Operations,
3
 Peace Support 
Operations (PSO)
4
, Stability Operations
5
 or Counter Insurgency
6
 (see Glossary at 
Appendix 1).  The guiding idea behind this dissertation is that in these 
circumstances it is better to move beyond stasis and to nurture what might be 
termed a ―viable peace‖7 in part through deeper military engagement with, and 
hence support to, the political peace process.   
 
Recent UK PSO and Stability Operations doctrine stresses the need to adopt ―a 
comprehensive approach‖, 8 which means ―a broader multi-agency and, often, 
multinational response‖,9 of which the military force forms only a part, to resolve 
underlying problems.  This approach necessitates civil-military structures to 
oversee field operations and the development of solutions to issues beyond the 
security domain.
10
 In the field, political considerations and direction guide a 
―rheostatic‖ (see glossary) application of force.  At the same time intelligence-led 
security operations amongst the people,
11
 are intended to provide a secure 
environment for conflict resolution and to protect and reassure the population.
12
 
 
This first chapter describes the context for these post Cold War and post 11 
September 2001 (9/11) operations with the broad themes driving the development 
of the UK military response.  The reasons for conducting this study are primarily 
driven by a conviction that it is a professional necessity for commanders to 
support the practicalities of a peace process and so help to deliver viable political 
outcomes in peace and stability operations.  This is done using the military means 
available to support - and not usurp - the political process. Conceptually this 
draws on Clausewitz‘s suggestion that the commander in chief should also act as a 
statesman, as a member of the cabinet, ―so that the cabinet can share in the major 
aspects of his activities‖;13 albeit this did not mean that the commander would be 
the ultimate arbiter on political decisions.  But is this relevant or appropriate to the 
contemporary theatre level challenge?  Accepting that there can be no purely 
military solution in these circumstances; does the UK (and increasingly US) 
military practice regarding facilitating political outcomes in stability operations 
provide an effective model for enhanced multinational solutions?  Primary source 
material obtained through interviews with senior commanders and other 
practitioners suggests that, applied with care, there is a role for commanders to 
act, usually behind the scenes, in support of the ―peace‖ or political process.14  
  2 
This thesis develops this theme and will suggest that although doctrine has long 
suggested the need for political primacy, there has in fact been little writing on 
how commanders should support this. The latter part of this chapter develops the 
basis for the dissertation with the research topic, hypothesis and aim, study 
objectives, scope, methodology and the outline chapter layout.  
 
Kipling‘s poem The White Man’s Burden,15 sardonically addressed the wars faced 
by the US following its conquest of the Philippine Islands, and described the 
―savage wars of peace‖.16 This often repeated term, neatly captures the challenge, 
for the West, of contemporary campaigns.  Perceived British success in Malaya 
(1950-60) is often suggested as the root of the UK Armed Forces‘ capability to 
deal with such problems.  Rupert Smith comments that ―The Malayan emergency 
is held up to this day in militaries around the world as a successful example of 
counter-insurgency and counter-revolutionary war‖.17  He goes on to suggest that 
the British achieved this effectively by removing the insurgents‘ principal political 
objective through the promise of independence.  Yet contemporary proponents are 
often unable to recount facts about what was learned in Malaya
18
 or elsewhere.  
This study suggests that some lessons from campaigns past and present may 
suggest pertinent solutions, at least in part, to some of the expanding challenges of 
contemporary multinational operations.  The essential goal of which is to help 
create and maintain stability: ―…a condition pertaining to a state where it has 
effective control and administration of its territory, population, and resources;‖19 
but to do so in circumstances of challenging underlying social, economic and 
political problems ―within and across states‖ 20  where there can be no purely 
military solution.   
 
Whilst providing a basis of experience, earlier UK counter insurgency techniques 
may not be the answer to contemporary problems.  The context for contemporary 
multinational stability operations, together with the prevailing legal and social 
imperatives, differ from those for operations previously conducted on a national 
basis in Malaya (1950-60) or Northern Ireland (1969-2007).  Many aspects of 
contemporary multi-national operations are now much more complex and some 
approaches and techniques would not necessarily be appropriate or acceptable 
now.
21
  Recent UK Ministry of Defence Analysis suggests that the context for 
operations will be ever more challenging and uncertain
22
.  As Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, the former Secretary General of the United Nations had previously 
concluded:   
 
 ―The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just 
international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism 
and weapons of mass destruction…poverty, deadly infectious disease and 
environmental degradation... can have equally catastrophic consequences. All 
of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of 
them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international system.‖23  
 
There is a real challenge in separating the overlapping meanings of terms used to 
explain and define both the nature of contemporary conflict and the types of 
operations mounted in response. In Contemporary Conflict Resolution
24
 
  3 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall provided a useful guide to the discourse on 
the various theories and descriptions of contemporary conflict encompassing: 
Huntington‘s ―clash of civilisations‖;25 environmental conflict; the international 
political economy critique of conflict resolution with liberal governance 
interventions seen as ―riot control‖; the ―new wars‖ interpretation of post cold war 
state decay; and the ―greed versus grievance‖ debate over the importance of 
economic agendas.  Contemporary Conflict Resolution also suggests a framework 
for contemporary analysis using factors drawn from five levels: Global; Regional; 
State (social, economic, political), Conflict Party; and Elite / Individual. 
26
  
 
The term ―complex emergency‖, which NATO defines as ―a complex, multi-party, 
intra-state conflict resulting in a humanitarian disaster which might constitute 
multi-dimensional risks or threats to regional and international security...‖; 27 and 
―failed state‖, referring to ―countries with weak or non-existent central 
authority‖,28 (see glossary) are often used to describe some of the severe problems 
highlighted by the UN Secretary General.   A former US Marine Corps 
Commandant, General Krulak, coined the term ―The Three Block War‖ 29  to 
describe a situation requiring in response the simultaneous application of war 
fighting, peace support and humanitarian techniques close to each other in such 
circumstances.
30
  Paddy Ashdown terms this the ―post-conflict reconstruction 
phase‖31, yet conflict may not have ended.  Arguably the most difficult phase is 
the ―post-war fighting, post intervention‖32 or ―pre-peace‖ phase of operations, 
where the long term outcome may still be very unclear
33
, but where early actions 
will have a critical impact on what follows.  This period has been termed 
―operations on the cusp‖. 34  This phase of transition starts at an indefinable 
moment (and there will be different moments across the battle space) and 
encompasses the most difficult
35
 and drawn out period before a ―steady state‖36 or 
―viable peace‖37 can be said to exist.   
 
For the 2003 Iraq intervention, the transition or ―peace building‖38 phase was 
known as ―Phase 4‖39: it is clear that planning for this phase was, inadequate and 
the consequence was a ―security gap‖ 40  whereby neither international nor 
indigenous actors were in a position to provide adequate security. (See Figure 1 
below).  Failure at this stage will have long term consequences and this begs the 
question how should the international community be organized to conduct 
operations ―on the cusp‖ and beyond? And how should military commanders 
respond? Clausewitz took the view that ―War is not an independent phenomenon 
but the continuation of politics by different means…According to this point of 
view, there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic 
issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it‖.41  So the core issue is not only 
how to ―nest‖ military objectives within political objectives,42 but how to use 
military capabilities to ease the forward progression of political solutions and ―a 
better peace‖.43 
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Figure 1.1 The Security Gap. Source: Bellamy.
44
 Showing Iraq in 2003, this 
graphic developed by Bellamy demonstrates the how conflict tends to occur in a 
cycle and that, unless adequate preparations are in place, a security gap opens 
immediately after the conflict phase.  
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The term ―stability operations‖ is widely applied by the US45  to describe military 
responses in such circumstances and this seems to be becoming synonymous with 
many aspects of ―peace support operations‖ and also ―counter insurgency‖ (see 
glossary).  A recent RAND report characterised the campaigns in Malaya, 
Northern Ireland and Bosnia as ―stability operations‖; 46 these might previously 
have been seen as counter insurgency (Malaya) and ―aid to the civil power‖ 
(Northern Ireland) and Peace Support (Bosnia) respectively.  Other work draws 
similar conclusions and suggests that the overriding driver of success is the 
security situation.
47
   Stability or stabilisation operations are relatively new terms 
in UK parlance. Although with the recent publication of extensive doctrine 
―Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution‖48, and the creation of a 
―Stabilisation Unit‖ 49  funded by the UK‘s defence, foreign and development 
ministries, the term stabilisation is now firmly in the national lexicon, albeit no 
formal definition of stabilisation is provided by the doctrine.  Stabilisation is 
nevertheless used to describe contemporary challenges faced by the armed forces, 
when dealing with contemporary conflict, with ―new wars‖50 in a multi-national 
and multi-actor setting.  Often these wars involve weak states
51
  and the rise of the 
intractable ―warlord‖ (see glossary), which John Mackinlay termed a ―virus of the 
new strategic era‖52, whose vested interest lies in retaining power and making 
profit from chaos whilst resisting any peace process; here, war itself has a political 
  5 
economy.
53
  British Army counter insurgency doctrine, which addresses similar 
circumstances, has also recently been updated.
54
 (Chapter two will provide 
analysis of British stability operations and counter insurgency doctrine and the 
somewhat questionable relationship between the two). 
 
In 1999 Tom Mockaitis, reflecting on the typologies of both the types of conflict 
and the doctrinal responses, suggested that this may be, in part, a question of ―new 
names for old games‖? 55   However this view may now be slightly dated. 
Emerging terminology describes the evolution of: ―hybrid conflict‖ or ―hybrid 
warfare‖ or ―hybrid threats‖ which exist where ―conventional, irregular, and 
criminal capabilities are integrated operationally and tactically at the lowest level 
possible,‖ 56 both in and out of the theatre of operations. Here it is not entirely 
clear however if the emerging terminology refers to the nature of the conflict, the 
nature of the (Western) response, or both. In essence these terms extend the notion 
of ―warfare‖ to aspects not traditionally included and which are consequences of 
instability. The UK MOD‘s new Stability Operations Doctrine suggests that this is 
―where states or non-state actors choose to exploit all modes of war 
simultaneously using advanced conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism 
and disruptive criminality to destabilise an existing order‖. 57  This places a 
premium on insight: ―in order to develop effective strategies for ending conflict, 
one must first understand its complex dynamics and the various interests involved 
in perpetuating conflicts‖.58 These then need to be stabilised through a range of 
responses from high intensity conflict to development and delivery of aid.
59
   
 
The coordination challenge posed by such operations is exemplified by the current 
NATO campaign in Afghanistan.  Here, efforts to apply a comprehensive 
approach hang in the balance.  Successful tactical level combat actions against the 
Taliban are achievable but these must be immediately followed up by political 
activity to separate the insurgent from the people and reconstruction activity in 
order to make the local population‘s lives better, distance them from insurgent 
elements and so consolidate tactical military success.  If this cannot be achieved 
there is no incentive for local people to do anything but support and accept 
insurgent dominance. Reconstruction in this context means providing basic 
services, economic opportunity, nascent rule of law and overarching all of this: 
effective governance.
60
 The provision of all of these elements, under stable 
security conditions will deliver operational success and can be termed a 
comprehensive approach.
61
 However this is not easy given the difficulty of 
deploying and coordinating reconstruction capabilities, usually sourced from other 
government departments or members of the ―actor complex‖,62 in an extremely 
unstable security situation.  Beyond the security gap it is likely that there will be 
an overall governance gap and, worse, a coordination gap.  Hence commanders of 
necessity find themselves inexorably drawn into the political domain, if only to 
secure and (help) coordinate the necessary civilian resources, at times in a political 
void.
63
    
 
Elsewhere, since the creation of the United Nations, a different phenomenon, 
military peacekeeping (see glossary), has arisen in the multinational arena.  These 
operations have sought to support the pacific resolution of disputes Under Chapter 
  6 
VI of the UN Charter.  They imply and assume a reliance on consent as the 
peacekeeping force would adopt a neutral stance and thus, as a principle, use force 
only in self defence.  ―Effective United Nations peace-keeping requires the full 
consent and co-operation of the parties; United Nations peace-keepers must 
maintain their neutrality…‖64.  So, for peace keeping operations to be successful, 
there needed to be a ―…peace to keep‖65.   But increasingly in the post cold war 
era, the mandates for such operations have sought to enforce the settlement of 
disputes, and latterly to attempt to get failed states back on their feet using 
integrated missions or ―multi-dimensional peacekeeping‖, 66  with consequent 
challenges for the military.  Thus for the intervening ―actor complex‖,67 as with 
stability operations, the scope of operations was now widened to include 
reconstruction of the essential elements of a state: governance, the economy; the 
rule of law and political institutions.  As the UN‘s latest doctrine suggests: 
 
―Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations deployed in 
the aftermath of an internal conflict face a particularly challenging 
environment. The State‘s capacity to provide security to its population and 
maintain public order is often weak, and violence may still be ongoing in 
various parts of the country. Basic infrastructure is likely to have been 
destroyed and large sections of the population may have been displaced. 
Society may be divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines and grave 
human rights abuses may have been committed during the conflict, further 
complicating efforts to achieve national reconciliation.‖68 
 
This begs a question regarding the efficiency of politico-military contacts between 
senior military officers and their civilian heads of mission; yet neither recent 
literature or doctrine offers help in pulling this together.
69
 (This issue will be 
examined further in chapters 2 and 3).  
 
Contemporary military operations in the circumstances described above demand 
careful political calibration.  They are set within a context of poor (local) 
governance, an unstable security situation, a dire humanitarian situation and a 
lengthy reconstruction task in prospect. This brings stark coordination challenges.  
It has become a truism that ―security without development is questionable, while 
development without security is impossible‖70  and coordination is made more 
difficult by the multinational,
71
 and multifunctional nature of the response and the 
probable absence of legitimate local governance capabilities. Thus the challenge 
posed to theatre level commanders, their staffs and civilian contemporaries, 
together with local actors where available, in effecting civil-military coordination, 
is formidable. 
 
General Sir Mike Jackson likened this situation to a rope with many strands.  If 
woven together the rope was stronger than its component strands but, if not, the 
individual strands could easily be broken.
72
 To deliver this comprehensive 
approach and ―weav[e] the strands of the rope‖, 73  specifically mandated and 
constructed political-military structures, under a civilian political lead are needed. 
Such political primacy demands that the military element, although providing the 
ultimate power base,
74
 does not see itself as in charge and is sensitive to this fact, 
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operating in a pragmatic, flexible way adjusting its response according to local 
political guidance.
75
  Such awareness and readiness to be involved with political 
structures and the necessary daily ―vertical integration‖76 down through the levels 
of command or organisational structure must be seen as a professional necessity in 
order to achieve military success
77
 rather than as a hindrance to the application of 
military means.  It implies a rheostatic approach to the use of force - where the 
―heat‖78 can be turned up or down.  It suggests employing only enough force to 
deal with the immediate tactical problem at hand whilst remaining aware of the 
potential long term ill effects caused by using too much force, or influence.     
 
Beyond the rheostatic application of force, careful direction is required to oversee 
an intelligence-led approach to security operations, designed, in conjunction with 
the civilian political leadership to both remove or ―fix‖79   disruptive elements and 
so create a secure environment and reassure the population.  Simultaneously 
employing the psychological dimension will help to separate the insurgent from 
the population and demonstrate that ―peace pays‖80 for all in tangible and material 
ways.  ―Winning the hearts and minds‖81 of the population, of course also implies 
in part dealing with long term issues and grievances. The doctrinal approach to 
pulling this together will be examined in chapter 2.  
 
There is a paradox here for military forces, at least for those from countries with 
healthy civil military relations.  They are supposed to be non-political (at any rate 
non-partisan) and to provide strictly military advice and outputs: ―we can do x, y 
or z; the cost in blood and treasure will be…‖.  Nevertheless UK practice is that, 
in the field, commanders can only really succeed by becoming in effect a local 
political actor, at least in some measure, and therefore by supporting the wider 
peace process through their actions.
82
  This implies designing and conducting 
military campaigns in ways that contribute actively to nurturing the local political 
peace process, as well as addressing strategic level political objectives.
83
  This can 
be seen as an un-stated professional necessity
84
and is central to delivering a 
comprehensive approach.
85
  This goes beyond the domain of Civil-Military 
Cooperation or ―CIMIC‖86 which, whilst important, has become largely a matter 
of coordinating tactical level activity. Getting in tune with the politico-military 
realm may be uncomfortable for some actors operating at the political level and 
certainly for some military establishments who prefer to concentrate solely on 
specified ―military‖ tasks given (through strategic-level political direction) rather 
than analysing and acting on the implied task which, in this case, is how to act and 
what activities to support in order that the wider political process succeeds.  Given 
that significant elements of the host state‘s capacity are missing in the failed state 
environment, such ―mission development‖, rather than ―mission creep‖, 87  is 
necessary.  This work will concentrate on policy interactions at the higher level in 
country, for example that between the relevant Special Representative of the 
United Nations Secretrary General (SRSG) and the military force commander – 
and the consequent ―vertical integration‖ 88 down (and up) through the levels of 
command and activity that necessarily follows.   
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2. Reasons for undertaking the study. 
 
Recent analysis suggests that the global context will continue to present 
challenging conflict scenarios.
89
 It seems that war will remain a given
90
 and 
intervention, either for values or interests, seems likely to continue. Collective 
action may be demanded by the International Community, notwithstanding 
ongoing Western debate over the application of the values-led ―liberal peace‖91 
concept and angst about interests-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Such 
responses could be a ―humanitarian intervention‖ 92  on the basis of ―the 
responsibility to protect‖,93  in the face of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity.  Or it could follow the pattern of earlier 9/11 era 
interventions involving forcible regime change and spreading ―democracy by 
force‖.94  Efforts to stabilise an existing operation by a third party or government 
(for example the UK operation to stabilise and support the UN operation in Sierra 
Leone in 2000 or the EU Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003) 
might also reoccur.  
 
The reasons for conducting this study are based on the need to better understand 
the conduct of the ―post conflict‖ and stability operations where often ―contingent 
sovereignty‖ 95 may be exercised over ineffective states.  This remains a key issue 
in security studies today.  Extensive personal professional exposure to the subject 
through field experience in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Iraq 
as well as in key planning roles in the European Union Military Staff and at 
NATO, together with research and writing over a 10 year period
96
 have led the 
author to conclude that the UK armed forces, and increasingly their US 
counterparts, have something to contribute, with others, to the global debate on 
how best to approach the politico-military aspects of contemporary operations, in 
particular by supporting viable political outcomes.   
 
This thesis seeks to further develop the military application of a key principle, 
identified during operations in the Balkans in the 1990s, which should help 
provide more effective future outcomes.  As a result of his experiences in the UN 
Mission in Bosnia in 1996 and Kosovo in 1999 as Principal Deputy SRSG to 
Bernard Kouchner, Jock Covey
97
 was insistent on ―the primacy of the peace 
process‖ as the key to ―aligning the efforts of all components of the mission‖.98  
He appreciated that ―British officer[s] understood without NATO guidance the 
need to ‗support those who support the peace process‘ ‖.99   It is suggested that 
acting in this way is indeed a professional imperative for commanders and other 
actors.  The real practical difficulty of applying the ―primacy of the peace 
process‖ also forms part of the justification for this work.  Involvement with the 
peace process, or in its absence a nascent political process, should matter more to 
the military than simply delivering achievable military benchmarks on a separate 
track from any wider political effort to secure conflict resolution process. For 
example in Iraq in 2005, the author observed MNF-I‘s initial preference for 
pursuing a limited objective of Provincial Iraqi security control (that is setting up 
the army and police) rather than the more difficult provincial Iraqi control 
(implying full Iraqi governance).  The latter would have required a significant 
governance input that the military just did not want (or feel able) to provide – 
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because the Corps Commander thought that he could not and should not be 
operating in that domain, even though the State Department clearly needed 
support to be able so to do.
100
  Covey suggests that this is essentially what 
happened earlier in Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Agreement: ―by insulating itself 
so effectively from the civilian component...the military ensured the failure of 
both‖.101 This implies that the military should move beyond a narrow sectoral 
approach and help to actually ―weave the strands of the rope‖,102 at least at the 
higher level.  This requires a deep understanding of and sympathy for the part that 
others have to play in the endeavour.
103
  But this is not always the case. 
 
One almost universal issue which deployed commanders face is reconciling 
instructions from their superior multinational commanders in theatre with their 
own national chains of command.  Often the theatre level imperative tends to give 
way to national constraints or preferences.  Paradoxically this may partly be due to 
―political‖ instructions, or at least an interpretation of these, which demands that 
soldiers stay out of local ―politics‖; this may be entirely understandable in some 
cultures where democratic control remains fragile.
104
 However it does not augur 
well for in theatre coordination and political management.  None of this is made 
easy by the reality that governments‘ structures for the political control of 
deployed military forces are usually distinct from those for other strands. Also 
some other strands, such as the police, may be more dependent on the UN for 
instructions and guidance.   (The impact of this issue is explored further in 
Chapter 4).   
 
It is not suggested that a commander‘s politico-military dexterity is the only factor 
needed for eventual success in such complex situations.  Other essential enablers 
include: an empowering mandate,
105
 a framework for civil-military activity, well 
trained flexible forces with good doctrine, a nuanced approach to the application 
of force, the active and properly resourced presence of the other ―strands of the 
rope‖106 and of course financial resources, a strong information campaign and 
above all a do-able objective.  All of these elements need to be in place, or at least 
on the way.  Moreover, to help achieve viable political outcomes faster and more 
reliably, military commanders need intuitively to act in concert, with the local 
political manager.  Robert Egnell is clear that this is ―only achievable through a 
new military culture of flexibility and political understanding, as well as a civil-
military structure that allows for true integration of the civilian and military 
aspects of counter-insurgency and peace operations‖.107 It needs ―mutual trust and 
understanding across the civil-military divide‖.108 This requires commanders to be 
comfortable with taking instructions from local political managers, adapting 
military action to suit political imperatives and indeed actively seeking so to do.
109
  
This approach is fine if political interlocutors exist and are up to the job: but what 
if not – how should the military commander respond when faced with a void?  
 
Dealing with conflict being their business, it is arguable that soldiers have a role in 
educating and explaining what needs to be done for the benefit of others such as 
politicians, economists and policemen. Whilst not going as far as stating that this 
was a ―professional imperative‖, General Sir Frank Kitson sagely observed (if not 
without some controversy at the time,
110
 ―all eyes turn to the soldier when 
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violence erupts…‖ and therefore ―…solders have to advise on other government 
measures too…‖.111  It is intended that this study will play such a role for an 
audience beyond the military and planning communities in a number of 
constituencies may benefit: The United Nations, United States; NATO; the 
European Union; and other regional organisations or, more probably, ad hoc 
groupings of all of the above. 
 
Who might apply such an approach?  Some UN operations might be improved 
with a more comprehensive approach within the generally understood limits of 
peacekeeping style operations: ―… they don't often move on from peacekeeping to 
peacemaking. They tend, time and again, to freeze a bad situation in glum 
immobility‖.112  Indian commanders, for example, may tend to concentrate on 
security objectives only and thus retain a ―traditional peacekeeping‖113 mindset.  
The UN Security Council will also need to embrace a broad approach
114
 when 
mandating ―regional arrangements‖ (as recognised under Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter) or coalitions of the willing and when integrating military forces from 
such groupings with a UN civilian presence such as occurred in Kosovo
115
 and 
East Timor.
116
  This work is intended to improve global doctrine for civil-military 
teamwork in UN mandated missions.   
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, US-led interventions saw the conquest of two countries, 
Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) and acquisition of responsibility for swathes 
of under-governed and unstable territory.  It is always possible that there will be 
more US-led interventions and the 9/11 Commission Report hints at this.
117
  The 
urge to export a fundamental belief in democracy and a market based economic 
approach implies a need to go well beyond a ―kick down the door and democracy 
will follow‖ approach and to enter the realm of ―nation building‖. 118  US 
commanders are adept at applying resources to achieve ―full spectrum‖ 
counterinsurgency
119
  and display an instinct to take overall charge. Arguably, the 
new FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency,
120
 known as ―the Petraeus Doctrine‖ - provides 
the US with doctrine to manage this and this might enable a (more) nuanced, 
intuitive population-centric approach to the conduct of counter insurgency and 
stability operations and the development of political solutions.  It remains to be 
seen how successfully this will be applied over time. 
 
Some EU focussed commentators, if not the EU as a body, suggest it should 
conduct challenging post conflict operations: Robert Cooper argued that 
Europeans have to be prepared to use force in ―post-modern intervention… for 
values‖.121  However the EU faces a difficult internal challenge of joining up its 
Brussels-based institutional framework in order to provide a comprehensive 
response to enable operations in the field effectively to employ the EU‘s 
undoubted potential (or to cooperate with others).  Description of what needs to be 
done in the field may enable higher level issues, particularly politico-military co-
ordination, to be seen for what they are; this may assist with the development of 
consensus in designing appropriate policy solutions.  The issues highlighted in this 
study may be equally applicable to other regional organisations such as NATO, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, the African Union (and the regional 
blocks in Africa such as ECOWAS or SADC) and the ASEAN Regional Council.  
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But perhaps the most likely scenario is that ad-hoc groupings of any of the above 
will come together to address specific problems.  Hence there will be a broad 
utility for an understanding or ―doctrine‖ of how stability might best be created 
and nurtured towards viable peace. 
 
3. Research topic. 
 
Research is needed to examine
122
 a key UK lesson from previous operations that 
there is an absolute requirement for tight civil-military co-operation with a 
suitable enabling framework in order that political objectives may be successfully 
pursued, in part through the achievement of security objectives which in turn 
enable other activity and achieve wider effects.  Within this framework, this thesis 
will establish that British commanders tend to accept that they are always a local 
political player, respond to political direction (even implied direction) by shaping 
operations that will impact decisively on short, medium and long term political 
outcomes and thus actively contribute to the peace process in its broader sense. 
This approach goes beyond setting up structures for CIMIC
123
 activity (which 
generally addresses routine cooperation and coordination issues at a relatively low 
level) and sits properly at the level of campaign direction as urged by extant 
British doctrine.
124
 British commanders tend to embody an innate sense that it is a 
professional imperative (albeit unstated) to be aware of political requirements and 
to ensure ―vertical integration‖125 of military activity down (and up) through the 
levels of command. This is necessary in order to achieve mission success 
efficiently.  The question is how to use this to improve outcomes in future 
multinational operations?   
 
4. Hypothesis.  
 
The hypothesis and core theme for this study is that beyond their specific security-
related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian 
interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and facilitate viable political 
outcomes in peace and stability operations. This approach needs soldiers at all 
levels to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political direction and 
shape military operations that will impact decisively on political outcomes in 
order to help generate political progress towards sustainable peace. In practice, 
this means that ―supporting those who support the peace process‖126 becomes a 
professional imperative, and understanding that finding workable local political 
outcomes, rather than a simplistic exit strategy,
127
 is central to success.  This 
suggests that the commander is always to some degree a local political actor
128
 
who commits political acts which will be perceived as such.  This mindset enables 
soldiers effectively to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political 
direction
129
  and shape operations that will impact decisively on short, medium 
and long term political outcomes; and so actively to contribute to the peace 
process in its broader sense. This does not imply any change to the Commander‘s 
central focus on the military mission but guides campaign direction to achieve 
politico-military objectives. 
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5. Aim.   
 
The aim is to examine the above hypothesis as an effective model for enhanced 
multinational solutions in future.  
 
6. Objectives.   
 
The study objectives are to establish: 
 
6.1. What is the current context for multinational operations – the problem 
presented by New Wars?
 130
 
 
6.2. What is the British military doctrinal approach to the politico-military 
relationship at the theatre / campaign level (including both historical and 
contemporary examples)?  
 
6.3.  What structures and processes are required to support this approach?  What 
happens if any of these are absent? 
 
6.4.  What other relevant approaches exist in the multinational arena?  What areas 
of good multinational practice exist? 
 
6.5. What model(s) for politico-military teamwork should be adopted as a global 
doctrine for future UN mandated multinational Peace and Stability 
Operations?  
 
7. Scope.   
 
This is not intended to be a hubristic account of British success and others‘ 
inadequacies: there have been plenty of difficulties and failures in the national 
experience, including recently.  Avoiding rose-tinted spectacles, the literature 
review and case studies will illustrate the emergence and application of methods 
to deal with conflict in circumstances other than war.  Whilst acknowledging the 
difficult and complex issues in stability operations; together with the absolute 
requirement for a comprehensive approach with the necessary enablers, and 
especially civilian resources, the focus will be on the military contribution to 
enabling the political discourse and peace process to go forward.   
 
Military operations are generally described in terms of the grand strategic (or 
political), military strategic, operational (or theatre) and tactical levels.
131
  Given 
that the key relationships to be discussed will be at the operational / theatre and 
the higher tactical levels, the study will focus here but with reference to both 
higher and lower levels when needed to illustrate particular points.  This 
encompasses the cliché of the ―strategic corporal‖ 132  which describes the 
circumstance where, in view of the compression of the levels of war, caused in 
part by the impact of modern communications, leadership and activities at the 
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tactical level in modern conflict inexorably impact beyond their tactical 
significance.  
 
This study is about military operations but given that success cannot be achieved 
through military means alone, politico-military issues are important because the 
co-ordinated application of civilian, political and economic measures, together 
with the adroit application of force, are central to success. Therefore, of necessity, 
the work will include detailed reference to civilian activities where this helps to 
explain the overall context and the vital need for a close relationship between 
military and civilian actors and the specific demands that this places on both.   
 
8. Methodology. 
 
Drawing on doctrinal theories and field practice, primarily from the security 
domain but also from conflict resolution and development, the study 
acknowledges the requirement for a multidisciplinary set of solutions to the 
security gap.  The thesis is essentially about behaviours hence the research method 
is qualitative in order to gain an understanding of decision making behaviours and 
the reasons behind these.  Clearly some of the analysis remains subjective,
133
 and 
deductions cannot therefore be empirical; nevertheless it is intended that the 
quality, quantity and cross referencing of evidence will provide a compelling case.   
In addressing the core theme the study is practically grounded but also draws on 
appropriate theoretical work.  The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 analyses 
relevant doctrine: this tends to be an amalgam of past practice, conceptual theory 
and subjective prescription for the future.
134
  Beyond this, analysis of practice is 
developed by cross-referencing between primary sources. These include: 
interviews with senior commanders involved in all three case studies and other 
experienced practitioners (see list at bibliography); output from workshops and 
conferences; official reports and publications; together with the author‘s personal 
and professional experience both in the field and in the doctrinal arena.
135
 Two 
sets of questions were developed to prepare interview subjects (see Appendix 2). 
The questions draw together the strands of the research approach and mirror the 
broad approach to the case studies.  Interviews took the form of a structured 
discussion based on the questions. 
 
No two military campaigns are alike in circumstance, conduct or outcome.  
However, the three case studies have been selected to illustrate the centrality of 
the requirement for military support to the political process across a variety of 
circumstances.  Critical and thematic analysis of politico-military relations during 
operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan will illustrate the key theme and 
aspects of its development over approximately 10 years (although shortage of 
space precludes more than a snapshot view).  Analysis of Afghanistan will follow 
that of Iraq in order to demonstrate significant US learning in Iraq and how it was 
later applied to Afghanistan.  An outline of the main issues emerging from the 
case studies is provided in the thesis structure below.   For each case study the 
research approach has sought to identify: structures and politico-military 
relationships; campaign design and conduct; and defining events before 
addressing a subjective view of performance and outcomes leading to 
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recommendations for improvement of doctrine.  The concluding chapter will 
assess the results from the case studies, compare these against a model derived 
from the hypothesis and then make recommendations on doctrine and areas for 
further study.  In terms of rigour and credibility, this approach remains mindful of 
the logical tests provided by the four case study design tests identified by Robert 
Yin, namely: ―construct validity‖; ―internal validity‖; ―external validity‖; and 
―reliability‖.  Practically applied, these tests suggest the following questions: are 
defining events really defining; are causal relationships correctly identified, are 
inferences accurate; can the findings be generalised beyond the study and could 
the results be accurately repeated?
 136
 
 
Given that soldiers are unlikely to be able to materially affect the roots of the 
international system, the study adopts a ―problem-solving‖ approach which 
accepts the parameters of the present situation and then attempts to solve problems 
encountered.
137
 This ―neo-realist‖ 138  stance will not include a critique on the 
international system and the policies that may lie behind the creation of the 
security gap or the international response to this.  The thesis will however 
demonstrate the difficulties inherent in dealing with the aftermath of intervention.  
These difficulties suggest that, before intervening, policy makers should consider 
the ways and means for dealing with the aftermath at the same time as considering 
the ends.
139
 The alternative would be to adopt a critical approach then suggest an 
entirely new model; but this does not seem relevant here given the core theme that 
a model and doctrine for civil-military relations already exists: what is needed is 
wider and deeper understanding, then application.
140
 
 
9. Thesis Structure.  
 
The thesis will comprise the following chapters: 
 
9.1. Introduction.  Chapter 1 has outlined the context for operations in the era of 
new wars, introduced the question and the approach to answering it. 
 
9.2. Chapter 2 – British Doctrine for Peace and Stability Operations.  Chapter 2 
will first examine the relevant aspects of Clausewitz‘s work to establish the 
essentially political nature of war and how military means must relate to this 
reality before suggesting that this is also germane to contemporary activities 
after formal or initial hostilities as described in Chapter 1.  Next, Jock 
Covey‘s requirement for ―primacy of the peace process‖ will be discussed in 
order to frame the politico-military discussion which follows.  Contemporary 
literature, focussing on doctrine, covering the British military approach will 
then be examined. Looking further back, the essential building blocks which 
have shaped the British approach will be sketched as will relevant reflections 
by senior British commanders and others. The chapter concludes by 
suggesting there is a gap in the current literature; there remains an imbalance 
in doctrine between the emphasis placed on the principle of political primacy 
and the guidance provided to commanders in terms of how to support it.  
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9.3. Chapter 3 – Contemporary US, UN and NATO Doctrine for Peace and 
Stability Operations.  Chapter 3 will examine how US, UN and NATO 
doctrine addresses politico-military cooperation in support of the political 
process at the theatre level.  This chapter addresses imperatives important in 
two important but distinct communities. First is the imperative to underpin 
progress in state building practice by the US (and NATO) in the face of 
potentially countervailing arguments to focus on war fighting.  Second is the 
imperative to support the UN in building on progress in complex 
peacekeeping through integrated missions; this is particularly important given 
the global scope and scale of UN operations. 
 
9.4. Chapter 4 – Kosovo: Keeping the Show on the Road.  Chapter 4 will be a 
case study of operations in Kosovo in 1999-2000 where a NATO military 
force was directly mandated to support a UN civilian mission under a United 
Nations Security Council Resolution.  The following features emerged:  
 
9.4.1. The advantages of an empowering mandate. 
 
9.4.2. The development of a framework for civil-military planning and 
activity between the UN and NATO.   
 
9.4.3. The positive impact of commanders‘ active support to the political 
process in order to deliver interim political results and so help create the 
conditions for longer term development of political solutions.
141 
  
 
9.4.4. The challenges provided by multi-nationality with notable differences 
in nations‘ approaches. 
 
9.5.  Chapter 5 – Iraq: Hard Lessons.  Chapter 5 will examine a coalition 
operation in Iraq (2003-2008) which was authorised by UN after the fact.  
Initially the post combat phase civil-military structure was inadequate given 
insufficient ―Phase 4‖ planning and preparation following the regime change- 
driven intervention.  Therefore at the beginning there was no political or 
peace process to give primacy to or support. The following features will be 
illustrated: 
 
9.5.1. The UN presence was weak and most civil-military dealings were with 
the Coalition Provisional Authority and US Embassy and, over time, the 
Iraqi government.  Lessons were learned from that. 
 
9.5.2. The evolution of a new US doctrine and operational approach once the 
realisation dawned that state building was required to facilitate exit.  The 
new doctrine – focussing on engagement with the people to deliver 
political reconciliation – was applied with vigour and success. 
 
9.5.3. The emergence of an improved approach to politico-military campaign 
design and partnership with Iraqis in Baghdad.  Intellectual primacy 
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remained with the civilian side and strong top down military support for 
the civilian effort paid dividends.  
 
9.5.4. The likely difficulty of facilitating the drawdown of military forces and 
handoff to Iraqi authorities to come. 
 
9.6. Chapter 6 – Afghanistan.  Chapter 6 will examine a stabilisation operation 
initiated following invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 as part of the ―war on 
terror‖ in response to 9/11.  It will focus on the post-invasion arrangements 
which became a NATO mission with a supportive UN mandate but a 
relatively weak UN presence. The following features will be illustrated: 
 
9.6.1. The example provided by UK ISAF commanders and to the NATO 
mission in terms of supporting the political process and enabling political 
progress.   
 
9.6.2. The positive impact of new US doctrine and lessons from Iraq. The 
benefits of US military leaders‘ eventual engagement with the political 
process and with local political leaders. 
 
9.6.3. The development of UN and ISAF coordination. 
 
9.6.4. An increasing realisation that the International Community as a whole 
needed to engage in state building to bring Afghanistan into some form 
of stability and facilitate its own exit; but that this could not be achieved 
without adequate security and Afghan leadership.  Hence there remains a 
focus on holding the ring militarily, whilst building Afghan security 
capacity and also attempting to get governance, economic and social 
measures in place and so separating the insurgent from the people. This 
underscored the core requirement for successful politico-military 
cooperation and a process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan. 
 
9.7. Chapter 7 – Conclusions.  Chapter 7 will draw together the conclusions of the 
study in relation to the core premise.  It will suggest the following broad 
themes:  
 
9.7.1. Mindful of the difficulties of operating in a multi-actor, multinational 
context, the primacy of the political or peace process remains a key 
organising principle for the conduct of peace support and stability 
operations.  The case studies demonstrate that it is adaptable to a variety 
of circumstances and should be applied more widely. 
 
9.7.2. Understanding and acting on political requirements remains the 
professional imperative for commanders. Applying military capacity to 
facilitate the political process and political outcomes is key. Assuming 
that adequate military means are available, there is no better way to 
influence military mission success in post conflict environments.  This 
implies that whilst not invariably a ―statesman‖ in the sense suggested by 
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Clausewitz, the theatre commander is an important political actor in his 
own right and should be used as a key facilitator for the overall politico-
military campaign including the political process.  
  
9.7.3. Case studies demonstrate that, despite significant progress, the aptitude 
of the International Community to fully understand this relationship and 
create the necessary structures and processes varies.  The absence of 
adequate political arrangements or civilian capacity may leave the 
military commander without a ―socket‖ available to ―plug in‖ his military 
capacity. 
 
9.7.4. Notwithstanding the above, in the light of incomplete civilian capacity, 
any temptation to allow military capacity to become overweening and 
take charge politically must be avoided.   Political and intellectual 
primacy must remain with the civilian side.  Equally civilian leaders must 
understand the responsibilities and imperatives that are important to 
military commanders and that some decisions remain for the military 
commander alone. 
 
9.7.5. Future UN mandated peace support and stability operations should 
apply this approach. This suggests that existing doctrine should be 
adapted to incorporate the requirement for soldiers specifically to support 
the primacy of the political or peace process, and underline the 
requirement for the political lead to remain with the political side.  
Doctrine also needs to be more honest about the issues that the military 
commander is likely to face.  Broadly there are three scenarios: first a 
multinational operation where politico-military arrangements are 
mandated and effective;  second an operation mounted by a single nation 
or coalition of a few nations where viable politico-military cooperation 
arrangements can be delivered relatively easily through either mandating 
or cooperation in the field; and finally, the more likely option of a 
multinational operation, with extensive international actor participation, 
where politico-military coordination arrangements do not deliver unity of 
command or purpose and the military commander may find himself 
facing a political void, or at best uncertainty.  New doctrinal guidance 
needs to cater for all three of these eventualities. 
 
9.7.6. Further research is needed on the civilian ―socket‖ and the 
development of civilian leadership and supporting politico-military 
doctrine for these missions. 
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Chapter 2 - British Doctrine for Peace and Stability Operations 
 
1. Scope of the Literature Review 
 
This chapter will first examine the relevant aspects of Carl von Clausewitz‘s work to 
establish the essentially political nature of war and how military means must relate to 
this reality before suggesting that this is also germane to contemporary activities after 
formal or initial hostilities as described in Chapter 1.  The next section will, starting 
with Jock Covey‘s requirement for ―primacy of the peace process‖,1 examine what 
contemporary literature and doctrine has to say about the British military approach to 
this.  (Multinational responses will be examined in Chapter 3).  Then, looking further 
back, a brief analysis of the essential building blocks which have shaped the British 
approach will be sketched.  The chapter will conclude by establishing that there 
remains an imbalance in doctrine between the emphasis placed on the principle of 
political primacy and the guidance provided to commanders in terms of how to 
support it.  An emerging model to test against case study material will be suggested 
and the case studies in the following chapters will demonstrate how generals operated 
in practice.  
 
2. Clausewitz – The General as Statesman? 
 
Carl von Clausewitz offers two practical ideas which, in combination, are central to 
the development of this thesis.  The first, in terms of strategic ends, is the importance 
of political objectives in war.  The second, in terms of practicalities, is the role of the 
general as a statesman, and therefore a political actor, in war.  Clausewitz‘s analysis 
of the aftermath of war, beyond the need for a peace treaty, is at best sketchy
2
 but 
perhaps points the way towards the application of similar principles. 
 
Clausewitz with On War articulated clearly the linkage between political aims in war 
and its conduct. If ―war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the 
prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting 
it…the political aim remains the first consideration.  Policy then will permeate all 
military operations and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a 
continuous influence on them‖.3 Keegan criticises Clausewitz‘s focus on war as a 
continuation of politics, seeing war more as a ―habit‖ which threatens our survival.4  
Nevertheless Clausewitz‘s analysis seems relevant and mirrors a key strand in 
contemporary doctrinal thought; for example, the key principle in UK 
counterinsurgency doctrine remains ―political primacy and political aim‖.5  Hence the 
present analysis suggests that Clausewitz‘s theory on the pursuit of political aims 
remains relevant to the pursuit of political objectives in the aftermath of war or ―new 
wars‖6 and thus to contemporary peace and stability operations, Wars that are not 
necessarily between states, as Clausewitz saw them, are nonetheless politically driven 
and dependent on political outcomes for closure.  This remains topical; as General 
Stanley McChrystal, a former NATO commander in Afghanistan has recently 
commented: ―…a political solution to all conflicts is the inevitable outcome. And it‘s 
the right outcome‖.7 
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If ―war is merely the continuation of policy by other means‖, 8  then surely the 
aftermath of war, between states and involving regime change, must be seen in the 
same light?  This seems equally valid for ―new wars‖, including values-led 
interventions into failed states.  However there is a problem here, if intervention 
merely removes a regime but does not replace it, then the underlying causes of 
instability inherent in failed states, including the absence of security, will remain until 
addressed.  Rupert Smith points out that the ―confrontation‖9 remains, whilst Michael 
Dziedzic notes that in such circumstances ―‗peace‘ is but the continuation of conflict 
by other violent means‖ 10 and therefore holistic action to transform the conflict is 
needed. Clausewitz saw this in the sense that the ―subordination‖ and ―permeation‖ of 
war by politics meant that there was no ―purely military solution‖11 to any military 
problem.  Moreover, as Schadlow suggests, ―…governance operations are the 
operational link needed to consolidate a state‘s final political aims in war‖.12 It is for 
the political element to conduct such governance operations, in partnership with local 
actors,
13
 and this thesis will explore and emphasise the critical enabling contribution 
to this effort which can be provided by military forces.  
 
This study focuses on a post ―war‖ or post intervention period and is not only about 
war between states in the customary sense.  Therefore, for soldiers, many other 
considerations also apply; these include the obligations of an occupying power
14
 and 
involvement with post war ―nation building‖15 activity. Clausewitz stopped short of 
offering detailed prescriptions relevant to such a period beyond offering that: 
 
 ―[w]e may occupy a country completely, but hostilities can be renewed again 
in the interior, or perhaps with allied help.  This can also happen after the 
peace treaty, but this only shows that not every war necessarily leads to a final 
decision and settlement.  But even if hostilities should occur again, a peace 
treaty will always extinguish a mass of sparks that might have gone on quietly 
smouldering…we must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the 
purpose of war has been achieved and its business is at an end.‖16  
 
Later, Clausewitz goes on to state that, ―No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his 
senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve 
by that war and how he intends to conduct it‖.17  As Bernard Brodie observes: ―What 
could be simpler and more obvious…!‖. 18  So is there a mixed message here: a 
determination to address objectives in war; yet Clausewitz toys with, but does not 
substantially address, difficulties that may occur if ―peace‖ (see glossary) cannot be 
achieved through the simple means of a peace treaty.  Thomas Adams suggested that 
Clauswitz‘s writing had ―little application to warfare outside the conventional 
model‖,19 yet it seems likely that this would follow had he addressed this ―post-
conflict‖ phase more directly.  
  
So Clausewitz, without really developing the idea, offers some tantalising hints on the 
relationship of war as a political activity and its impact on the subsequent peace.    
 
―War is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous 
…war is simply the continuation of political intercourse, ‗with the addition of 
other means‘…war…does not suspend political intercourse…. The main lines 
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along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are 
political lines that continue throughout the war and into the subsequent peace.  
How could it be otherwise.‖20  
 
It seems logical that this notion might be applied to the contemporary ―post-conflict‖ 
phase and it follows that if soldiers are still there, still engaged, ―afterwards‖ then they 
will have to be part of that ―political intercourse‖ and that their challenge will have 
been shaped by what has gone before because ―...war cannot be divorced from 
political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that 
connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and 
devoid of sense‖.21  Sun Tzu put it another way: ―Strategy Without Tactics is the 
Slowest Route to Victory. Tactics Without Strategy is the Noise Before Defeat‖.  
 
Clausewitz also provides some useful observations on the dynamics of the politico-
military relationship.  ―Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational 
details.  Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the 
employment of patrols. But they are the more influential in the planning of war, of the 
campaign, and often even of the battle‖.22  Equally, from the opposite perspective… 
―[s]ubordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is 
policy that has created war.  Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the 
instrument, not vice versa.  No other possibility exists, then, to subordinating the 
military point of view to the political‖.23  Finally ―…the assertion that a major military 
development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is 
unacceptable and can be damaging.‖ 24 But he did see an important role for soldiers in 
the political discourse. 
 
The second element of Clausewitz‘s writing relevant to this study, which is 
intertwined with the first, is that he saw the general as akin to a statesman in war.  ―If 
war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means 
available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the 
only sound expedient is to make the commander in chief a member of the cabinet so 
that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities‖.25  Michael Howard 
and Peter Paret note that through changes to his original text in the second publication 
of his work, ―[p]robably the most significant change‖, 26  which reflect that the 
commander in chief should be a member of cabinet so that the cabinet can share in the 
major aspect of his activities, ―Clausewitz emphasises the cabinet‘s participation in 
military decisions, not the soldier‘s participation in political decisions‖.27  However he 
must not cease to be the General.  ―He takes into view all the relations of the State on 
the one hand; on the other he must know exactly what he can do with the means at his 
disposal.‖ 28   Anatol Rapoport‘s analysis of this section suggests that this is not 
inconsistent with Clausewitz‘s basic principle of the primacy of political authority 
over the military:  ―The General must know state policy, but he does not direct it.‖ 29 
This is of course fine unless state policy does not exist or is unclear; then the general 
is left with some difficulty.  
 
Again, it seems logical that Clausewitz‘s dictum should continue on to ―afterwards‖ 
and equally that this should be extrapolated in some form to the context of 
contemporary new wars.  There is obviously a clear link between going in to war (or 
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intervention), ―winning‖ war, then military activities afterwards.  This study focuses 
specifically the actions of generals ―afterwards‖.  If ―The object in war is to attain a 
better peace‖,30 and assuming that there was no ―peace‖ before, then military activity 
afterwards matters as much as during the war, in fact more so in order to create the 
conditions for peace.  Success in the first part, winning the ―war‖ is pointless unless a 
―better peace‖ subsequently exists; but this peace has to be nurtured.  It follows that 
early preparation for this phase of conflict termination
31
 (―Phase 4‖ – see glossary) 
should be systematic and systemic, but also flexible, and it cannot be ad hoc.  Given 
the ―new wars‖32  context discussed in Chapter 1, where reconstruction and state 
building (see glossary) are all important, then we need to look harder at the general as 
a political as well as military actor during stabilisation in the aftermath of intervention 
and irrespective of the reason for intervening.  Through this, the present work will 
provide future commanders with support and direction as well as education for others, 
particularly in the political and diplomatic domains.      
 
3. A Successful Politico-Military33 Relationship in Kosovo in 1999  
 
To set the scene for a discussion of contemporary literature we go to Kosovo.  In 
1999, the context for ―post conflict‖ activity was UNSCR 124434 which mandated 
NATO‘s Kosovo Force (KFOR) to support the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), yet 
NATO was slow to provide guidance to its field commander.
35
 Nevertheless Jock 
Covey, the Principal Deputy SRSG in UNMIK, observed that ―[i]t was fortunate that 
the Kosovo Force started with a core of British officers at headquarters level and with 
General Michael Jackson in command…British officer[s] understood without NATO 
guidance the need to ‗support those who support the peace process‘‖. 36   This 
statement begs a number of questions: how does Covey define the challenges faced by 
commanders in these circumstances; what had he observed (both in Bosnia and 
Kosovo); and why was he able to say did say what he did about the UK approach?  
 
The backdrop to Covey‘s requirement was that ―[a]s custodian of the mandate, our 
immediate task was to set up an interim administration…to set up the mission and get 
things running…  The Security Council had made very clear that the exercise of 
sovereignty rested with UNMIK, so we had to get in there and get the place 
running‖.37  To achieve this Covey also needed a unified politico-military relationship 
and co-ordinating mechanism between UNMIK‘s other major international player, 
NATO‘s Kosovo Force (KFOR). He had experienced the absence of this relationship 
in Bosnia, with near disastrous results.
38
 Covey argues that the ―prime directive‖, 
guiding and facilitating this civil military relationship and its actions, should be the 
―primacy of the peace process‖.  This principle was developed in Bosnia,39 where, at 
least initially, ―joint civil-military planning was negligible …the military command … 
was very fearful that they not in any way take instructions, or even to be seen as 
taking instructions, from civilian officials.‖40 In eventually overturning this situation a 
new concept emerged: ―that the international military would no longer be neutral 
about the peace process‖.41 This of course implied taking ―instructions‖ from political 
managers. 
 
Beyond commonsense based on an analysis of the situation, this begs the question 
what doctrine, training or experience might have prepared the British military 
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establishment and therefore General Jackson with his staff to see the professional 
imperative to support political primacy and the peace process, or in its absence the 
political process, without specific instructions to do so?  Is this yet fully captured in 
doctrine? The remainder of this chapter will show that, although the British military 
reflex is actively to reach out to the political level and facilitate the latter‘s progress, 
this is not yet covered in the literature in a way that fully explains the necessary 
support to political primacy encapsulated by the idea of the primacy of the peace 
process.
42
 
 
4. UK Military Doctrine for Stability, Counter Insurgency, and Peace 
Operations 
  
4.1. The Purpose of Doctrine  
 
Before examining the doctrine and other literature underpinning the UK armed forces‘ 
approach to politico-military demands during operations ―on the cusp‖43, it is relevant 
briefly to consider the nature and purpose of doctrine. Doctrine ―is what is taught‖ and 
has been described as one of the means of capturing the lessons of past and present in 
order to inform the future.
44
 Alexander Alderson suggests that doctrine authors 
―should take due account of historical and more recent experience, contemporary 
pressures and identifiable trends, so that…it should represent military knowledge‖.45  
Accessing and developing that knowledge is central to this thesis and thus doctrine 
and the literary discussion surrounding it will provide the central sources for this 
literature review.  For the UK the application of doctrine is not regarded as being 
slavish; British Defence Doctrine quotes the NATO definition: ―fundamental 
principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives.  It is 
authoritative, but requires judgement in application.‘46 It should be seen primarily as a 
guide to how, not what, to think about complex military problems and is perhaps best 
applied in the staff college classroom rather than in the field
47
.  Others suggest that 
doctrine has a more central role in terms of defining organisation, training and 
equipping needs.
48
   It also provides a means to ―learn and adapt‖ which has been 
noted as lacking in Iraq.
49
   It is to doctrine that we shall return at the end of the thesis 
when considering recommendations for how to think about, and prepare for, future 
multinational peace and stability operations. 
 
Has the challenge posed by operations in the era of new wars in the post cold war, 
post 9/11 and globalised era, which was outlined at Chapter 1, been met by doctrine in 
the UK and, bearing in mind differing interpretations of civil-military relations,
50
 how 
does this doctrine address civil-military interaction over the peace process at the 
operational level?  The relevant doctrinal debate, reviewed below, centres on a group 
of similar operations termed stability, counter insurgency, and peace respectively.  At 
their root these share a common purpose, in the words of General Sir Mike Jackson, to 
―make it better‖51 and, as Mats Berdal points out, the categorisation has ―less to do 
with the operational environment… than…the wider objective [of military action]‖ 
which tends to be broadly humanitarian.
52
 Another common thread, discussed after 
the doctrine below, is the necessity to establish a pan-government ―comprehensive 
approach‖.  
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4.2. Contemporary Stability Operations and Counter Insurgency Doctrine 
 
The most up to date and relevant UK doctrinal works, both published late in 2009 
address stability operations and counter insurgency. UK MOD‘s JWP 3-40 Security 
and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution
53
 offers a sophisticated analysis of the 
politico-military relationship; the doctrine includes ―influence‖ as ―the guiding idea 
for the conduct of operations‖ 54  and the principle of the ―primacy of political 
purpose‖.55 JWP 3-40 offers a useful model depicting the elements of a stable state to 
help explain the government-wide actions necessary where these have failed and 
stabilisation activity is necessary.  (See Figure 2.1 below).  However, with a focus on 
security activity, the doctrine does not fully explain what military specific actions are 
needed to help deliver the necessary political settlement (and societal relationships) 
that are central to achieving stability.  Hence the principle of primacy of political 
purpose is not fully supported by the doctrine.  
 
Figure 2.1 Elements of a Stable State.  Source UK MOD
56
 
 
 
 
For the British Army‘s Countering Insurgency,57 the focus is on ―securing the local 
population and gaining and maintaining popular support‖. 58  Primacy of political 
purpose is the first principle and it is stressed that: ―counterinsurgency is warfare; it is 
distinctly political, not primarily military; and it involves the people, the government, 
and the military. The strength of the relationship between these three groups generally 
determines the outcome of the campaign.‖ 59   Whilst fully acknowledging the 
importance of political primacy, neither of these new documents provides doctrinal 
guidance on how this principle should be applied to generate stability. 
 
Significant doctrinal developments have also occurred elsewhere, notably in the US 
with the publication in 2006 of the ground breaking US Army and US Marine Corps 
  31 
FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
60
  In 2008 the US Army 
also published FM 3-07 Stability Operations.
61
  These significant advances in 
doctrinal thought will be discussed along with other multinational approaches in 
Chapter 3.  
 
4.3. Earlier Experiences – Small Wars and Imperial Policing  
 
Before addressing counter insurgency, it is appropriate briefly to discuss the relevant 
literature covering the UK‘s earlier experience of ―small wars‖, colonial 
administration, and ―imperial policing‖.  Christopher Bellamy pointed out in 1998 that 
―Many of the [contemporary] military operations… have shown striking similarities 
to those a hundred years ago or more…operations which are not crucial to the 
originating nation state…‖.62  Bellamy highlighted the work of Callwell63 and his 
colleagues which ―opens the way to resolving our own problems‖.64  With Small 
Wars. Their Principles and Practice,
65
 first published in 1896, Callwell described the 
nature of ―Small Wars‖ where ―…campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellious and 
guerrilla forces in all parts of the world where organised armies are struggling against 
opponents who will not meet them in the open field‖.66  Bellamy also pointed out 
Callwell‘s grasp of the problems of asymmetry and their ―value in focussing on the 
contemporary struggle with non-state or sub-state actors, and maybe international 
terrorists‖.67  Clearly there are contemporary parallels in Callwell‘s suggestion that ―If 
the enemy cannot be touched in his patriotism or his honour he can be touched 
through his pocket‖.68  Nevertheless some of the objectives suggested are rather brutal 
by modern standards ―to punish an insult or to chastise a people‖69 and there is no 
specific guidance in Callwell‘s chapters on strategy about coordination to effect 
political outcomes; although he did suggest that ―[t]heir purpose is to achieve a lasting 
peace…[t]herefore… the overawing and not the exasperation of the enemy is the end 
to keep in view‖.70 
 
Later strands of the British experience had foundations in the experiences of 
colonial
71
 or imperial policing
72
.  In 1934 two documents focussed on the military 
aspects of ―imperial policing‖. Major General Charfles Gwynn‘s Imperial Policing73 
advised on measures for the restoration of civil authority. He saw policy making left 
to the civil government [we would now see this as political primacy]; the application 
of minimal force; the use of firm and timely action; co-operation with the police and 
civil administration.
74
  Yet Tom Mockaitis saw the weakness of Gwynn‘s approach as 
lacking an appreciation of the need to meet the legitimate grievances of subject 
peoples.
75
  A War Office pamphlet Notes on Imperial Policing, whilst a step forward, 
contained little reference to cooperation with the administration and police, and none 
to politics.
76
   
 
In 1949 a new pamphlet entitled Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil 
Power focussed on the restoration of law and order by military means.
77
  It 
―…advocated that civil military cooperation be facilitated through the holding of 
periodic meetings between police, soldiers and administrators at district level‖.78  It 
was clear on the distinct civil and military roles and the need to foster relationships: 
the military was in a supporting role, yet should be prepared to engage in civil 
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affairs.
79
  A requirement for senior commanders to concern themselves with political 
affairs was also hinted at but not developed.
80
 
 
4.4. Countering Insurgency. 
 
British Colonial experience counted for much, but the core learning, in terms of 
political primacy and a coordinated approach, really gained momentum in the 1950s 
with the onset of independence movements and revolutionary war.  The challenges of 
Marxist and Maoist inspired insurgencies as part of wider independence struggles 
after the Second World War
81
 provided a number of lessons, some of which remain 
relevant.  For the purposes of this work, ―insurgency‖ means: ‗An organised, violent 
subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established 
authority‘.82 Space precludes a detailed discussion of the nature of insurgency here, 
although Mao‘s insight ―to understand that the population was his vital ground‖83 was 
succinctly described by Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy in 2007.  The following is also 
illustrative of the scope and scale of the problem posed by insurgency: ―Insurgency 
embraces forms of violence, often loosely controlled, with national or international 
political aims‖,84 and ―[it] has implied a politico-military campaign with the object of 
overthrowing the government of a state.  In essence political, social, economic and 
psychological elements have been added to irregular military tactics with 
revolutionary intent‖.85  
 
The post war UK response to insurgency was characterised by pragmatism rather than 
dogma and has involved a flexible rather than purely reactive stance
86
.    The UK 
―principles‖ for action by the government as a whole, not merely the military,87 are 
generally attributed to Robert Thompson in his influential work Defeating Communist 
Insurgency. First, (the government must have) a clear political aim; Second, function 
in accordance with the law; Third, have an overall plan; Fourth, give priority to 
defeating the political subversion not the guerrillas; and Fifth, secure base areas 
first.
88
  Ian Beckett pointed out that here, Thompson ―readily demonstrated the 
interrelation of factors and the need for adaptation rather than attempting to slavishly 
apply some kind of template‖.89  Frank Kitson‘s considerable contribution90 in Low 
Intensity Operations
91
 and Bunch of Five
92
 focussed on coordination, the struggle for 
men‘s minds – necessitating political and economic measures – together with 
intelligence-led operations amongst the populace - ―a chain reaction of analysis 
alternating with action designed to get information‖93 and also inducing the enemy to 
change sides.  In sum, ―coordinating machinery at every level for the direction of the 
campaign, arrangements for ensuring that the insurgents do not win the war for the 
minds of the people, and intelligence organisation suited to the circumstances, and a 
legal system adequate to the needs of the moment.‖94 
 
Although, as Mockaitis suggested, there was an ad hoc approach to each campaign,
95
 
―broad principles [were] transmitted informally from one generation of civil servants 
and soldiers to the next‖. 96   Over time the British counter insurgency principles 
evolved into: political primacy and political aim; co-ordination of the government 
machinery [through the levels]; the importance of intelligence and information; the 
need to separate the insurgent from his support [both physically and with hearts and 
minds]; neutralising the insurgent [with the minimum use of force]; and finally longer 
  33 
term post-insurgency planning [to address grievances].
97
  It is immediately 
noteworthy that these (national) principles explicitly cover the civilian as well as 
military response; yet there is no record of comparable civilian doctrine. ―COIN 
operations are carried out to complement those political, economic, psychological and 
civic actions necessary to defeat an armed insurgency.‖98  The application of force 
was always measured; ―[u]nless the security forces use force in a highly selective 
manner, they will have little chance of winning the loyalty of a population threatened 
by subversion‖,99 and there remained a clear consciousness of always operating within 
the law under the civil authority.
100
  Subsequently in 1977, Counter-Revolutionary 
Operations doctrine
101
 situated itself in the restoration of law and order and, as 
Alexander Alderson points out, included a requirement for ―political awareness‖.102 
 
The key organisational mechanism that emerged at the political level, first in Malaya, 
but replicated elsewhere, was co-ordination across government, using a committee 
system,
103
 usually under a ―Director of Operations‖104 to co-ordinate both planning 
and conduct of activities in all spheres: political; economic; police and military. 
Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs was the first, writing in 1951, he explained that: 
 
―It was therefore decided by the High Commissioner of the Federation to ask 
for the appointment of a ‗Director of Operations‘.  In view of the necessity to 
maintain civil Government under the new Federation Agreement this 
appointment had to be in the nature of a compromise, and it was decided to 
appoint an officer of the rank of Lieutenant-General but in a civil capacity, 
ranking equal to the Chief Secretary, but with full powers of coordination of 
the Police, Naval, Military and Air Forces.‖105   
 
Briggs also developed the eponymous plan
106
 for a coordinated approach; this was 
comprehensive and pan-government in nature and was based on his own politico-
military appreciation of the situation (albeit as a soldier).
107
 This plan became the 
foundation for success in Malaya and the coordinated system of command and control 
became the model for similar campaigns after Malaya and until Northern Ireland.
108
  
These arrangements and the plan, with much else, were explained to the participants 
in locally produced doctrine.
109
 Shy and Collier described the British response in 
Malaya as being: 
 
 ―... like that of their colonial tradition at its best: tight integration of civil and 
military authority, minimum force with police instead of army used when 
possible, good intelligence of the kind produced by "Special Branch" 
operatives, administrative tidiness… and a general readiness to negotiate for 
something less than total victory.  On the military side the British colonial 
experience showed again its capacity to train effective local forces, a patient 
view of the time required for success, and a preference for the employment of 
small, highly skilled troops in well-planned operations rather than massive use 
of large numbers and heavy firepower. Exploiting ethnic divisions to mobilise 
Malays against Chinese rebels, the British still required more than a decade to 
put down the Malayan rebellion.  Whether their flexible, patient methods 
would have succeeded against a more powerful revolutionary movement must 
remain a question.‖110   
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Planning and coordination was certainly not without its difficulties.  In 1963 the 
doctrine explained that ―...the heads of the three [armed] services, the police, the 
principal officers of the administration and the heads of intelligence and psychological 
operations...As soon as the situation permits prominent local political leaders and 
others may be co-opted... so as to associate the local people with the conduct of the 
emergency‖.111  In 1967 Julian Paget explained the importance of including local 
officials in policy discussions and underlined the ―highest standards of civil military 
cooperation‖, which took time to establish, but was decisive in both defeating the 
insurgents and ―establishing a political solution‖ (in Malaya).112   None of this was 
easy as John McCuen (also Frank Kitson and Richard Cousens) pointed out. ―Unity of 
effort is however extremely difficult to achieve because it represents the fusion of 
civil and military functions to fight battles which have primarily political 
objectives...All the political, economic, psychological and military means must be 
marshalled as weapons under centralized co-ordination and direction.‖113   
 
For counter insurgency in the post colonial era, the military continued to operate with 
the clear understanding that it is not in overall charge and that there is no purely 
military solution to the problem. ―Three broad fundamentals of policy have been 
developed and adapted… Minimum force, civil/military co-operation and tactical 
flexibility, continue to provide an essential backdrop for the newer and more recent 
forms of peace support operations‖.114 This simple statement again plays down the 
essential requirement for a viable political lead to guide military action and for 
military commanders at all levels to be fully responsive to the nuance of supporting 
the political process. This national, and military, approach was also generally applied 
over three and a half decades of continuous operations in Northern Ireland; albeit the 
deployment was technically termed Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP),
115
 not 
Counter insurgency.
116
 
 
Counter insurgency (or ―COIN‖) doctrine provides food for thought on a national 
politico-military approach in other circumstances.  The earlier 2001 UK counter 
insurgency doctrine suggested that ―in other situations some of the principles and 
tactics of counter insurgency may be applicable. For instance, in a period of fragile 
peace after a war (when the civil administration in a defeated or liberated country has 
broken down), or in a peace support operation (when armed factions interrupt 
humanitarian relief or attack peacekeepers), troops may need to employ selectively 
the relevant COIN tactics and techniques‖.117  In 1999 Tom Mockaitis argued that: 
 
―... recent intrastate conflicts.... and traditional insurgency have certain key 
characteristics in common.  Both types often involve both regular military and 
paramilitary forces operating in difficult rural terrain or in the even more 
challenging environment of urban areas.  Combat does not occur across clearly 
marked boundaries....The belligerents will almost certainly employ terrorism 
to enforce compliance amongst their own people and to intimidate their 
opponents.  To combat these threats an intervention force may be required to 
do everything from conducting conventional military operations to performing 
police duties.  Internal war also disrupts the infrastructure of a state, requiring 
a comprehensive, unified effort by military forces and civilian agencies to stop 
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the fighting, provide relief to the victims of war, and rebuild the institutions of 
civil society.‖118 
 
In these circumstances, as Major General Ken Perkins suggested nearly two decades 
earlier, when reflecting on campaigns in Malaya, the Dhofar and Northern Ireland, ―it 
is not possible, even at the lowest level, to separate the military from the political.  
Thus it is essential for military commanders and politicians to be well informed about 
each other‘s business‖.119   
 
4.5. Peace Operations Doctrine 
 
Operations conducted in the wake of the Cold War, as described in Chapter 1, saw a 
dynamic requirement in the West for new doctrinal guidance.
120
 ―Second Generation‖ 
peacekeeping operations,
121
 were described in the resulting interim UK doctrine 
Wider Peacekeeping (1994).  This reflected the British military experience in Bosnia, 
a largely consent-based approach (under Chapter VI of the UN Charter), to dealing 
with intra state conflict and complex emergencies (see glossary).  This had suggested 
a hands off
122
 approach: ―coercion, even if practicable in the short term, will foster 
resentment and hostility and instability, engendering risk and instability which will 
ultimately prove counter productive.‖123 But in reality, as Chris Bellamy explained in 
Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace,  this approach was 
attempting to deal with a ―Chapter 6.5‖124 situation and had failed in UNPROFOR 
and therefore the debate continued.  Positive new ideas began to emerge, presumably 
partly under political pressure for doctrinal guidance leading to better results in the 
field. The debate was not without some acrimony.  Richard Connaughton had been 
strongly critical of the concepts in Wider Peacekeeping on the basis that ―the doctrine 
of consent and impartiality carries little weight where the problem is not so much bad 
government as the absence of government‖ and an ―absolutist philosophical approach 
[to the use of force – i.e. avoiding it]‖125.  John Mackinlay however saw it as ―an 
important step toward recognising [a changed] military role‖ beyond ―arriving, 
deploying and departing‖ because ―in reality the military elements are, de facto, part 
of an orchestrated process of stabilisation‖.126 
 
John Mackinlay‘s edited Guide to Peace Support Operations 127  in 1996 was an 
important step towards a contemporary (UK) politico-military doctrine for use in such 
―post conflict‖ circumstances. This introduced the international players to each other 
whilst explaining structures for co-operation between agencies, essentially the UN 
System.  In discussing co-ordination, the guide advocated a ―common operational 
approach‖, 128 but did not press the point.  It also accepted that the military element 
may need to use force vigorously.
129
  During the mid 1990s the contradictions and 
limitations inherent in avoiding the use of force lest it cause uncontrollable escalation 
with no way back, which General Sir Michael Rose had termed staying behind the 
"Mogadishu Line",
130
 were increasingly apparent to the military community.  Colonel 
(then) John McColl (latterly DSACEUR) saw the need for more flexibility in the use 
of force up and down the spectrum.
131
  He also saw that impartiality ―should relate to 
the pursuance of the mandate rather than the parties involved in the conflict‖; 132 this 
was a critically important insight.  In 1998, drawing on the internal military debate, 
the Guide to Peace Support Operations
133
 and other work, particularly by Chris 
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Bellamy
134
, the UK MOD delivered its accumulated experience of responding to 
complex emergencies, particularly in Bosnia,
135
 in new doctrine Peace Support 
Operations” UK Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50.136   
 
JWP 3-50 covered a spectrum of Peace Support Operations (see glossary) including 
peacekeeping.  Notably it assumed the deployment of war fighting-capable forces 
prepared to conduct ―Peace Enforcement‖137 (see glossary), under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter,
138
 when necessary, to secure mandated objectives.  These 
objectives were generally seen in terms of humanitarian goals or creating self-
sustaining peace.
139
  To deliver this, the doctrine suggested a carrot and stick approach 
and the principle of impartiality
140
 which provided a means of actually crossing the 
"Mogadishu Line"
141
 and then returning safely; previously this was seen as impossible 
for ―peacekeeping‖ forces (see  glossary). This meant the even-handed threat or use of 
force for coercive purposes, where necessary, and then, in order to maintain consent, 
at least at the operational if not tactical level, calibrating its application against the 
common baseline of the mandate.   
 
This ―Third Generation‖142 operations doctrine went beyond the ―Second Generation‖ 
Wider Peacekeeping, which contained scant reference to the need for co-ordination 
between military and civilian actors.  The Author of the doctrine, Phillip Wilkinson, 
explained the weaknesses of Wider Peacekeeping and the evolution of the new 
approach in a thesis for Cranfield University.
143
 The ―Third Generation‖ JWP 3-50 
anticipated a multi-dimensional approach to conflict and a ―composite response‖144 to 
missions, including civilian-led planning, which implied a requirement for robust high 
level political leadership and direction, without which ―operational activities alone are 
unlikely to achieve the desired end state‖.145 Here the military was seen, rightly, as 
creating the necessary security conditions so that the efforts of civilian counterparts 
can bear fruit.  ―De-escalation and resolution involves three overlapping activities: 
controlling the physical violence in a conflict; producing an atmosphere conducive to 
the promotion of co-operation; and identifying the underlying causes and symptoms 
of the problem so as to facilitate reconstruction and longer term settlement.‖146 Given 
the wider multi-functional context of these operations the politico-military interface 
was naturally seen as crucial
147
 and the military commander was expected to play a 
leading role in overall mission planning, albeit he was not in overall charge.
148
 
 
Third Generation operations relied on impartiality as the key determinant guiding the 
conduct of military operations advocated a robust, but suitably nuanced, approach to 
using force where necessary.
149
  JWP 3-50 suggests that ―political considerations must 
permeate all military considerations and actions‖.150  It provided a complex exposition 
of the likely operating environment, the problems likely to be faced and what had 
been learned about dealing with these.  The doctrine was soon applied in Kosovo in 
1999,
151
 and among other things it provided a sound basis for delivering Jock Covey‘s 
requirement for a [unified] sophisticated politico-military relationship, at least for the 
British (see Chapter 4).  Arguably it also enabled Covey to take impartiality, and the 
use of force, a step beyond simply enforcing a mandate or avoiding prejudicing the 
political outcome,
152
 and to link it directly to the primacy of the peace process: those 
against it could expect a rigorous response.
153
  It did not, however, go as far as 
suggesting how military commanders should actually relate to the political strand in 
  37 
the sense of being a de facto local political actor, or as Clausewitz suggested, a 
Statesman.  Finally, it did not provide much guidance on what to do in the absence of 
high level political direction.  When interviewed, Generals Jackson, Richards, Smith 
and McColl
154
 confirmed that this challenge remains topical.  Thus it seems that it 
only partially helped in terms of addressing the underlying political issues inherent in 
these campaigns and adapting military planning and operations accordingly.   
 
That said, the manoeuvrist approach, here intended to focus on the perceptions and 
attitudes of the belligerents,
155
 and a flexible approach to operations execution, 
enabled by mission command,
156
 implies perhaps that a commander might do this, but 
it is not explicitly stated (and it is not designed for operations ―amongst the people‖).  
Nor is this issue necessarily well understood elsewhere in the multinational civil-
military community which constitutes a defining reality of these operations
157
.  After a 
number of difficulties in terms of interpretation, particularly over the use of force, had 
been resolved, JWP 3-50 was eventually accepted, with some changes, by NATO in 
2001 as Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations.
158
  The 
process of gaining acceptance of the doctrine and the differences of view which this 
revealed
159
 will be briefly examined in Chapter 3.   
 
Richard Connaugton did not like this doctrinal shift either, calling John Mackinlay‘s 
guide ―fatally flawed‖. 160   Responding, Mackinlay pointed out the value of 
recognising the ―spaghetti tangle of political, military and humanitarian interests that 
prevail and asked for Connaughton‘s own prescription.161  On the whole commentary 
on the new approach was favourable. In particular Peter Viggo Jackobsen noted a 
more flexible response to ―grey area‖ operations doctrine (i.e. than Wider Peace 
Keeping).  He pointed out the significant influence of the more robust French 
―Restauration de la Paix‖162 approach on the eventual (Western) consensus captured 
in JWP 3-50.  The French applied ―active impartiality‖ to defend the mandate as 
opposed to maintaining consent at all costs.
163
  Viggo Jackobsen saw the doctrine as 
enduring and noted that in solving the problem of variable consent, it follows that 
more robustly equipped and prepared forces would need to be deployed.
164
  Michael 
Pugh also examined the consequences of the doctrine and notably wondered about its 
political acceptability to troop contributors and the risks of escalation in the use of 
force or ―vertical mission creep‖.165  Pugh sounded a note of caution and suggested 
that the stricter division of labour between civil and military implied by more 
muscular military peacekeeping meant consequent ―insularity from civilian and 
conflict resolution functions‖ as well as encouraging ―military fixes of deep-rooted 
political problems…exacerbated by pressure for quick exit strategies‖.166   
 
Much of the debate on Third Generation doctrine rightly surrounded the use of force 
although the complexity of the new operations and the players involved was clearly 
described; Mackinlay and Connaughton in particular pointed out the need for an 
adequate response amongst all actors.  Berdal noted that given its political impact 
enforcement action cannot be impartial,
167
  he warned that where ―escalation 
dominance can supposedly be maintained, advocates of the so called middle ground 
options [i.e. peace enforcement]…are allowing governments to avoid hard decisions 
about the implications deploying military personnel.
168
  Quoting Rupert Smith, he 
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remained concerned about the political requirements for the effective use of force, that 
is ―what [military force] can achieve as opposed to what it can do‖.169   
 
However whilst the implications of the doctrine discussed above may have been clear, 
none of the doctrine or debate surrounding it focussed on the specific need, having 
deployed military force, to employ, or calibrate, military activity directly to support a 
nascent political or peace process, however loosely defined.  Indeed a critical tension 
emerged; on the one hand, as Mackinlay pointed out, the military was part of an 
―orchestrated process of stabilisation‖.170  Yet Pugh had his finger on another possible 
problem: a sense of distance between civilian actors charged with resolving conflict 
and the military.  The politico-military actors‘ reaction to this dynamic to is central to 
this thesis.  
 
4.6. Contemporary UK Peace Support Operations Doctrine 
 
In 2004 the UK updated JWP 3-50.  The new work, Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 
2nd Edition (JWP 3-50) The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations",
171
  
explicitly acknowledged the supporting role of the military.  This arguably achieved a 
major step towards delivering, at least conceptually, a comprehensive approach.  The 
key tenets of the doctrine were the theory of ―campaign authority‖ and, again, 
emphasis on military involvement in overall planning through the principle of 
―comprehensive and complementary campaigning‖.172  The former was seen as an 
amalgam of perceived legitimacy conferred by the mandate, compliance or consent, 
and the degree to which the operation meets local and other expectations.
173
  For the 
latter, the commander ―may be required to develop‖ two complementary plans.  A 
―Comprehensive Peace Support Operations Plan‖, which was a master plan for the 
international community as a whole and a complementary ―Peace Support Force 
Campaign Plan‖.174 Hence military involvement in the whole is clearly required yet 
there is no specific guidance on how, or whether, the commander might relate to the 
political or peace process and how this complicated planning process might work in 
reality.  
 
4.7. A “Comprehensive Approach”? 
 
Common to the stability, counter insurgency and peace support doctrines discussed 
above is the requirement for coordination across the span of the comprehensive 
government activity necessary to stabilise and resolve conflict.  Military doctrine has 
long fully acknowledged the requirement for a comprehensive approach and has 
stressed that the military role is only a contribution to a greater whole.
175
  Clearly the 
approach needs to be comprehensive at a number of levels.  First, both within and 
between capitals of involved states. Second within and between multilateral 
institutions. Third, and where the effect is delivered, between actors deployed in 
theatre.  This thesis focuses on the actions of commanders in the latter category but 
the first two also impinge when attempting to stabilise failing or failed states.  
However, the immediate problem, as explained in JWP 3-50 (2
nd
 edition), is that 
―there remains a tendency for government mechanisms to be optimised for the 
demands of routine government…rather than the specific complex and protracted 
demands of [Peace Support Operations]‖. 176    
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The debate has been somewhat complicated because of the interrelation between a 
comprehensive approach and an effects based approach.  The doctrinal community 
has been cognisant for some time of this need, not least due to work on effects based 
planning.  Earlier emerging doctrine for effects based planning ―encourage[d] the 
adoption of a revised, broader thinking…‖ and ―the way of thinking and specific 
processes that, together, enable the integration and effectiveness of the military 
contribution within a comprehensive approach‖.177 In an attempt to draw the strands 
together, the UK Ministry of Defence led the charge in 2005 with Joint Discussion 
Note as an attempt to secure pan government consensus on adopting a Comprehensive 
Approach at the Strategic level in the UK
178
.  This, probably unsuccessful,
179
 tentative 
MOD attempt to lead other government departments ―from the back‖ reminded a pan-
government audience that the military instrument cannot be used in isolation and 
suggests that the Comprehensive Approach is a natural extension of the UK Military 
―Effects Based Approach‖,180 focussed on actions and their influence on behaviour 
rather than on targets and attrition.    Alluding to previous successful efforts in the 
field to adopt such a ―whole of government‖181 approach (particularly in Kosovo) the 
MOD urged that the same should be achieved down through the levels as a national 
strategy.
182
   
 
The whole effects based idea has, however, recently been rather debunked recently in  
JDP 3-40 ―[it] simply does not work [in a mechanistic form] for complex and variable 
human systems.‖183  Equally, given that such comprehensive solutions extend well 
beyond the purely military domain, an obvious difficulty will lie in gaining 
acceptance of, and then co-ordinating, such an approach.  It implies that someone is in 
charge of it all, but who and how?  ―The idea of a supreme single authority to oversee 
and direct, on behalf of HMG, an unfolding and chaotic situation for which a 
thousand or more moving parts are in constant and yet uncoordinated motion is 
fanciful. Laws, authorities and responsibilities, risk procedures and systems are the 
responsibilities of each separate actor in these campaigns.‖184  This reminds us of the 
core problem of delivering a comprehensive approach both in capitals and in theatre. 
 
No capital finds this easy, space precludes discussion of similar travails elsewhere, 
but Andrew Rathmell‘s explanation of the problem for the UK is perhaps typical: 
―COIN, especially in its modern, globalised manifestations, is a highly complex 
public policy challenge….the most challenging issues for the UK are around 
delivery…unfortunately, the literature…reminds us just how difficult the public sector 
finds it to deliver policy outcomes in complex environments that cut across 
domains‖. 185   He also points out that ―we will fail if the host government is 
ineffective, incompetent or thoroughly discredited.‖186  
 
There is also a problem of delivering the necessary civilian capacity to help bring a 
comprehensive approach together.  Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy suggested that 
―British success in Malaya also depended on a caucus of talented individuals with 
considerable experience of the country and its culture, language and environment.  
This type of hands-on field-experienced, political personality, the would-be campaign 
director, was the product of a colonial service that no longer exists.‖187 Mackinlay 
further explains in The Insurgent Archipelago that, more recently ―the diplomats who 
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belatedly attempted to fill this role… crucially lacked the derring-do, local credibility 
and natural authority of their colonial era predecessors‖.188  Efforts are now underway 
to select, prepare and train suitable individuals through a cross-department 
Stabilisation Unit in London which is ―responsible for deploying a variety of different 
people to hostile environments, including civil servants, police officers and civilian 
experts.‖189 Whether this will impact on senior civilian leaders remains a moot point. 
 
So, in circumstances where coordination to deliver unity of effort is likely to prove 
challenging, how should the commander respond?  The core argument in this thesis is 
that he should involve himself in the problem in order to support the progression of 
the political or peace process irrespective of gaps in the international tool kit.  The 
military will to do this exists.  Speaking at RUSI in 2007 Lieutenant General David 
Richards pointed out that General Templar in Malaya was able to achieve unity of 
command and ―pull all of the necessary levers‖.  Today: 
 
―…the theatre commander can achieve unity of effort at best and will need to 
involve himself with a range of political and diplomatic activities in order to 
achieve it.  This is not something we soldiers should shy away from. The ‗Soldier 
Statesman‘ is in our Genes…in certain phases of a conflict, a soldier may be best 
suited to playing the lead role, only he has the organisational strength to pull the 
issues and the key players together.  If a commander does not take the risks 
involved in trying to achieve this, then he can hardly blame others when the 
conditions needed to exploit narrower success are not in place.‖190 
 
4.8. Contemporary literature - Reflections by senior commanders and others 
 
General Sir Rupert Smith‘s The Utility of Force191 is pre-eminent amongst the recent 
accounts by former commanders.  He covers a broad sweep of the development of war 
in the industrial age – industrial war, and its antithesis ―war amongst the people‖ 
where ―political and military developments go hand in hand‖.192  And in so doing he 
establishes the context for a modern utility of force, which needs to be understood at 
the political level.
193
  The political objective and the military strategic objective are 
not one and the same; one is nested within the other.  You give utility to the force 
used by recognising that the [military] strategic rests within the political.
194
  And ―one 
must avoid the trap of confusing activity with outcome‖.195 Unfortunately, as in the 
case of NATO‘s bombing campaign on Serbia in 1999, this does not happen.196 
 
Equally in terms of planning and conduct ―…the paradigm of war amongst the people 
reflects a very different world from the one of industrial war: it is one in which the 
political and the military are both parts of the same continuum, often working together 
– with a main difference being that military representatives may be part of the 
political and diplomatic negotiations.‖197  Here Smith begins to develop, but does not 
pursue, Clausewitz‘s idea of the solider as statesman.  At interview Smith underlined 
the importance of a level where politics as a whole is fused, including the locals.  This 
is the theatre (not the operational) level. Commanding at this level is best through 
―partnerships‖ - using the law firm analogy.  A shared vision of the outcome and 
achieving it is needed. So, in a law firm the role of the managing partner is in 
sequencing and supporting activities rather than giving orders.  Individual players 
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need only be coordinated to do their task as part of a partnership (for example a 
plumber‘s role in building a house).  Activity is also more economical this way. 
However the significant difficulty is making it work in a campaign because 
contributions are not from a single source politically. Also, because of national 
constraints you cannot disaggregate authority and responsibility. Therefore little 
national fiefdoms result.
198
 
 
Given the modern preoccupation with leaving as soon as possible after intervention 
Smith notes that we intervene ―to establish a condition in which the political objective 
can be achieved by other means and in other ways.‖199  (This suggests the notion of 
interim end-states which will be illustrated in Chapter 4 on Kosovo).  And part of this 
condition is ―to influence the will of the people‖.200   Smith explained the critical 
requirement for time:  the more the opponent adopts guerrilla methods, the longer it 
takes to reach the condition in which a strategic decision and be made and a solution 
found.  And while it is being found the condition has to be maintained, and since in 
part at least it has been arrived at by force it must be maintained for he want of a 
strategic decision.  Hence modern operations are timeless.
201
 Mike Jackson has also 
commented that we do ―operations‖ rather than conventional war.202 
 
Particularly relevant to this study are Smith‘s views on the Commander‘s difficulties 
when operating in a political vacuum
203
 and generalship in these circumstances.
204
    
Smith forcefully makes the point that force will have no utility unless it is used to 
obtain strategic objectives and these need to be carefully calibrated by asking a series 
of questions - about the context and what we want to achieve at the political and 
theatre levels - and then planning the means of achieving this with all of the agencies 
(not just military) involved.
205
  This takes us again straight into the challenge of 
effecting a ―comprehensive approach‖.  Where ―…the strategic object cannot now be 
achieved through the singular use of massive military force alone: in most cases 
military force can only achieve tactical results and to have more than passing value 
these must be stitched into a greater plan‖… ―Hence the analysis of the outcome 
required must be in sufficient detail to see what to attack, and to link these 
applications of military force to the applications of other levers of power.‖206 ―The 
true institutional difficulty is in bringing the agencies together to answer all the 
questions.‖  But it must be done otherwise the use of force reinforces the opponent‘s 
position rather than leading to our outcome.
207
 
 
Elsewhere, in 2004 after operations in 2000 to stabilise the situation in Sierra Leone, 
the Force Commander, Major General David Richards, described the ―flowering 
benefits of coherent and multi-dimensional action based on a widely understood and 
firmly directed plan‖.208  He illustrated the military capability to analyse complex 
conflict and produce ―a coherent plan‖209 and then to ensure coherence over time 
across the interdependent lines of operation (political, humanitarian, economic, 
financial, reconstruction, industrial, security…).  Drawing parallels with Templar in 
Malaya, Gwyn Prins suggested that this was achieved by ―daily meetings of all the 
elements of British presence….at the British High Commission.‖ 210 
 
Smith is clear that the campaign as a whole needs to be connected over time and 
space.  ―By thinking of it as one confrontation in which conflict has a role the actions 
  42 
that are taken in the early stages are conducted so as to contribute directly to, or at the 
least to avoid the confounding of, the achievement of later ones.  Answering the 
[planning] questions…helps to clarify the matter as a whole, as also the connections 
between various actors.‖ 211  So, all agencies need to be involved. Implicit, yet un-
stated in Smith‘s thesis, is the idea that the military commander must cooperate fully 
with the wider political process, and help to enable it.  He confirmed at interview that 
the military component does not own the military means or the ways because the 
ways must fit into the political purpose of the endeavour.
212
 
 
In closing, Smith avows that ―[t]he commanders at these sub-strategic levels need to 
have their actions firmly nested in a context that includes the political, economic and 
social factors local to the achievement and exploitation of their objective.  Without 
this wider context commanders at all levels will not be able to achieve their 
objectives, nor therefore enable the final attainment of the desired political outcome – 
the overarching purpose of the activity.  In other words force will not have utility‖.213    
 
Smith‘s contribution is of seminal relevance to this thesis.   Having set the context for 
the engagement of (Western) forces in contemporary conflict, amongst the people, he 
distinguishes  ―something must be done‖ from strategic analysis and planning leading 
to a relevant and  integrated effort to secure political objectives and give utility to the 
use of force, as but one element of the mix of tools applied.  He is clear on the 
difficulties of achieving this and although he does not specifically suggest how a 
general should relate to and support the (peace) process in theatre.  Robert Cooper 
suggests that for Smith, 
 
―Using force effectively is not just a matter of having the right forces. You 
must also have the right direction and must tune the military campaign to the 
political goals. Defence, foreign and aid policy need to be brought together. 
Clausewitz recommended that the head of the armed forces should sit in the 
cabinet, not so that the politicians should receive military advice, but so that 
the army should understand exactly what political goals it was fighting for and 
could conduct the campaign accordingly. We need to find the modern 
equivalent.‖214   
 
This is the point that this thesis is intended to develop. 
 
Michael Rose, in Fighting for Peace
215
 outlines in stark terms the problem, for the 
military, of operating (in Bosnia) without adequate political will or unequivocal 
direction on the use of force to ―obtain a political settlement‖, 216  or an agreed 
campaign plan based on a common strategy which would coordinate ―political activity 
with humanitarian and security elements of the mission‖. 217 He also highlighted the 
difficulty, in a peacekeeping mission, of crossing ―the Mogadishu line‖218 by using 
too much force and so going beyond the mandate and losing consent without a way 
back.   In Soldier Mike Jackson highlights the change in strategic circumstances with 
the ―self-proclaimed declaration of war by Al-Qaida against the West and its 
values.‖219  Now its not about possession of terrain but values: a new sort of struggle. 
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The most up to date and, in all probability, influential analysis on the problem of 
contemporary insurgency is John Mackinlay‘s 2009 seminal treatise The Insurgent 
Archipelago
220
 which updates the conception of insurgency.  He highlights the 
importance of the propaganda of the deed.  He suggests that globalised insurgency has 
moved far from its Maoist roots and that it now can be recognised through an 
evolving list of characteristics.  
 
―First, it is essentially a political process... Second, the techniques of an 
insurgency evolve with the societies from which it emerges….  Third, organising 
an insurgency is an act of desperation…Fourth and most importantly an 
insurgency has to involve the population; its energy, its ability to sustain itself 
and to continuously replace and regenerate its losses , arises from popular 
support.‖221   
 
This neatly captures the likely challenge and the operating backdrop for contemporary 
deployed commanders because, as Mackinlay explains:  
 
―the insurgent‘s art is to take advantage of an environment to exploit a society‘s 
aspirations and the way it exists…to win back the population, the state needs to 
have a political manifesto. Just as important, at the operational level, it needs to 
have a counter-insurgent instrument that can engage the contemporary 
characteristics of the adversary.‖222  
 
Albeit much of the thrust of Mackinlay‘s discussion is about the perils of intervention 
and the impact on Muslim populations at home.  Hence his conclusions focus more on 
domestic measures and not on the actions of the soldiers, whom despite his eloquent 
arguments, we will probably continue to deploy. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
5.1. The literature.   
 
The key point identified in Clausewitz‘s writings above, to migrate analysis of the 
essentially political nature of war through to ―Phase 4‖, and for the solder 
appropriately to involve himself in the necessary political discourse has not been fully 
developed in the literature reviewed above.  There is much cogent material, 
particularly in contemporary UK doctrine, and also notably by Rupert Smith on the 
political imperatives which act as drivers for military operations and the consequent 
planning and coordination challenges facing commanders and others. There is much 
on the meshing of military planning with political objectives.  Nevertheless, the body 
of work reviewed, with the exception of Covey‘s brief statement of a requirement, 
does not cover the specific facilitation and nurturing of the political or peace process 
and so of political outcomes 
 
UK MOD‘s JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution 223 
includes ―influence as the central idea224 and the notion of the ―primacy of political 
purpose‖. The object is to use military means in pursuit of a political settlement: 
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hence, borrowing from Smith, ―to have utility, military activity and particularly the 
use of force, should shape and drive this political settlement as a part of the solution to 
security and stabilisation problems‖. 225   But this does not include the specific 
requirement to support the political process or provide doctrinal guidance to the 
commander on how he might do so. 
 
Earlier writing on imperial policing and counter insurgency established a tradition of 
civil-military cooperation. This relationship is perhaps typified by the selection of 
General Templer as High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya in 1952.
226
  The 
Director of Operations may have embodied the peace process, yet there is no direct 
evidence emerging from this post war period of policy or doctrinal guidance 
providing for military support to a political process in people-centric campaigns 
where the key to success was to focus on people not guerrillas.
227
 What did emerge 
was a readiness to cooperate, a willingness to subordinate military activity to political 
needs or the needs of the administration, and a willingness on both sides to 
compromise over the niceties. This state of affairs can be partly ascribed to the 
closeness of colonial administrators and military during an extended period of 
―imperial policing‖ and of course a more direct civil-military involvement countering 
a series of post war insurgencies.  
 
 
5.2. A Doctrinal Gap To Be Filled.   
 
Notwithstanding a number of relevant contributions, notably by Rupert Smith
228
 the 
new UK stability operations doctrine
229
 and the new UK counter insurgency 
doctrine
230
; there remains an important gap in the literature over military support to 
the political dimension of these operations. There is an imbalance in doctrine between 
the emphasis placed on the principle of political primacy and the guidance provided to 
commanders in terms of how to support it.  The available literature does not cover the 
requirement for military commanders at the operational or theatre level to actively 
facilitate political outcomes through campaign actions and the ―docking mechanisms‖ 
with civilian authorities, in terms of the ―comprehensive approach‖, which are needed 
to achieve this.  Acting in concert with the local ―political manager‖ and so supporting 
the needs of the wider peace process should be seen as a professional necessity.  The 
relevance of this thesis to the current doctrinal debate is clear: the object is to bring to 
life the ―primacy of political purpose‖ at theatre level.   
 
Material presented in the following case studies will provide the means to help fill this 
gap and will help to provide tomorrow‘s solutions.   This means describing the key to 
pulling it all together: the military contribution to enabling the political element and 
political peace process to go forward successfully.  This may on occasion need to go 
as far as actually leading or influencing the political element when there is a void in 
terms of presence on the ground or the ability, even willingness to act politically.   
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5.3. An Emerging Model To Test Against The Multinational Challenge 
 
Drawing on the above, the author intends to test the following model against the case 
studies. 
 
5.3.1. Primacy of the political or peace process is the dominant theme for 
coordination of politico-military activity.  Civilian political managers and 
Military commanders must embrace this as a focussed, politico-military, 
form of comprehensive approach and adjust their operations to suit. This 
will impact both at a conceptual level and in terms of practicalities. 
 
5.3.2. Military commanders at all levels must accept to some degree a role as 
a political actor. This is a professional imperative. 
 
5.3.3. A politico-military framework is needed to enable coordination to 
secure political ends.  If this is missing then military commanders need to 
act to fill the void, at least in terms of coordination.  However care is 
needed here in managing an ambiguous relationship
231
 and the military 
commander must judge when to push and when to step back. 
 
Falling from the above a tentative recommendation for further study is to examine the 
political void: how can potential leaders in post conflict situations be best prepared for 
the politico-military aspects of their role?  
 
Having described the context for contemporary conflict, Chapter 1 suggested the need 
for military commanders at the theatre level to adapt the planning and conduct of 
operations to specifically support political outcomes. Chapter 2 has examined the 
British doctrinal guidance available for this and has suggested that, whilst political 
issues are given prominence, there is no specific guidance for the military component 
on how to support political primacy and political outcomes.  Chapter 3 will now 
examine the issues surrounding multinational approaches to the crucial politico-
military relationship particularly in the US and UN communities. 
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Chapter 3 – Contemporary US, UN and NATO Doctrine for Peace and 
Stability Operations 
 
1. Introduction.   
 
The aim of this chapter is briefly to examine the US, UN and NATO doctrines relevant to 
the contemporary debate on politico-military cooperation in support of the political 
process at the theatre level.  All three of these entities have an important role and 
influence on the conduct of peace and stability operations globally and are directly 
relevant to the three subsequent case studies.  This is important because, as discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2, it is widely accepted that a comprehensive approach is necessary in the 
face of resolving complex conflicts.  The mix of nations and other agencies taking part 
in, or influencing,
1
 peace and stability operations seems likely to become ever more 
complex thus delivering a comprehensive approach will remain challenging.  As Lord 
Paddy Ashdown explained at interview, Western public opinion is shifting away from 
intervention and the move to a multi-polar world would mean the increased involvement 
of other powerful countries which have an interest particularly, China and India.  Hence 
the UN may become more involved in implementation for any future contingencies; here 
Ashdown takes a ―baleful view‖2 of the UN which is ―really necessary, important for 
specialist agencies, but not good at managing executive action‖. 3   Therefore it is 
suggested that contemporary doctrines need to be drawn together to ensure that the best 
available doctrinal practice supports state building and peace building activities and to 
deliver a truly comprehensive approach. 
 
The emphasis in this chapter, as with Chapter 2, will be on the policies captured in the 
doctrinal debate and the literature immediately surrounding this.  It is neither possible nor 
feasible to conduct a detailed review of the significant body of literature covering, for 
example, civil-military relations and state building in the case of the US, or peace 
keeping and peace building in the case of the UN. Space also precludes detailed analysis 
of field practice although reference will be made to this to illustrate key aspects of policy 
development, and the subsequent case studies in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will take up the 
significant themes.   These issues will then be developed chapter 7.   
 
This chapter will show that, as with the case of the UK, the US, UN and NATO have 
doctrinal guidance
4
 which suggests military support to political primacy and the political 
process.  This should take the military component beyond merely providing a safe and 
secure environment and sees the military commander becoming a political actor.
5
  What 
is missing, however, is practical guidance on what this means in terms of substantive 
actions or practical military support to the political process at theatre level.  Also absent 
is guidance on the civilian side on how to understand the military component as a 
political actor rather than solely an instrument of state power.  Enhancing doctrine to 
include this would help to address the absence of unity of command and the difficulties 
of achieving unity of effort.
6
  It is here that the commander may need to act in a 
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statesmanlike manner to help keep the political process on track and maintain campaign 
progress towards a military end state, which in turn helps enable a strategic outcome. 
 
2. The United States.    
 
Given its importance derived from political and economic throw-weight, underpinned by 
conventional military power, the United States currently remains a paramount influence 
in the Western World in terms of intervention, stabilisation and peace operations.
7
  As 
such it is possibly the most likely future leader of coalition post intervention operations 
in the short to medium term.  The approach adopted by US military commanders, and 
their civilian counterparts, now and in the future, remains a critical issue in the context 
addressed by this thesis.  Understanding the current US doctrinal approach and the 
pressures underlying this will provide a valuable insight into behaviours which will be 
examined in the later case studies.  It is also be important to recognize that the US 
military faces countervailing pressures and arguments to avoid entanglement and focus 
on war fighting rather than state building.
8
  Nonetheless the US military have moved on, 
rapidly, to understand this operational necessity.
9
  It is also germane here to underline the 
importance of doctrine to the US Army and Marine Corps as the conceptual catalyst
10
 in 
the ―force development‖11 process.12  Hence if US military doctrine is inappropriate it is 
likely that inappropriate military capabilities could be fielded for the task at hand. 
 
2.1. The US Army and Marine Corps Counter Insurgency Field Manual  (FM 3-
24 / MCWP 3-33.5):  “A moon without a planet”. 
 
2.1.1. The problem: "mosaic war" 
 
John Nagl explained that the US Army had been ―unprepared‖ to fight an insurgency in 
Iraq in 2003,
13
 it ―was organised, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat another 
conventional army ...".
14
  It had been unwilling ―to internalize and build on the lessons 
from [its last significant experience of insurgency in] Vietnam‖ in part because ―we 
purged ourselves of everything that had to do with irregular warfare or insurgency; 
because it had to do with how we lost that war‖.15 New doctrine for "war amongst the 
people"
16
 was needed.
17
  Alexander Alderson
18
 has provided a revealing, detailed and 
nuanced summation of the rapid development during 2005-6 and the initial employment 
in 2007 of Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, principally under the hand of the 
experienced
19
 US Army General David Petraeus and US Marine Corps General James 
Mattis. In the foreword to the publication Petraeus and Amos (Mattis‘s successor) 
underlined its purpose: to ―fill the doctrinal gap".20   
 
The new doctrine was firmly population-centric and not insurgent-focussed.
21
  It was 
influenced by earlier British and French writings, especially Robert Thompson
22
 and 
David Galula; the latter notably stressed the need for civil-military unity of effort in 
counter insurgency (COIN).
23
  Petraeus was nevertheless clear that this was for a new 
kind of war beyond Maoist insurgency,
24
 where the ‗insurgents may use guerrilla tactics 
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in one province while executing terrorist attacks and an urban approach in another... The 
result is more than just a "three-block war": it is a shifting "mosaic war" that is difficult 
for counterinsurgents to envision as a coherent whole.‘25 It was also made clear that "any 
successful COIN operation must address the legitimate grievances insurgents used to 
generate popular support."
26
 
 
2.1.2. Core Ideas and Principles 
 
The core ideas are that this is about political power, population security being key 
because it enables other essential grievance-resolving activities; hence the civilian is the 
centre of gravity to be insulated from insurgent pressure.
27
  Each side (that is insurgents 
and counter insurgents) ―aims to get the people to accept its government's authority as 
legitimate"
28
 thus success is about gaining consent ―to the [host nation] government's 
rule".
29
 Bringing together the necessary supporting economic, governance and essential 
service elements to achieve this, over a long period, unsurprisingly, require that ―all 
elements of the United States Government ... must be integrated".
30
 The following table, 
originally developed by Alex Alderson, summarises the principles, contemporary 
imperatives and paradoxes which are the main argument in FM 3-24.  Selective 
discussion of these follows. 
 
Table 3.1. FM 3-24 Principles Contemporary Imperatives and Paradoxes. Source 
Alderson and FM 3-24 pp 1-20 – 1-28. 31 
 
Historical Principles 
For Counterinsurgency 
Contemporary Imperatives Paradoxes 
 
Legitimacy Is the Main 
Objective  
 
 
Unity of Effort Is Essential  
 
 
Political Factors Are 
Primary 
 
 
Counterinsurgents Must 
Understand the 
Environment  
 
 
Intelligence Drives 
Operations 
 
 
Manage Information and 
Expectations 
 
 
Use Measured Force 
 
 
Learn and Adapt 
 
 
Empower the Lowest Level 
 
 
Support the Host Nation 
 
Sometimes, the More You 
Protect Your Force, the Less 
Secure You May Be 
 
Sometimes, the More Force Is 
Used, the Less Effective It Is 
 
The More Successful the 
Counterinsurgency Is, the 
Less Force Can Be Used and 
the More Risk 
Must Be Accepted 
 
Sometimes Doing Nothing Is 
the Best Reaction 
 
Some of the Best Weapons 
for Counterinsurgents Do Not 
Shoot 
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Insurgents Must be Isolated 
from Their Cause and 
Support 
 
 
Security Under the Rule of 
Law is Essential  
 
 
Counterinsurgents Should 
Prepare for a Long-Term 
Commitment  
 
The Host Nation Doing 
Something Tolerably Is 
Normally Better than Us 
Doing It Well 
 
If a Tactic Works this Week, 
It Might Not Work Next 
Week; If It Works in this 
Province, It 
Might Not Work in the Next 
 
Tactical Success Guarantees 
Nothing 
 
Many Important Decisions 
Are Not Made by Generals 
 
 
An early draft of FM 3-24’s ―principles imperatives and paradoxes was published in 
advance of the new doctrine in order to get the doctrine available for use in the field.
32
 
Interestingly, the article suggested that political primacy should be a principle in its own 
right. 
 
"While all the elements of national power have a role in successful 
counterinsurgency, political objectives must retain primacy. All actions, kinetic or 
non-kinetic, must be planned and executed with consideration of their 
contribution towards strengthening the host governments legitimacy and 
achieving the US government political goals. The political and military aspects of 
an insurgency are usually so bound together as to be inseparable, and most 
insurgents recognise this fact. In counterinsurgencies military actions conducted 
without proper analysis of their political effects will at best be ineffective and at 
worst aid the enemy.‖33 
 
This language closely reflects the key argument in this thesis; nevertheless it is 
interesting that the final version of the manual saw softer text. Political primacy became 
―Political Factors Are Primary‖34 and the language is nuanced, perhaps to reduce the 
express reliance on political direction at theatre level; nevertheless it stresses the 
requirement for political and diplomatic leaders to actively participate throughout the 
conduct of COIN operations "the political and military aspects of the insurgencies are so 
bound together as to be inseparable".
35
  But the doctrine does not provide a clear 
statement of who is in charge
36
 and FM 3-24 uses what seems compromise language to 
deal with the matter of unity of effort.  "Ideally, a single counter insurgent leader has 
authority over all government agencies involved in COIN operations. Usually, however, 
military commanders work to achieve unity of effort through liaison with leaders of a 
wide variety of non-military agencies. The US Ambassador [and] ... senior [host nation] 
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representatives ... must be key players in higher level planning; similar connections are 
needed throughout the chain of command.‖37 Whilst this formulation probably reflects 
reality, it seems inadequate doctrinal guidance on the difficulty of achieving unity of 
effort in order to pursue the political solution. This is a core point which will be 
developed in Chapters 5 and 6.   
 
The ―paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations‖ (see Table 3.1 above), apparently 
innocuous, even obvious, homilies,
38
 for example, "sometimes, the more you protect 
your force, the less secure you may be," bring to life the complexity and contradictory 
nature of counterinsurgency. Yet they mask fundamental policy issues for the US, 
notably over the use of force, risk taking, and its political consequences.  This is 
illustrated by the nuanced imperative to "use the appropriate level of force"
39
 which is 
distinct from earlier war fighting approaches where the use of force was less discriminate 
– because, then, the objective was not the people themselves.40 As Sarah Sewell pointed 
out, "this is a radical message because it countermanded decades of conventional US 
military practice".
41
 Now, ―because the civilian is fundamental to the COIN mission, 
force protection must...give way."
42
  And where defensive activity is needed for the 
restoration of public security, this "is a stark departure from the Weinberger-Powell 
doctrine of overwhelming and decisive offensive force."
43
 The relevance to this thesis 
here is the additional (domestic) political issue for commanders to consider. 
 
In terms of objectives, ―effective analysis of an insurgency requires identifying its 
strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgents‘ 
desired end state. Operational objectives are those that insurgents pursue to destroy 
government legitimacy and progressively establish their desired end state. Tactical 
objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts."
44
  This of course begs the question 
what is the counter insurgent‘s objective at those same three levels and what is their 
narrative? The doctrine suggests that legitimacy is the counterinsurgents‘ main 
objective.
45
  Therefore a COIN campaign is not a military one and it needs political 
leadership. However, is this political leadership and decision-making to be done by a 
politician or a general? In reality: who calls the shots? Part of the answer is the people, 
because counterinsurgents "must continually diagnose what they understand legitimacy 
to mean to the host nation population. The population's expectations will influence all 
ensuing operations".
46
 Clearly intervening forces need a grasp of political issues at all 
levels. 
 
2.1.3. Civil-Military Relationships  
 
Given that ―[n]on-military capacity is the exit strategy‖,47 civil military relationships and 
hence unity of effort are essential. FM 3-24 notes the importance of military efforts but 
these need integrating with other instruments of national power.
48
  But, again, who is in 
charge? Sarah Sewall sees the role of politics here and ―military dependence not simply 
upon civilian political direction at all levels of operation, but also upon civilian capacities 
in the field. It asks the US civilian leadership and bureaucracy to take on more of the 
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responsibility and burden." She adds that "the primacy of the political requires significant 
and ongoing civilian involvement at virtually every level of operations. Political 
leadership may…deliver a negotiated solution…‖.49 This seems clear but it leaves open 
the problem, for the military, of how to respond if the civilian capacity is not present. 
Equally, what if the military find themselves in the best position to negotiate political 
issues?  Discussing the realistic division of labour, FM 3-24 suggests David Galula's 
observation that "to confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital 
tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be 
senseless [although ideally] it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians."
50
  
 
FM 3-24 is unambiguous about the interdependence of all actors' contributions to the 
counterinsurgency effort. It follows that the coordination of these will be where the 
operational art lies. But it is not clear who is the artist. The manual offers that "[Logical 
Lines of Operation] (LLOs) in COIN focus primarily on the populace. Each line depends 
on the others. The interdependence of the lines is total: if one fails the mission fails. 
Many LLOs require applying capabilities usually resident in civilian organisations; 
...effective COIN leaders understand the interdependent relationship of all participants, 
military and civilian COIN leaders orchestrate their efforts to achieve unity of effort and 
coherent results."
51
 A few lines later ambiguity in the drafting suggests a requirement for 
a single leader in order to achieve unity of command.
52
 So how many leaders are there? 
There is however a useful sense of manoevrist flexibility.  ―Given the primacy of 
political considerations, military forces often support civilian efforts. However, the 
mosaic nature…means that the lead responsibility shifts amongst military, civilian, and 
[host nation] authorities. Regardless, military leaders should prepare to assume local 
leadership for COIN efforts…focusing on what needs to be done, not on who does it."53  
 
This pragmatic advice reflects reality: a shared vision of purpose,
54
 and not unity of 
command, is probably the best that can be achieved given the multiple actors involved, 
and that the situation will change according to the "mosaic" and the stage of the 
campaign.  Achieving his would be easier in a single nation intervention than in a 
multinational, multi-actor effort. This thesis suggests that further developing this 
guidance to stress the support to the political process would provide a helpful means of 
keeping in mind the peace building as well as security aspects of such a vision of 
purpose.  A requirement for politically savvy military leaders follows, particularly when 
dealing with the host nation. Commanders ―are required to lead through coordination, 
and communication, and consensus ... [they] often act as diplomats as well as warriors 
...".
55
  The solider-diplomat is a theme which will continue to emerge. 
 
2.1.4. Operational Design, Planning and Execution of Operations 
 
FM 3-24 strikes a balance between ―targeting of irreconcilable insurgents and 
[persuading] less committed enemies [to give up using other] elements of power,‖ 56 and 
―support[ing] a [host nation] government in gaining legitimacy and the support of the 
populace‖.57 The complexity of these problems is such that "... the hardest part of the 
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problem is figuring out what the problem is". Thus, the importance of commanders 
leading the design of such a campaign, before staffs conduct detailed planning ―to 
translate design into execution",
58
  is emphasised. Here FM 3-24 offers the helpful 
concept of "Iterative counterinsurgency campaign design".
59
 (See Appendix 2 for 
details). This cycle of activity, designed to analyse and then unify is very helpful.  But, as 
we will see with UN and NATO doctrines, it leaves the open the linkage with a wider 
political context and political process, for which there is no design. In this sense it 
remains rather tactical
60
 begging a number of questions already posed by the author:  
who owns this design and planning process; how does it relate to the over arching 
political process and how does the commander help it along? The obvious difficulty here, 
and at the tactical level, is integrating and sequencing all of the civilian actors, the 
military and the host nation across the LLOs to deliver this outcome, particularly if all of 
the players do not show up.
61
 (For further details see Appendix 2). 
 
The US Army sees counterinsurgency operations as "full spectrum operations" which 
include offensive, defensive, and stability operations. This seems to indicate that stability 
operations are nested within counterinsurgency operations, although this is rather unclear 
in the doctrine.
62
  Although, over time if COIN succeeds, perhaps it becomes a matter of 
maintaining stability so that gains are not lost?
63
 As with the British doctrine
64
 there 
remains some confusion and discussion over the relationship between counterinsurgency 
and stabilisation doctrines.  The US version appears to see counterinsurgency as part of 
irregular warfare and stability operations as a subset of counterinsurgency.  The next 
section will examine US stability operations doctrine.  
 
2.2. FM 3-07 The US Army Stability Operations Field Manual 
  
2.2.1. Problem statement 
 
In 2005, the US Department of Defence directed that ―Stability Operations are a core 
U.S. military mission‖. 65   The ensuing doctrine, FM 3-07 Stability Operations was 
published by the US Army in 2008. Following soon after FM 3-24 it covers a wide 
canvas of potential operations. Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley set out the strategic 
context, remind of lessons learned at great cost, and suggest that "humility in accepting 
that US combat power alone cannot, in the end, produce lasting political change and 
enduring stability is the basic proposition at the core of FM 3-07…Such a proposition is 
as simple as it is revolutionary".
66
 The ―thick conceptual fog produced by strategic 
shocks ..."
67
 remains a problem for policy makers and the emerging operational 
environment suggests the US military "will face three core challenges: rising tensions in 
the global commons, hybrid forms of warfare, and threats posed by weak and failing 
states‖.68 
 
As with FM 3-24, FM 3-07 was seen as a radical departure for the US military.
69
  It fills 
a gap evident at the tactical level during early operations in Iraq and "the manual's 
emphasis on the "comprehensive approach" and the interagency approach to writing it, 
  62 
"highlights the understanding that the military cannot succeed in these environments on 
its own".
70
 Janine Davidson insists that this is not, 
 
 "an attempted takeover by the military of core civilian functions [because for the 
majority of the] essential stability tasks FM 3-07 clearly articulates the military's 
role as a supporting one. ... A comprehensive approach ... recognises that there 
are many non-military actors with more appropriate skill sets than the military 
possess ... thus the doctrine calls for a division of labour in which military and 
civilians work together in the field toward a common objective and do not 
displace or compete with each other."
71
  
 
She also points out the problem of limited civilian capacity and that military forces must 
be prepared to assume these responsibilities.
72
  
 
2.2.2. Principles 
 
FM 3-07 does not offer principles (or imperatives or paradoxes). Instead it adopts an end 
state-based planning approach around a matrix of tasks, at different echelons of 
responsibility. Such a strategic matrix had been in the making for close to a decade and 
reflects work at the (former) U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute,
73
 the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) , the Association of the United States Army (AUSA),
74
 
and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
75
  The key idea in the ―strategic 
approach‖ - the ―how‖ in FM 3-07 - is to foster the comprehensive approach: 
understanding that unity of command is impossible in a multi-agency environment; the 
doctrine makes great play of the requirement for unity of effort, "uniting all of the 
diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in stability operations requires 
collaborative and cooperative paradigms that focused those capabilities towards a 
common goal".
76
 Beyond this a whole of (US) government approach and a 
comprehensive approach are vital; "a comprehensive approach is founded in the 
cooperative spirit of unity of effort".
77
 This is workable if all the players cooperate, but 
clearly difficult if not. Another element of the strategic approach, ―conflict 
transformation‖78  addresses the dynamics of conflict and attempts to turn these into 
processes for "constructive, positive change", through "reducing the means and 
motivations ... while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives ...".
79
 
 
The strategy (not strategic approach as discussed above) - the ―what‖ - for stability 
operations is encapsulated in an "overarching framework"
80
 which is "founded on five 
broad conditions that describe the desired end state of successful stability operations. In 
turn, a series of objectives link the execution of tactical tasks to that end state.  The end 
state conditions are: a safe and secure environment; established rule of law; social well-
being; stable governance; and a sustainable economy.
81
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2.2.3. Operational Design and Approaches to Stability 
 
The operational design is provided by the end state framework and here the effort to link 
military and civilian efforts ―creates a single model that forms the basis for developing 
lines of effort".
82
 (See Appendix 2 for details) The manual describes work by the 
Department of State on post-conflict reconstruction essential tasks "the essential stability 
task matrix"
83
 which breaks down the tasks into "stability sectors"
84
 However, again, 
there is no guidance for the general on how to relate his efforts to the political process
85
 
and the overarching question remains what links all of the tactical activity together?  
 
FM 3-07 provides a useful categorisation of tasks. Those where the military retain 
primary responsibility; where civilian agencies likely retain responsibility, but the 
military forces are prepared to execute; and tasks which civilian agencies or 
organisations retain primary responsibility. These primary stability tasks are each 
discussed in detail.
86
 Again, in a section on support to governance, there is no guidance 
on how to dovetail with political direction and how commanders should approach taking 
political decisions.
87
 Discussion of civil affairs operations at all levels hints at political 
imperatives but provides no guidance on supporting the political process or political 
primacy.
88
  
 
A chapter on transitional military authority, for use in circumstances immediately 
following intervention, discusses practical details yet, interestingly does not provide the 
familiar task matrix to guide planners.
89
 It hints at involvement with political issues yet it 
does not provide a scintilla of advice to commanders on how to help establish a viable 
political process as part of an initial state building effort, or how to orchestrate a handoff 
to civilian authority. This is a glaring omission, particularly in view of the promising 
quote at the beginning of the chapter referring to previous interventions where: "... US 
military leaders sometimes had to add to their traditional roles as soldiers those of a 
statesman and the politician."
90
  
 
2.3. Recent Doctrinal Developments in US Civil Military Cooperation. 
 
2.3.1. Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
 
The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the US Army published ―Guiding 
Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction‖91 in late 2009.  The aim was to fill a 
longstanding gap in doctrine for civilian policy makers, planners and practitioners.  
Although the authors emphasise that this work is not government policy, the book is 
helpful in terms of thought leadership.  It identifies ―strategic principles for all major 
activities in [stability and reconstruction] missions in one place‖.92  It seeks to foster 
common understanding and, with this, a comprehensive approach. As with FM 3-07, end 
states are outlined.  These are linked to corresponding US government technical sectors
93
 
and, distinct from FM 3-07, there is a set of overarching cross cutting principles.
94
  (See 
summary in Table 3.2.)   
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Table 3.2 USIP Summary of End states Technical Sectors and Crosscutting 
Principles. Source USIP.
95
 
 
 
End states 
 
 
US Government Technical sectors 
 
Safe and Secure Environment Security 
 
Rule of Law 
 
 
Justice and Reconciliation 
 
 
Stable Governance 
 
 
Governance and Participation 
 
Sustainable Economy 
 
Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure 
 
 
Social Well-being 
 
Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-
Being 
 
Cross Cutting Principles 
 
Host Nation Ownership and Capacity 
 
 Political Primacy 
 
Legitimacy 
 
Unity of Effort 
 
Security 
 
Conflict Transformation 
 
 Regional Engagement 
 
 
 
 
  65 
The work provides a helpful explanation of the practical impact of political primacy, 
referred to as a cross cutting principle, which ―means that a political settlement is the 
cornerstone of a sustainable peace.  Every decision and every action has an impact on the 
possibility of forging political agreement.‖96 Jock Covey‘s ―primacy of the peace 
process‖97 (see chapter 2) is also cited although the context suggested is one of 
maintaining a safe and secure environment, not supporting the broader political process.  
 
2.3.2. Emerging US Military Doctrine: US Joint Forces Command “A 
Guide to Strengthened Civil Military Cooperation in the Combatant 
Command’s Area of Responsibility; and US Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Stability Operations Joint Publication 3-07. 
 
A new series of pamphlets, the ―Unified Action Handbook Series‖ issued in January 2010 
by United States Forces Command, is designed to ―assist the joint force commander… 
[to] design, plan and execute a whole of government approach‖.98  This explains a new 
doctrinal term ―unified action‖ which is ―the synchronisation, coordination, and/or 
integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military 
operations to achieve unity of effort‖.99 It underlines the centrality of war amongst the 
people where ―a principal objective is to win the confidence of the population and 
convert the adversary to become a partner to contribute to stability‖.  This is distinct from 
the destructive aspect of conventional warfare.  The handbook postulates a ―notional 
whole of government planning initiative‖ (see figure 3.1 below), which sets out sensible 
lines of operation leading to sequenced military, civilian and host nation end states. 
These are supported (in the pamphlets) by a wealth of advice and material on the now 
accepted state-building requirement.  The road already travelled by the US military, from 
the ―avoidance of mission creep‖,100 to a situation where some agencies complain that the 
military have gone too far in creating civil-military interdependencies, is acknowledged.   
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Figure 3.1: Notional Whole of Government Planning Initiative.
101
 
 
 
 
Among the principles for mission success, the handbook identifies a ―focus on state 
building as the central objective‖ and a requirement to ―recognise the links between 
political, security, and development objectives‖, with consequent tradeoffs.102  Against 
such an ambitious backdrop, whilst the need for coordination is stressed,
103
 it is a pity 
that the work does not develop the state building idea to identify a central narrative for 
the political process to help achieve unity of effort. The handbook implies but does not 
underline the requirement for political primacy and hence political judgement when 
making the required tradeoffs between objectives.  This had been clearly identified as a 
crosscutting principle in the earlier USIP work on guiding principles.
104
  Nor does it offer 
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guidance on precisely how the interesting ―notional whole of government planning 
initiative‖ (see Figure 3.1) would be pulled together.   
 
Much of the work in the Unified Action series and FM 3-07 is pulled together in draft 
doctrine, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Stability Operations Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.
105
  
This repeats the UK MOD‘s elements of a stable state model 106  and highlights the 
centrality of the political settlement as a strategy.  Usefully the draft JP 3-07 Stability 
Operations asserts that, 
 
 ―all military action should be assessed by its contribution toward influencing the key 
conflict relationship and shaping a the eventual political settlement. At the heart of 
the political problem lies a contest between the way political power is organized, and 
who wields that power. A commander Leaders of peacemaking efforts will need to 
convince decisive elites that their interests are best served through an accommodation 
with the approved political settlement, rather than renewed conflict. Where this is not 
possible, the use of military force can influence and alter the political dynamics, 
which may remove the barriers to any accommodation.‖107 
 
The above quotation is repeated showing the ―Microsoft Word Track Changes‖ as found 
in the draft JP 3-07 Stability Operations.  These perhaps reveal an interesting ongoing 
discussion and perhaps some tension over the limits to the role of US military forces in 
the peace building process.    
 
2.4. Conclusions on US doctrine  
 
The ―demands of counterinsurgency‖108 and state building captured in FM 3-24 (and FM 
3-07) certainly seem to ―challenge much of what is holy about the American way of 
war"
109
 and this raises questions as much about which wars to fight as how:
110
 "The 
paradox here is that by discussing the conduct of war - jus in bello... ironically ... the 
manual‘s value may lie in better informing ... jus ad bellum decisions."111  The doctrine 
has been described as ―something of an apotheosis of this genre‖;112 it is, although there 
remain gaps. The first problem is not the quality or quantity of the military doctrine and 
the guidance that it provides, but the absence of an overarching civilian counterpart.  
Hence Sewall‘s correct suggestion that FM 3-24 was ―a moon without a planet to 
orbit‖. 113  Equally the absence of guidance for politico-military relationships on the 
ground rather leaves the commander to his own devices in forging unity of effort.   
 
Alderson points out that FM 3-24 was not without its critics.
114
. Relevant to this thesis, is 
the criticism that the necessary inter-agency approach required by the doctrine would 
"leave the military practitioners to expect too much ... we all talk about a comprehensive 
whole government approach, but the US never really gets there ...".
115
 Leaving aside the 
geo-strategic issues relating to US foreign policy, this leaves the apparent paradox that, 
absent top-level guidance, the doctrine was written anyway by the military - because the 
doctrine-driven army cannot operate successfully or change without it.  Another paradox 
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here is the concomitant requirement for US officers to take on essentially political roles 
to make the doctrine work, here there is scope for what Robert Egnell termed a 
―Huntingtonian fear of military politicisation‖.116 
 
Beyond the impact of doctrine on the organisation of the army, there is another issue.  
FM 3-24, (and its stability operations counterpart FM 3-07), identifies civilian political 
and capability requirements that are vital to military strategic and overall success.  A 
void here leaves the commander with some difficulty. Does he, as the US 
counterinsurgency doctrine implies, and as the US stability operations doctrine states, 
actually take the lead? Or should he adopt a more nuanced position whereby he provides 
the resources and the effort necessary to prop up the political effort whilst at the same 
time accepting that he is not and should not attempt to become, the dominant partner?  
Musing on the political nature of counterinsurgency, as elucidated by Galula, Alderson 
asks ―how can doctrine be developed without a clearly articulated joint and inter-agency 
approach? In the absence of [this approach] Petraeus and his…team [made] FM 3-24 at 
least a start point, one which he developed effectively with Crocker in Baghdad".
117
 This 
is the gap which this thesis is intended to fill. It begs the question whether Petraeus 
realised the limitations of the appetite for doctrine in terms of politico-military 
cooperation, for which he personally did not need guidance, on the one hand, whilst on 
the other responding to the imperative to change the US Army, and its lower level tactics, 
in order to bring the situation in Iraq under control. 
 
Turning to stability operations, FM 3-07 provides an excellent tactical reference source 
for those contemplating state building; nevertheless there remain significant gaps in the 
advice, particularly over the higher level civil military relationships that are necessary to 
develop and sustain a viable political process leading to military transition and exit. The 
core idea – deciding end states across an ambitious range of sectors, and then prescribing 
unity of effort and synchronisation of a myriad of tasks – is not ground breaking advice 
at the theatre level. Davidson complimented the writing team on actively seeking the 
perspectives of other agencies and non-governmental organisations, "it is in every other 
way, shape, and form a true interagency, whole-of-government product".
118
 Nevertheless, 
the doctrine lacks ―connective tissue‖119 and is remarkably light on guidance for the 
inevitable political interactions that such an all encompassing interagency effort will 
require of soldiers. It is also unduly dense and repetitive.  Beyond the debate over 
whether the military approach to taking on civilian tasks is too muscular, there is no clear 
guidance on political primacy, and the nuanced support to political actors that this 
requires. There are also inconsistencies in the use of terminology.  The delivery of this 
major doctrinal product, coming only two years after a similar effort to generate FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency, also raises questions as to which doctrine the US Army is actually 
following on operations today. 
 
The emerging US work on ―whole of government approaches‖ does not yet provide 
sufficient clarity on the importance of the political process (which could also be used as a 
means to achieve unity of effort along the lines of Covey‘s ―primacy of the peace process 
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discussed in Chapters 1 and 2). The requirement for political primacy and hence political 
judgement when making the required tradeoffs between objectives has been clearly 
identified as a crosscutting principle in Guiding Principles for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction, but as yet there is no material designed to take this forward in practical 
terms.  Helpfully, the political process theme is successfully taken up in the draft JP 3-07 
Stability Operations which highlights the centrality of the political settlement; 
nevertheless it seems that there is an ongoing debate on the depth of US military 
involvement in the peace building process.  Finally, it is important not to underestimate 
the potential global impact of the doctrines discussed above. This will range from US 
training assistance to other countries through to a significant impact on the US approach 
to insurgency and stability, and therefore on the UN and NATO, in Afghanistan.  
Turning to the global stage, the next section will address how policy and doctrinal work 
under the aegis of the UN addresses the problem of post conflict stability. 
 
3. The United Nations 
 
The United Nations Charter and the global scope and scale of UN involvement suggests  
that it remains the organisation of choice to conduct both complex peacekeeping and 
peace building activities: ―as often as not, governments call the UN‖.120  The UN is often 
a significant peace building player following interventions by other organisations or 
coalitions of the willing,
121
 and is ―uniquely equipped with the legitimacy, experience, 
coordinating ability and logistics mechanisms to work in post conflict settings‖.122 The 
UN is involved to a greater or lesser degree in the interventions to be examined in the 
case studies: Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
In order to narrow the focus to the relevant contemporary debate, selective consideration 
of the UN will start with the ―Brahimi Report‖123  in 2000.  This seminal analysis of the 
United Nations peace operations market, conducted in the light of failures during the 
1990s,
124
 provides a comprehensive baseline for discussion.  The policy, doctrinal and 
operational changes which flowed from it reveal significant challenges,
125
 and a real 
effort to move beyond ―traditional peacekeeping‖126 and to fit the UN for ―integrated‖ 
peacekeeping operations where active peace building is a prerequisite for success.
127
   In 
terms of improving outcomes for complex peace operations, the best guidance for the 
Force Commander would be advice along the lines that he has a mandate which is 
primarily about creating security conditions, but that he should also look at supporting 
the political process through his planning and actions in order to help resolve underlying 
issues.  For SRSGs the issue would be their ability to inform the Force Commander on 
what is required of him and accepting his help in supporting the political process.   
 
3.1. The “Brahimi Report”128  on United Nations Peace Operations in 2000 
 
Over a four-month period in 2000, Lakdar Brahimi led a panel "to assess the United 
Nations ability to conduct peace operations effectively and to offer frank, specific and 
realistic recommendations for ways in which to enhance that capacity".
129
 Much of the 
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work was orchestrated by Dr William Durch, a noted expert on peace operations.
130
 In a 
comprehensive document entitled Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations (“The Brahimi Report”), the panel addressed various aspects of conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping and peace building drawing on the experience of the 1990s. 
They underlined the duality of projecting credible force whilst building peace in 
circumstances where the confrontation
131
 between the parties to the conflict remained. 
Thus "peacekeepers would work to maintain a secure environment while peace builders 
work to make sure that environment [is] self-sustaining ... [this] offers a ready exit to 
peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peace builders inseparable partners".
132
 
The consequent requirement to develop peace building strategies and programmes might 
suggest that the military (or civilian) peacekeepers have no role in peace building. 
Equally, in terms of definition there appeared to be clear blue water between 
peacekeeping and peace building, albeit there are some bridges. 
 
The Brahimi Report validated the ―bedrock principles‖ 133 of peacekeeping134 as consent, 
impartiality, and the use of force only in self defence but recommended a robust doctrine 
and realistic mandates for the future, underlining that impartiality requires adherence to 
the principles of the UN Charter; if its terms were broken, then equal treatment of 
transgressors would be ineffective and, at worst, could amount to ―complicity with 
evil‖.135 This implies that impartiality must be in relation to achieving the mandate and 
not the parties to the conflict.
136
 The panel began to shape the outlines of improved 
mission guidance and leadership, suggesting that the new mission leadership team - 
including the force commander - should come together to facilitate pre-deployment 
planning at UN Headquarters.
137
 
 
The Brahimi Report defined the elements of United Nations peace operations as: conflict 
prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building.
138
 Conflict Prevention 
deals with sources of conflict, whilst peacemaking attempts to stop ongoing conflict. 
Peacekeeping "is a 50 year old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from 
a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after 
inter State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, 
working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars".
139
 Whereas 
Peace-building, 
 
"defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the 
foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations 
something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building 
includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian 
society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and 
restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for 
human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and 
existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development 
(including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting 
conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques."
140
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The Brahimi Report offered a distinction between "traditional peacekeeping, which treats 
the symptoms rather than sources of conflict…[and has] no built in exit strategy",141 and 
post cold war peacekeeping which "has often combined with peace-building in complex 
peace operations deployed into settings of intra-state conflict". 
142
 Moreover, 
 
 "United Nations operations ... do not deploy into post-conflict situations so much 
as they deploy to create such situations. That is, they work to divert the 
unfinished conflict, and the personal, political or other agendas that drove it, from 
the military to the political arena, and how to make that diversion permanent."
143
 
 
In a complex peace operation, the Brahimi panel saw the peacekeepers maintaining a 
secure local environment for peace building and the peace builders supporting political 
social and economic change to deliver self-sustaining peace. Peacekeepers and peace 
builders are "inseparable partners ... peace builders may not be able to function without 
peacekeepers ... [and] peacekeepers have no exit without ... peace builders."
144
 The 
potential overlap between peacekeeping and peace building activity in complex peace 
operations is relevant because, as with the counter insurgency and stability operations 
doctrines discussed above, it poses a question for military commanders: how can, and 
should, they support the peace building process? (So far in this thesis this process has 
been termed the ―political or peace process‖, but for practical purposes, given Brahimi‘s 
definition above the author equates this with ―peace building‖).  In terms of 
peacekeeping doctrine, Brahimi provides a robust endorsement for the use of (more) 
force, together with a call for realistic planning assumptions, yet there is nothing on the 
provision of military support to peace building or the political process.
145
 In a section on 
the multidimensional nature of peace building, the panel offered no direct mention of 
military support, this is gently implied, although there is a real sense of separateness 
between the military and civilian contributions.
146
  
 
The panel called for ―clear, credible and achievable mandates‖147 and ―a clear chain of 
command and unity of effort‖148 yet offered no guidance on civil-military coordination 
and cooperation.
149
 Nevertheless the approach suggested in this thesis appears to be 
endorsed by a statement that mission leadership should develop, before deploying,  ―a 
strategy for implementing the mandate while trying to establish the mission‘s 
political/military centre of gravity and sustain a potentially fragile peace process‖.150 This 
integrated and seemingly comprehensive approach was supported by a proposal to 
establish ―integrated mission task forces‖151 to conduct planning and provide centralised 
support for deployed missions.
152
 But there were apparent limits to the level of ambition.  
In addressing the ―challenge of transitional civil administration‖,153 the panel noted the 
inherent difficulties of providing governance and basic services whilst conducting what 
others would refer to as state building. Yet the panel noted the dilemma, for the UN 
Secretariat, given reluctance to ―be in this business at all‖,154 whilst being faced with a 
potential requirement to attempt it again and hence a need to avoid failure.
155
  The 
remainder of this section will examine the extent to which these issues have subsequently 
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been addressed in United Nations doctrine
156
 and the gap which remains as regards the 
questions posed by this thesis.   
 
3.2. UN Doctrine following The Brahimi Report  
 
Lack of space precludes discussion of the ―rancorous debate‖157 over the UN‘s wider 
role
158
 in the wake of The Brahimi Report.  This section therefore focuses on initial 
progress in developing doctrine after the report. A Handbook on United Nations 
Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations
159
 was published by the UN‘s Department of 
Peackeeping Operations (DPKO) in December 2003.
160
 Military tasks were (rightly) 
centred on providing a secure environment with other roles such as Demobilisation 
Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and de-mining.
161
 The requirement for 
coordination was stressed and, although there were 49 references to a peace process as a 
central political activity, the outline of such a process was not defined.  There was scant 
acknowledgement of a role for the military commander as a key actor in supporting this 
process in either practical or substantive terms.  Reflecting internal institutional 
difficulties within the UN Sectretariat, the doctrine captured much of what Brahimi had 
termed ―peace building‖ albeit under a ―peacekeeping‖ rubric.162 It stated that DPKO 
was responsible for direction of peacekeeping missions yet it also noted that the 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was the focal point for conflict prevention, 
peacemaking and peace building.
163
 Later a United Nations World Summit in 2005 
approved the new ―Peacebuilding Commission‖ supported within the UN Secretariat by a 
―Peacebuilding Support Office‖ in order to take action on the challenges of peace 
building.
164
 Hence, at least doctrinally, the matter of who is in charge of the exit strategy 
remained wide open. 
 
In the chapter on the responsibilities of and factors relevant to the Special Representative 
of the Secretary General (SRSG),
165
 the handbook describes the broad role as: facilitator 
of a political process; head of UN presence; head of mission; and interim or transitional 
administrator.
166
 Arguably the Force Commander would have influence or even some 
practical input to all of these roles yet he is barely mentioned as an interlocutor for the 
SRSG.  The requirement for a chain of command in the field where military components 
are under UN authority is also left rather vague.
167
 Perhaps as reaction to UK thought 
leadership through Peace Support Operations (PSO) doctrine (discussed in Chapter 2), 
the requirement for a ―comprehensive mandate implementation plan, developed by the 
mission,‖168 which ―can optimize the contributions of all partners by providing unity of 
purpose‖169 is clearly stated.  The parties to the conflict are rightly seen as ―the main 
interlocutors for the SRSG in the political process‖;170 these may shift given ―evolving 
political and military realities‖. 171  Again no role for the Force Commander seems 
envisaged here, despite the stated linkage of the political with the military and the 
distinct likelihood that the Force Commander‘s own interlocutors, most notably the 
parties to the conflict, would wield political as well as military influence. 
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In a chapter on military issues,
172
 the basic thrust is that the principal military role is to 
provide a secure environment "so that other elements of the peace process can be 
implemented".
173
 Whilst "military capability ...[can] provide the space and opportunity 
for peacemaking and political negotiations‖,174 there is no mention of a military role 
beyond technical assistance
175
 or of a substantive part in peace building activity as a 
political actor. There is a helpful recognition that "the military component interacts with 
all other ... components".
176
 For the political component this means ―joint strategic 
planning for mandate implementation and adjusting the tasks of the military component 
to the changing political realities on the ground‖,177 and ―the military component must 
work with all other partners to help consolidate peace‖.178 Sadly this is at the end of the 
document thus perhaps unlikely to be read by an SRSG and there is no guidance on how 
to operationalise this advice.  The handbook also lists useful integration techniques such 
as an integrated civil-military coordination cell and a joint operations centre. 
179
 
 
A comprehensive assessment of progress since the Brahimi panel: The Brahimi Report 
and the Future of UN Peace Operations was provided in a 2003 report by Durch, Holt, 
Earle and Shanahan.  This suggested that there had been improved performance in 
peacekeeping but more effort was needed on ―peacebuilding elements that promote 
acceptable conditions for mission drawdown and exit‖.180  The report emphasised the 
reality of many operations as a new model ―post-enforcement peace building—where a 
coalition force maintains order while the UN addresses other pressing needs‖. 181  
Nevertheless transitional administration remained a ―touchy subject‖182 in part due to 
perceived association with ―colonial legacies‖.183 
 
3.3. UN Capstone Doctrine 2008. 
 
In a report to the UN General Assembly in 2006
184
 the UN Secretary General suggested a 
reform strategy: ―Peace Operations 2010‖. 185  Among the recommendations were 
requirements to continue work on lessons learned, best practices and doctrine, including 
defining the limits of peacekeeping. A key reform element would be integration as a 
―fundamental principle‖ 186  and the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission and 
Peacebuilding Support Office was intended to implement this as part of an overall 
peacebuilding effort.  Also noted for improvement was DPKO‘s integrated mission 
planning process. Finally the Secretary General suggested that improved relationships 
with international financial institutions would help to secure success both in the 
immediate post conflict and later institution building stages.
187
  
 
Subsequent strategic level doctrinal guidance United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
Principles and Guidelines
188
 was published by DPKO and the Department of Field 
Support (DFS) in 2008. Referred to as UN Capstone Doctrine,
189
 and acknowledging 
Brahimi‘s analysis,190  this was intended to capture the experiences and evolution of 
peacekeeping over 60 years and the shifting nature of conflict from inter-state towards 
intra-state.
191
 Jean Marie Guéhenno, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations stressed that beyond monitoring ceasefires, todays ―multi-dimensional 
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peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process‖.192 The UN 
Capstone Doctrine underlined the need for an integrated approach and included an 
attempt to show the ―linkages and grey areas" between the various peace related 
activities undertaken by the UN. (See figure 3.2 below). This helps to explain the 
difficulty over using force, and the blurring of the line between "robust" peacekeeping, 
peace enforcement and war,
193
 the main difference being that force is used to achieve 
tactical compliance in peacekeeping whereas in peace enforcement force is applied at the 
strategic level.
194
 For the post-conflict or post-ceasefire phase, the required progression 
in the political process is clearly illustrated and could be seen as synonymous with a 
peace process. 
 
Figure 3.2: Linkages and Grey Areas in UN Activities.   Source United Nations.
 195
 
 
 
 
The UN Capstone Doctrine again highlighted the difficulty with "traditional" 
peacekeeping operations which do not have a role in political conflict resolution 
efforts.
196 
But in the light of the changed conflict and landscape, its focus is on "a new 
generation of 'multi-dimensional' UN peacekeeping operations".
197 
The core outputs 
would be to:  create a secure and stable environment while building local capacity; 
facilitate the political process; and provide a framework to ensure coherence among 
external actors.
198 
 For the military this would include the use of the minimum amount of 
force necessary to protect the peace process, but not to achieve the military defeat of any 
spoilers.
199 
Peace building activities in the security, rule of law, political and social and 
economic spheres are required for sustainable peace yet the guidelines suggest that UN 
peacekeeping operations are generally not adequately resourced for these. Nevertheless 
they may be required to ―play a catalytic role‖ in a number of areas. Those of specific 
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interest to the military are DDR, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and support to the 
restoration and extension of state authority.
200
  
 
The doctrine underscores the integrated approach and a shared vision from the planning 
stage forward, yet whilst rather long on words it does not paint a simple picture which 
might help to visualise this.
201
 Sensibly it points out that too much integration maybe 
counter-productive, particularly for humanitarian and development partners, in some 
circumstances.
202
 The integrated missions planning process
203
 is "intended to help the 
United Nations system arrive at a common understanding of its strategic objectives‖204 
by getting the right people and issues to the table. 
 
A final section in the UN Capstone Doctrine on what amounts to the UN‘s operational 
art describes mandate implementation and the necessary support over the life of a 
mission from deployment to exit.
205
 Accepting that the UN‘s doctrine is intended to 
cover a range of types of operation and mandate, with or without external actors, 
including non-UN military formations, the guidance remains very broad.
206
 The 
―challenge of mission implementation and coordination‖207 and the need for integration 
―guided by a common strategic vision‖208 are mentioned.  Yet missing is any tool or 
generic plan to help the SRSG
209
 and all concerned to capture, visualise, then integrate 
the various strands of effort needed.  Nor is there guidance on how, even generically, the 
civilian and military actors might interact in pursuing and integrating these.
210
  This is an 
omission because, in a final section on transition, the doctrine offers a clue to the 
integration requirement through benchmarks for transition of mission responsibilities.  
These include, broadly, a satisfactory: security and human rights situation; completion of 
DDR, national security capability; judicial and corrections capability; restoration of state 
authority and basic services; return or resettlement of displaced persons; formation of 
political institutions with free and fair elections.
211
 However there is no mention of 
supporting a political settlement. 
 
3.4. Updated UN CIMIC Policy in 2010 
 
Other UN doctrinal documents give a flavour of the difficulty of integrating the military 
with the civilian and also, as with the US and NATO, the absence of guidance as to how 
to support political primacy and the peace process. A new UN policy document on Civil-
Military coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)
212
, issued in 
January 2010, provides an excellent rationale: "civil-military coordination ... should be 
conducted in support of the wider peace process and not solely in support of the military 
commander's intent or humanitarian objectives".
213
 The document goes beyond the 
military mission although it focuses on enabling civil affairs (fixing bridges and so on) 
rather than the political peace process. It is also tempered by the need to avoid problems 
for the humanitarian community, particularly over the political aspects of 
peacebuilding.
214
 Thus, coordination with this community is referred to separately as UN 
Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) as championed by UNOCHA.
215
 The UN-
CIMIC document separates provision of a secure environment from support to the 
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political process and long-term social stability. The former being primarily a military 
function and the latter primarily a civilian activity.  However in a complex situation such 
a separation seems simplistic.  The policy helpfully stresses the need for soldiers to have 
"a solid understanding of the civilian effort, of the political and social context ... and of 
ways in which the military can make a constructive contribution",
216
 and also 
"maximising the comparative advantage of all actors ... the essential aim [being] to 
maximise and exploit opportunities to create enabling conditions for civilian 
organisations and partners, especially the host nation government, to accelerate the peace 
process and bring about the military and state".
217
  
 
Despite this excellent concept, the policy is self limiting in two senses.  First the actual 
coordination function is limited to UN-CIMIC officers, and not the military mission as a 
whole, thus potentially limiting the opportunities for interaction; as US General Petraeus 
suggested, albeit in a different context, ―everyone must do nation-building‖.218 Second 
the policy sees UN Civil Affairs officers rather than UN Political Officers, as the primary 
interlocutors for UN-CIMIC Officers.
219
 Depending on the precise role of civil affairs 
staff, focussing here may tend to reduce emphasis on military support to the overall 
political process and, in UN parlance, peace building activity.  In terms of the Integrated 
Missions Planning Process (IMPP),
220
 the document suggests efforts "to develop an 
integrated strategic framework for peace consolidation",
221
 with military input. However 
there is no hint of what this would look like and, as Cedric de Coning had suggested 
earlier, the CIMIC concept is somewhat overtaken by the UN Integrated Mission 
concept, at least at the strategic level.
222
   
 
3.5. Peace Challenges Forum – Emerging Guidance For Senior Leaders. 
 
The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (formerly the Peace 
Challenges Project), comprising policy makers, practitioners and academics,
223
 has since 
1997 engaged with DPKO to develop peacekeeping doctrine. This has included work in 
support of the 2008 UN Capstone Doctrine.
224
 A recent draft report "Considerations for 
Senior Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Missions"
225
 was intended to build on the 
strategic level capstone doctrine with practical guidance for the mission leadership team 
at the operational level.  It identifies key objectives, operational outputs, activities that 
need to be undertaken by the mission, benchmarks, and a framework based on short 
medium and long-term priorities.
226
  Whilst acknowledging that ―the functions of 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building become entwined‖,227 the structure of 
this emerging product nevertheless persists with the separation of the political and the 
security strands, although acknowledging the "developing nexus between peacekeeping 
and peace building".
228
  
 
Significantly, this putative new doctrine stresses political primacy in peacekeeping and 
the "political engagement of the international community‖.229 This means that all actors 
are involved, including the force commander. Specifically, the engagement of the UN 
Mission Leadership Team should be a "skilled articulation of refined political 
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judgement".
230
 The question how the military commander should best support this 
requirement is unanswered, although helpful examples of politically charged issues 
which would involve the Force Commander, are identified.  These include the 
establishment of mechanisms for dispute resolution and the separation of warring 
factions.
231
  Both would need careful coordination between political, military, and police 
elements to achieve the peacekeeping mission‘s objectives.  Helpfully integrated 
planning and action with standing coordination arrangements and an Integrated Strategic 
Framework - essentially a shared vision of objectives with results timelines and 
responsibilities - are detailed.
232
  
 
3.6. Conclusions on UN Doctrine.  
 
This briefest of surveys has focussed on published and emerging UN doctrine and the 
work immediately surrounding this rather than the plethora of material on the role of the 
UN and the field missions themselves.  It seems clear that the Brahimi report could be 
seen as the beginning of the UN's comprehensive approach and the UN readily 
acknowledges that ―no single organisation can presently conduct all of the multifaceted 
tasks required to support and consolidate peace processes‖.233 The scope of potential 
types of missions remains broad and clearly, in terms of mandates, there can be no one 
size fits all.  Notwithstanding this challenge a body of all-embracing doctrine now exists 
to provide guidance if not guarunteed political support and resources.
234
 Practice suggests 
that a UN mission is likely to find itself operating alongside a national or coalition 
element providing some or all of the security function, 
235
 or acting as an emergency 
backup as in the case of the British intervention which rescued and then galvanised 
UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone in 2000.
236
  The UN‘s involvement in this aspect of 
contemporary operations will be addressed in the case study chapters to follow. 
 
It is helpful that the UN doctrine is civilian-focussed; this distinguishes it from the 
military led approaches in the UK and US.  However three issues remain. First available 
UN doctrine does not tend to paint a picture of the multiple lines of activity across 
various sectors needed to deliver a comprehensive approach and the coordination 
challenge that this brings for the UN and other actors.  Second, and building on the first 
point, there remains a sense of stove piping: peacekeeping and peace building activity are 
at best blurred, with as Paddy Ashdown suggests, scope for internal turf wars
237
.  Third, 
the potential military role in assisting peace building is not fully acknowledged or 
developed. There is little evidence in the doctrine of recognition of an emerging role for 
the military commander as a political actor in his own right.  Clearly there should be 
sensible limits to military action in this realm.
238
 Nevertheless for the UN, the civilian 
and military roles currently remain distinct, as Durch et al suggest: ―Peacekeepers protect 
peacebuilders, the substantive civilian members of a complex operation, who help create 
the conditions that enable peacekeepers to go home.‖239 But the problem remains in 
―designing and implementing peacebuilding strategies that can facilitate responsible 
transition and exit‖.240   Given that emerging UN doctrine for the theatre level does 
indicate a requirement for all actors to support political primacy, it is relevant to examine 
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what can the military do to help the political process. Equally how should their civilian 
counterparts take advantage of the military asset when implementing peace?  
 
4. NATO   
 
4.1. Why discuss NATO? 
 
NATO is a Regional Organisation recognised under Chapter VIII of the United Nations 
Charter.
241
  Its core purpose is to foster Euro-Atlantic security.
242
 NATO has been 
involved in a number of stabilisation operations (Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan). Given this experience, the significant military resources 
potentially available from its member states, efforts to analyse and prepare policies and 
doctrines for the future security environment,
243
 the increasing (albeit contentious) global 
reach of the Alliance, and its somewhat existential involvement in Afghanistan, NATO 
remains the most significant regional organisation. As the leader of significant numbers 
of non-NATO countries,
244
 NATO‘s operational policies and doctrines are likely to have 
global reach, albeit amongst more developed troop contributing nations. NATO controls 
significant ongoing post-intervention operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.  And whilst 
the EU has both pretensions and potential
245
 it currently does not conduct significant 
stability operations.  Although contentions for some members, should the need arise the 
EU could draw on NATO capabilities through the "Berlin plus"
246
 arrangements for the 
use of NATO assets and capabilities. This would of course include NATO‘s military 
doctrinal approach.  As with the UN, lack of space precludes substantive analysis of the 
policy debate
247
 surrounding the security environment or NATO‘s role, functions and 
reform of its institutions;
248
 this section will therefore concentrate on NATO doctrinal 
development in support of current and future peace and stability operations.  
 
4.2. NATO’s policy challenges. 
 
Overlaying the doctrinal debate in NATO is a difficulty in achieving a true shared 
analysis on a number of levels.  These include debate on the necessity for intervention, 
the nature of any commitment and resources required
249
 and, importantly, the practical 
arrangements with other organisations. One consequence of the lack of shared analysis 
tends to be different approaches taken by different lead nations in different regions on 
operations (as exemplified in Kosovo and Afghanistan).  At the tactical level, this also 
impacts on the military response to the political imperative as suggested by this thesis.  
 
NATO currently faces several broad policy challenges in the doctrinal arena. First 
delivering its own internal comprehensive approach to help it effect coordination 
between international actors (such as the UN, the EU, the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, and the African Union)
250
 at all levels. Second, for current 
operations and as the major military,
251
 and arguably political, player in what is clearly a 
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan (see Chapter 6), NATO needs to be part of a 
comprehensive approach and develop the ability to ―draw on tools that complement‖252 
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what NATO can offer. Third, NATO needs to agree the relevant military doctrine to 
underpin this. The difficulty of delivering this both at the grand strategic level, and in the 
field, is exacerbated by the fact NATO remains a military alliance and some member 
states, for different reasons,
 253
 wish to constrain its ability to reach out to, and 
consequently to coordinate with,  other organisations in the non-military dimension.
254
   
 
Since the end of the Cold War a significant challenge for the Alliance has been agreeing 
military doctrine for ―out of area‖255or "Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations"256; in 
other words operations not in direct defence of Alliance territory. NATO‘s Balkan 
interventions galvanised the process, and British PSO doctrine (see chapter 2), albeit 
somewhat watered down in order to achieve consensus, became the basis for NATO's 
Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations.
257
 However, this long 
debated
258
 product was designed for a broadly consent based environment with a peace 
process to support, and, although providing a basis for NATO training since 
ratification,
259
 it has not met the demands of operations against insurgents, particularly in 
Afghanistan.
260
  
 
4.3. NATO’s comprehensive approach 
 
As a major Regional Organisation, NATO understands that there are no solely military 
solutions
261
 to contemporary security problems and therefore a comprehensive approach 
from the strategic level downwards is needed. So what are the basic questions to be 
resolved from this perspective? Although policy is not agreed, NATO suggests that it is 
developing ―pragmatic proposals‖262 which seek to make improvements in five areas of 
work.  First, the planning and conduct of operations, where ―practical cooperation at all 
levels with all relevant organizations and actors in the planning and conduct of 
operations‖ is needed. This will promote unity of effort with ―clear definition of 
strategies and objectives‖; critically the effect on the local population must also be 
considered at the outset.  Second, in the area of lessons learned, training, education and 
exercises, the key point is to improve trust and cooperation by encouraging joint training 
of civilian and military personnel amongst all relevant actors. Third, the effort to enhance 
cooperation with external actors would help achieve mutual understanding, trust, 
confidence and respect among the relevant organizations and actors whilst respecting 
their autonomy.  Fourth, NATO understands that its public messaging needs sustained 
and coherent public messages
263
 and that the main actors‘ information strategies need to 
complement not contradict each other. Finally, military stabilisation and reconstruction 
activities need to be improved.  This is partly about delivering the right military (and 
civilian) capabilities but also needs better coordination between military and other IOs 
and NGOs as providers of essential stabilisation and reconstruction capabilities.  It seems 
likely that resolving these issues will be a significant challenge to be addressed by the 
future Alliance Strategic Concept and the ―International Community‖ as a whole.264 
 
Much of NATO‘s emerging policy is focussed above theatre level and has left vague the 
matter of coordination of efforts between the international community and with local 
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political actors.  Unity of command within the ―international medley‖265 of intervening 
actors remains impossible and understandably there is no sense of whom, if any one, 
might be in charge.
266
  However progress is being made at the operational level and as 
Sir Stewart Eldon, the UK Permanent Representative to NATO pointed out, ―we must 
not let … Brussels get too far behind the practitioners‖.267 He was referring to Exercise 
ARRCADE Fusion
268
 where the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) worked with 
―diplomats, development experts, media experts, NGOs and academics, all under a ‗UN 
Integrated Plan‘.  A Policy Steering Group brought together the UN Special Envoy, the 
President of the host government, the Commander, and other representatives of the 
military, diplomatic and development communities‖. 269   Other related UK-led work 
under the aegis of the ARRC, Project Tardis, seeks to operationalise the comprehensive 
approach.  Taking the debate beyond the conceptual, it argues for the ―required 
resources, political will and strategic patience‖270 and a ―holistic view of the mission‘s 
strategic objectives…[with] flexible command and control [embracing] key civilian 
partners…‖.271  However none of the work addresses the detail of military support to any 
specific political process.  Hence, the proposition in this thesis is that this is an omission 
and commanders need to understand their position as significant political actors who can 
and should support and the demands of a political process.  There is a further potential 
problem, on occasion, the discordance of the ―international medley‖ may provide the 
commander with such a complex situation as to leave him with no choice other than to 
attempt to fill gaps left by the absence of civilian political capacity.   In order to sustain 
progress he may be in a position where he is forced to decide for himself what might be 
the acceptable political bandwidth for military activity. 
 
4.4. NATO’s military counterinsurgency doctrine. 
 
―Military activities aim to protect the population and neutralise the insurgents. 
These activities will create favourable conditions for [host nation] and Alliance 
agencies and all other civil actors to gain access to the population and address 
core grievances. They will also allow the [host nation] government to broker a 
political solution which defeats the insurgency.‖272 
 
Emerging, not yet ratified, NATO counter insurgency doctrine, AJP 3.4.4 Doctrine for 
Counterinsurgency is encapsulated in the above quotation.  It is an interesting amalgam 
of the British stabilisation and US counter insurgency doctrines
273
 which repays the 
careful reader with some nuggets of useful advice. It concentrates on military 
stabilisation and reconstruction activities in countering insurgency but seems informed 
by the NATO debate on the comprehensive approach, with its inherent gaps. Focussing 
on the military contribution, but also intended to inform other actors,
274
 the draft doctrine 
describes the ―complex operational environment‖275 in terms familiar to the reader of 
British Security and Stabilisation doctrine JDP 3-40 (see Chapter 2).  Given intra-state 
conflict and the likely failed state problem, with its inherent inability to resolve conflict, 
the doctrine situates countering insurgency as the ―most demanding‖ campaign theme in 
―countering irregular activity‖.276 (See Glossary). 
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As with the US version, the doctrine is population-focused;
277
 this underlines the need to 
moderate the use of force, resolve grievances and create incentives; hence a 
comprehensive approach is required.  Given the broad range of activities required to deal 
with insurgency the draft helpfully underlines the significance of political considerations 
which ―are of much greater importance than military considerations in a struggle for the 
consent of the population. Therefore, every action in [counterinsurgency] should support 
a political resolution to the problem.‖278  
 
The importance of unity of effort and unity of purpose and hence good civil military 
relations are made clear. This is important given the likely reality that the civilian task of 
delivering security and stabilisation, will fall to the military,
 279
 at least initially, should 
the security situation so dictate.
280
 In addressing this, NATO‘s comprehensive approach 
would need complementary action at three levels: at the political-strategic level, building 
confidence and trust; at the theatre level, securing effective cooperation with indigenous 
and international actors; and at the operational level, delivering complex effects.
281
 There 
is useful advice on political realities: ―commanders must…understand all military and 
civilian aspects of the comprehensive approach because of its impact upon the 
operational environment and resulting effects upon military requirements‖. 282 
Nevertheless there is no real attempt to address the substantive or practical requirements 
of the political process needed for exit and the requirement that this places on 
commanders, particularly at theatre level.  
 
As a basis for discussion on what is required to address state fragility,
283
 the doctrine 
draws on the British analysis
284
 of the elements of a stable state as an amalgam of 
security, economic and infrastructure development, and governance and the rule of law, 
these being drawn together by societal relationships and a political settlement
285
 (as 
discussed in Chapter 2).  The sections on operational design, planning and execution of 
operations draw extensively on FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency discussed above.  Focussing 
at the operational level, the draft doctrine emphasises the requirement for joint design 
and planning of operations whilst political primacy and unity of effort are again stressed:  
 
―Political considerations in COIN require special attention to achieve unity of 
effort. The means to achieve unity of effort are a comprehensive approach - 
essentially all multinational, joint, intergovernmental, inter-agency, non-
governmental and other actors working towards a common purpose. In its most 
basic terms, all actors should strive to counter an insurgency as a team.‖286 
 
The second half of this quote seems highly aspirational in the face of the international 
medley, which may be discordant.  It may not reflect operating realities, absent a 
significant diplomatic effort on the part of military and other leaders.  The unity (of 
command) theme is pressed further in discussion of planning, the operational art
287
 and 
leadership. Depending on the progression of the campaign and the proportion of military, 
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development and diplomatic effort being applied, there is a requirement for a political or 
military supremo.  
 
―Coordination requires leadership. Indeed, it also requires the existence of one 
top theatre authority (either civilian or military, depending on the phase, but it 
must be one authority)… One should keep in mind that the insurgent‘s strategy 
often benefits in terms of time from the coexistence of equally high ranking 
leaders who may be unable to agree and are then unable or slow to trigger effort 
in given fields. The subsequent lack of unity of effort can protract the 
insurgency.‖288   
 
Although perhaps a seductive idea, no clue is given as to how this is to be achieved by 
NATO in practical terms except, presumably, through a de facto reality and not a de jure 
arrangement.  As the draft doctrine suggests: 
 
―[T]he commander is pivotal in orchestrating the efforts of a wide variety of 
agencies into a comprehensive approach…through consensus and compromise as 
well as with traditional command practices. Commanders should promote the role 
and sovereignty of the [Host Nation]. Although NATO forces are endowed with 
immense military power, versatility and … firepower, they have to operate in 
close coordination with non-military actors. This cooperative and collaborative 
effort is required to stabilise the environment and to contribute to the defeat of an 
insurgency. Commanders must act as diplomats as well as soldiers.‖ 
 
4.5. Conclusions on NATO doctrine 
 
The ―gaps between… theory [in NATO HQ] and operational practice‖289 are beginning 
to be filled.  Emerging policies at NATO HQ, in operational level headquarters, and in 
the doctrinal arena provide a sound basis for improved strategic analysis, planning and 
conduct of operations at all levels.  Challenges and gaps remain, not least inter- and intra-
institutional reluctance to effect a comprehensive approach and the lack of civilian 
stabilisation and reconstruction capability either owned by NATO or member states.
290
 
Doctrine will not solve that problem nor can it prevent other difficulties such as fiefdoms 
in theatre with separate regional approaches.
291
  
 
The doctrinal proposal that a military or civilian supremo is required harks back to 
distant counterinsurgency campaigns (see Chapter 2); yet, given that NATO does not 
own the whole problem or the solutions in theatre, this element of the comprehensive 
approach amongst the "international medley" is likely to remain aspirational. 
Nevertheless this hints that in some circumstances the commander may have to act as a 
de facto statesman and therefore take on such a role, particularly in the absence of either 
political direction or capable civilian interlocutors. The guidance discussed above should 
prove useful, at least in terms of driving a shared understanding of the problem, for 
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contemporary operations in Afghanistan and notwithstanding past
292
 and current public 
scepticism over any future interventions.  
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
The core doctrinal debate has now moved from the use of force to how to operate 
amongst the people in a failed state scenario, deliver the necessary prescriptions to 
resolve grievances and so secure the required political authority. The literature recognises 
that a comprehensive approach is needed and that civilian leadership with political 
primacy are required to deliver this.  Yet it is also clear that the civilian side needs a good 
deal of support from the military component, particularly where civilian capabilities are 
unavailable.  The international medley of actors present, who may be discordant, the 
impossibility of achieving unity of command and the difficulty of achieving unity of 
effort across diverse strands all point to a continuing challenge for military 
commanders.
293
  The bottom line is that there is a quantity of doctrine spreading the 
mantra of integration, but this is light on guidance to both civilians and military on 
supporting political primacy and why this is important.  So, how should the military 
commander effect positive military support to the political process?  There is some 
emerging US doctrinal work on this and the centrality of the political settlement, but this 
work appears equivocal. This thesis advocates a significant role for the military 
component in this context and the following case study chapters will illustrate why the 
author believes this to be necessary. 
 
It is helpful that doctrines now strike a sensible balance between force and persuasion.  
The last decade has seen the US reducing its reliance on force in the light of post 
intervention state building realities; whereas, in the wake of the The Brahimi Report, the 
UN now seems more prepared to apply force in complex peace operations.  There 
remains some terminological confusion and differences, for example between US 
counterinsurgency and stability doctrines and between peacekeeping and peace building 
for the UN. Nevertheless as Larry Cable pointed out, before any of the doctrine reviewed 
above was written, there are more fundamental similarities, ―the insurgent, the counter-
insurgent, the peace enforcer and the peacekeeper all have the same goal: political 
authority over a specified population in a defined geographic venue.‖ 294  Hence the 
central challenge remains the same – joining up civilian and military efforts. 
 
In these circumstances, the operational art revolves around achieving unity of purpose 
through a shared vision and integrating multiple strands of activity.  Achieving this will 
need dynamic activity and demand diplomatic skills, and in all probability statesman-like 
behaviour, of senior soldiers and senior civilians.  Although the available doctrine 
variously implies such challenges for the general, there is no real guidance on 
specifically how he should support the political process or how others should view this. 
Additional challenges will include what to do if civilian capacity is absent or incomplete; 
or if civilian political instructions are lacking, or complex? 
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The global scope and scale of UN operations suggests a clear imperative to support the 
UN in building on progress in complex peacekeeping through integrated missions and 
also those where the UN acts alongside coalition forces.  A key internal issue for the UN 
is bringing peacekeeping operations and peace building operations together properly and 
achieving synergy, because in some senses, given the UN's structural arrangements, as 
with US-led state building efforts, there may be a tendency to operate on a separate 
orbits.  UN and other contemporary doctrines also need to be harmonised to ensure that 
the best available doctrinal practice supports state building and peace building activities 
and to better deliver a comprehensive approach. 
 
So far this thesis has addressed the broad security environment and suggested a 
hypothesis for military interaction with, and support to, the political process in stability 
and complex peace operations.  The thesis has suggested that British, US, UN and NATO 
doctrines, although extensive, do not fully meet this requirement. The purpose of 
doctrine is to capture experience and the following case studies will show that practice 
now indicates a requirement for further doctrinal guidance on supporting the political 
process.  This would help to explain what is to be supported under the often repeated 
mantra of "political primacy".  One approach for the soldier-statesman here would be to 
postulate deriving an ―acceptable political bandwidth for military activity‖.  Such an 
approach would help judge the mix of military and political actions needed to keep the 
political process on track, accepting imperfections, and maintain positive progress 
towards eventual military exit. Equally, it is intended to suggest further research on the 
extent to which senior civilian actors understand the military commander‘s latent 
potential to support the peace process. 
 
The following chapter presents a case study of operations in Kosovo in 1999-2000 where 
a NATO military force was directly mandated to support a UN civilian mission under a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution.  The case of Kosovo demonstrated 
significant and successful innovations in politico-military cooperation which helped to 
engender and sustain political progress and wider peace building activities. 
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Chapter 4 - Kosovo:  Keeping the Show on the Road1 
 
“From the beginning, both civilian officials and military commanders need to 
meet in the middle not just to co-ordinate, they need to meet in the middle and 
join as partners.  The lesson of Kosovo is that you can achieve effective joint 
planning if the two take seriously the needs of the other”.2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine the case of Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of intervention 
by NATO in 1999. The core issue was that a ninety percent Albanian majority
3
 in 
Kosovo had long wanted independence from the Republic of Serbia itself part of the 
Federal Yugoslav Republic (FRY). Under Milosevic, Serbia had annulled Kosovo‘s 
autonomy in 1989. A Kosovo Albanian separatist guerrilla movement, the Kosovo 
Liberation Army
4
 provoked a repressive reaction by Serbia and the International 
Community‘s attempts to broker peace in 1998-9 failed. NATO‘s intervention took the 
form of an air campaign launched in March and, then in June following negotiations, and 
the exit of Serb forces from Kosovo, the entry of a 50,000 strong NATO-led military 
force into Kosovo to conduct a peace support operation
5
 under a UN mandate.  The aim 
of the chapter is to establish evidence for the hypothesis that in such circumstances, 
beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct 
support to civilian interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and facilitate 
viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. This requires soldiers at all 
levels to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political direction and shape 
military operations that will impact decisively on political outcomes in order to help 
generate political progress towards sustainable peace. Successive chapters will apply the 
same approach to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  It is important again to underline 
the distinction between the broad brush of civil-military interaction and the more specific 
politico-military interaction implied by this hypothesis. 
 
The chapter will sketch the security, political, economic and social aftermath of war 
together with an analysis of the various elements comprising the mandate for the NATO-
led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and its civilian counterpart, the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK).  This will be followed by discussion of politico-military cooperation 
and campaign design to illustrate the extent of integration between the military and the 
political in planning.  Campaign execution will then be examined to demonstrate the 
effect of actions by commanders on the security and political domains.  The chapter will 
conclude with a short assessment of the results of the approaches described and the 
doctrinal implications resulting from the application of the hypothesis to this case study.  
Analysis will be based on primary source material to the fullest extent possible and the 
earlier literature on specific doctrinal lessons has already been addressed in chapter 2. 
 
The analysis will be limited to the first year following the entry of KFOR in June 1999 
covering tenure of a British Lieutenant General, Mike Jackson, and his German 
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successor, General Klaus Reinhardt. This is not to suggest that the problems faced by 
Kosovo, not least the lack of a final status, were solved by mid-2000.  The opposite was 
true; however what was in place was a workable, if imperfect, arrangement for detailed 
politico-military co-operation between KFOR and UNMIK in the pursuit of political 
ends over time.  (Given the requirements of the mandate there was also a good deal of 
successful wider civil-military coordination, for example in the humanitarian field). The 
account will remain impressionistic and will focus narrowly on the political and security 
nexus during a specific period.  There is insufficient space to provide an historical 
account of twelve centuries of conflict between Albanians and Serbs;
6
 the build up to 
NATO‘s military intervention in Serbia including Kosovo in 1999; the development of 
the political process over time; the eventual declaration of independence by Kosovo in 
February 2009; or subsequent events. Except where necessary to illustrate particular 
points on politico-military or multi-sector coordination, this chapter will not discuss the 
myriad of problems such as creating a viable international police force and integrating 
this with a 39 member NATO led military force; restarting the economy; or addressing 
the social consequences of ethnic war.  
 
2. The Problem Faced by the International Community in Kosovo in 1999-2000   
 
Figure 4.1 Map of Kosovo.  Source CIA.
7
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2.1. Security and the Rule of Law 
 
On 12 June 1999 a state of near anarchy greeted the arrival of the first elements of the 
NATO led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo.  By 20 June
8
 KFOR had conducted a 
―relief in place‖ 9  of Serbian Security elements and whilst major conflict had been 
avoided,
10
 the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were, temporarily, in the 
ascendancy. A climate of fear amongst Serbs and euphoria
11
 amongst Albanians 
prevailed.  Of the original population of some 2 million, over half were refugees, whether 
Albanian or Serb.  Many of the others were internally displaced with some 30-50% of the 
housing stock damaged or destroyed.  Albanian refugees were streaming back into the 
province eager to return home and either regain their possessions or in some cases 
replace these with items removed from the Serb Community.  Some Serbs were leaving 
and those that remained were frightened yet some were arrogant
12
 – having no real 
acceptance of the effect caused by the collective actions of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY).   
 
Both the Serb administration and the parallel Albanian version had largely disappeared.  
The infrastructure of the province was in a parlous state.  Vital water and power supplies 
were largely off, with Kosovo‘s own power stations abandoned.   Hospitals were barely 
functioning; public health was at risk. Schools, refuse collection, busses, telephones and 
the fire brigade had ceased to operate; many of the essential workers for these functions 
having departed.
13
  There was no gainful employment.  The general disenfranchisement 
of the Albanian population since the imposition of Serb domination a decade previously 
was having an impact as many Serbs, formerly in key managerial positions left their 
posts.  Conversely the Albanian population, although in the main euphoric, were in a 
state of shock and in no position to pick up the reins of public services at that stage.  In 
addition to this, NATO‘s air forces had destroyed much infrastructure including certain 
bridges, fuel supplies and barrack accommodation during the earlier bombing 
campaign.
14
   
 
The security system had completely broken down at the point when KFOR‘s mission 
commenced.  There were no police,
15
 no judges and no jails: there was no law and order. 
There was a ―dangerous vacuum‖16 following the Serb withdrawal. Such conditions have 
previously been termed the ―security gap‖17 (as discussed in Chapter 1).  In Kosovo this 
gap resulted in a climate of lawlessness, fear and apprehension.  The situation was 
characterised by paramilitary activity, ostensibly in the name of the ―victors‖ in the 
conflict whereby the actions of politically driven paramilitaries might be justified in 
terms of public need, or filling the ―gap‖.18  The KLA were quick to attempt to take on 
such a role to establish, consolidate and expand their power base in the immediate 
aftermath of the departure of the Serb Security forces from Kosovo.  Some became self-
styled ministers and argued that they were above the law.
19
 Albanian intimidation of 
Serbs was intense and many left following killing and abductions.
20
  Pristina initially saw 
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the highest apparent incidence of crime.  Many returning Kosovar Albanians were drawn 
there because housing in the city had been largely untouched by Serb paramilitaries. 
Additionally it was the home of many Serb officials and other professionals who were 
considered as war criminals by ethnic Albanians, making their residences vulnerable
21
 to 
forced expropriation.
22
 Nevertheless, into this barely hospitable environment some 
400,000 people moved back in the first week.  As KFOR‘s first commander explained 
―the refugee crisis solved itself‖23 and the majority of the refugees were back in the first 
month.
24
   
 
The challenge facing the international response elements in the light of these conditions 
was immense.  Under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 the UN Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) had overall responsibility for governing the province yet would need 
time to organise and deploy in sufficient numbers to make a difference.  An 
administrative vacuum had been expected by KFOR, but not perhaps to the extent that 
became apparent as the summer wore on.
25
  Increasingly, as winter approached, concern 
would grow over UNMIK‘s ability to deliver basic services and deal with the 
humanitarian challenge, let alone policing.
26
 This situation understandably had an impact 
on the perceptions of the host peoples.  Initial euphoria turned into impatience and 
frustration as the inability of the mandated authorities to fully conduct their role became 
apparent.
27
 
 
KFOR faced regional as well as internal security issues. Richard Shirreff, a British 
Brigade Commander arriving in Spring 2000 found that a complex security situation was 
emerging. This comprised a real external threat from the FRY, nascent Albanian 
extremism and inter-ethnic violence, mainly characterised by attacks on minority Serbs 
as well as organised crime. The external threat was countered to a degree by the 
establishment of a safety zone within Serbia as part of the provisions of the Military 
Technical Agreement (MTA); however this threat still had to be deterred conventionally 
thus drawing military resources away from the internal security problem.  Albanian 
political extremism included both attacks on Serbs, to drive them out, and internal rivalry 
between the KLA and the Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), where the KLA 
sought to achieve dominance. As another former British commander explained ―[h]ard 
line Albanian nationalists see themselves as victors in a war of national liberation and 
pursue their aims with the vigour and singularity that implies‖.28 Inter-ethnic violence 
saw scores being settled by Albanians and attacks on Serb and Roma families. 
Overlaying all of this was endemic criminal violence and organised crime as criminal 
networks both external and internal to Kosovo took advantage of the security gap and the 
elements of the KLA transformed towards organsised crime.
29
 
 
2.2. The Local Economy 
 
The initial report provided by the interim SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello, indicated a 
precarious economic outlook, 
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―…Well into summer, much of Kosovo‘s rich agricultural land lies fallow, a 
grave situation for a territory that relies heavily on agriculture for its livelihood. 
The industrial and manufacturing sector has been severely debilitated by a long-
standing lack of capital investment, and by damage caused by the conflict and in 
some cases by the departure of Kosovo Serb managers and staff. While an 
encouraging revival of commercial activity is evident, significant economic 
activity will continue to be hampered by the existing system of discriminatory 
property rights, lack of commercial or industrial finance, currency instability and 
other impediments. Payments systems and the financial services sector are largely 
non-functional. At present, much of Kosovo‘s current economic activity is 
confined to trading of scarce goods and services at inflated prices‖30 
 
2.3.  Social Issues and Attitudes in Kosovo. 
 
Kosovo society up to 1999 had been diverse in character. There was a clear distinction 
between the urban and rural populations. Ethnically diversity had seen Roma, Gorani, 
Bosniacs, Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks existing side by side. There had also been a 
tendency for Serbs to occupy key leadership and managerial positions throughout 
society. Within the Albanian majority both the KLA and a slightly more moderate 
political party the LDK were held in high esteem, given their, success in engineering 
NATO's intervention and the "liberation" of Kosovo. Yet there were apparent 
contradictions, for example many Albanians (not all) where highly reverential towards 
the presence of the Serb patrimonial sites in the province.
31
 Many Albanians realised that 
security and civilian administration had at least been better organised under the Serbs. 
Equally the remaining Serbs were proud and bloody minded to the extreme.
32
  One 
observer described a ―patchwork of disparate priorities and loyalties, with very little 
vertical influence or consensus about the appropriate use of political power‖.33  This brief 
sketch of a complex society points to a significant challenge for commanders in KFOR in 
understanding the background calibrating the best response when violence or political 
problems erupted. 
 
2.4. Mandate 
 
The Security Council, with 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, tasked the Secretary-General, 
―with the assistance of the relevant international organizations, to establish an 
international civil presence in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in order to 
provide an interim administration in Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can 
enjoy substantial autonomy.‖34  Bernard Kouchner, SRSG from July 1999 to January 
2001, was clear that this implied ―an administrative body, a government, and it was our 
task to build one even though we were not prepared for this task.‖ 35  His Principal 
Deputy, Jock Covey commented that the ―outcome of Kosovar sovereignty and all those 
things was intentionally clouded‖.36   
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No single agency had the capability to take on the enormity of the whole task
37
 and 
UNSCR 1244 mandated an ―International Civil Presence‖ which would have a composite 
mission structure based on 4 pillars:
38
  Pillar 1, Humanitarian affairs was headed by 
UNHCR (Pillar 1 was later to become Police and Justice under the UN); Pillar II, Civil 
Administration, including the police, was headed by the UN (DPKO); Pillar III, 
Institution Building, including police training, was headed by the OSCE and Pillar IV, 
Reconstruction, was headed by the EU.
39
  The picture was completed by the NATO-led 
KFOR who were given responsibility for security. This seemed fine on paper however 
most of the civilian organisations were represented by a handful of people, if at all, in the 
initial period and were expanded painfully slowly as the summer progressed.
40
  The 
paucity of human resources and functional capability within UNMIK was to have an 
impact on KFOR.   
 
UNMIK was mandated by the Security Council to administer Kosovo, therefore the 
SRSG could act as ―the legitimate civilian authority for the use of coercive force.‖41  This 
naturally would require KFOR to seek political guidance for planning and then, for 
specific operations, authority from UNMIK.  That said, KFOR remained the ultimate 
power base and UNMIK would remain weak in both political and practical terms and UN 
police would be very slow to deploy.
42
  The ―mission‖ given to the international security 
presence – the NATO-led KFOR - under UN Security Council Resolution 124443 was 
quite clear, from a purely tactical standpoint, as the tasks of the military and police 
presence were well delineated.
44
  (See Figure 4.2 below). 
 
Figure 4.2 KFOR’s Tasks Under UNSCR 1244 – Source UN45 
 
KFOR’s Tasks under UNSCR 1244 
Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a 
ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into 
Kosovo of Serb military, police and paramilitary forces;  
Demilitarising the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo 
Albanian groups;  
Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons 
could return home in safety, the international civil presence could operate, a 
transitional administration could be established, and humanitarian aid could 
be delivered;  
Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence could 
take responsibility for this task;  
Supervising demining until the international civil presence could, as 
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;  
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Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the 
international civil presence;  
Conducting border monitoring duties as required;  
Ensuring protection and freedom of movement for itself, the international 
civil presence, and other international organizations. 
 
General Jackson observed that having absolute clarity on the tasks to be done was 
helpful,
46
 and in the absence of an end-state, mission command needed to be applied. 
This was not for him a problem and there was no need to get hung up on it.
47
 The 
absence of a political bottom line was not entirely advantageous, as Major General Fry 
pointed out ―UNSCR 1244 avoids any definitive statement on Kosovo‘s final status in a 
manner, which has given comfort to adventurists in both communities and will continue 
to do so until Kosovar political society is mature enough for the international community 
to seek to define its external relationships‖. 48   This reality would drive subsequent 
planning and action by KFOR and UNMIK.   
 
2.5. Other Defining Instruments and Instructions  
 
Three agreements with the warring parties were to be key to the broad mandate for 
KFOR and UNMIK. First a Military Technical Agreement with the Governments of the 
Federal Yugoslav Republic (FRY) and the Republic of Serbia, second an Undertaking 
from the KLA, and third the subsequent establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps 
(KPC).  The Military Technical Agreement (MTA) was signed by Jackson for KFOR and 
by representatives of the governments of the FYR and the Republic of Serbia at 
Kumanovo, in Macedonia, on June 9, 1999.  The MTA stipulated that the Ground Safety 
Zone (GSZ) was the territory within ―a 5 kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo 
province border into the rest of the FRY territory.‖ Eleven days after the entry into force 
of the agreement, all FRY forces were required to complete their withdrawal to areas 
outside Kosovo and not within the GSZ. 
 
The KLA‘s ―Undertaking‖ to disarm was the result of direct negotiations between NATO 
and the KLA.  A negotiating structure had been established before KFOR and UNMIK‘s 
move to Kosovo and much of the politico-military negotiation was conducted for NATO 
in Albania by Major General John Reith.
49
 The final deal to renounce violence and 
acknowledge KFOR‘s sole authority under UNSCR 1244 was hammered out in a KLA 
base in Kosovo after the arrival of KFOR by Reith and Jamie Rubin (US Assistant 
Secretary of State) and the KLA commander Hashim Thaci and his field commander 
Agim Ceku representing the KLA.
50
   Following the Undertaking, the next step was 
announced on 21 September after a difficult negotiation.
51
  UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 
establishing the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Which stated that: ―The Kosovo 
Protection Corps shall be established as a civilian emergency service agency‖.52  The 
KPC would provide disaster response services; perform search and rescue; provide a 
capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas; assist in demining; and contribute 
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to rebuilding infrastructure and communities. There was to be no role in law enforcement 
or the maintenance of law and order
53
  This was to be only the beginning of a central 
strand of the Kosovo peace process: transforming the KLA.
54
 
 
Together these basic documents formed the ―mandate‖ of the international security 
presence which guided the actions of KFOR (and UNMIK) and provided providing the 
basis for actions in support of the various remits - principally creating a secure 
environment.   Taking into account the various aspects of the "mandate", General 
Jackson's assessment of his military mission was simple; he needed to ―do something to 
make things better‖.55 General Reinhardt, his successor saw it in equally simple terms ―to 
command my forces and to ensure that the situation within Kosovo stays calm‖.56 Yet 
these simple statements mask a difficult, complex and dangerous operating environment, 
where cooperative political and military action would be needed to bring ends ways and 
means into balance if violence was to be reduced and a viable political process 
established.   
 
2.6. KFOR’s Internal challenges 
 
Beyond the political boundary provided by the various elements of the mandate another 
issue would come to impact on Commander KFOR‘s decision-making and would in 
effect form a military boundary for his planning and action. This was the practical effect 
of multi-nationality within the force. National constraints and national interests
57
 would 
mean that multinational brigades, and within these some units, would often act 
independently or on direct instructions from their capitals. This ―fact of life‖58 was to 
limit the commander's freedom to manoeuvre his forces to the fullest effect, and would 
become particularly difficult when sensitive local political issues were involved, such as 
in dealing with Mitrovica
59
 and in some areas with the KLA.
60
 Senior British officers 
also argued that there was an imbalance of capabilities in KFOR, with many of the troops 
deployed being un-employable for any more than low level peacekeeping or static 
guarding tasks. Moreover highly capable Special Forces troops would not tend to be 
released by national contingents for direct employment by Commander KFOR.
61
   
 
A Statesman-like General 
 
"The responsibility of statesmen…is to resolve complexity, rather than to 
contemplate it".
62
 
 
There is no question that, throughout his time as Commander KFOR, General 
Jackson
63
 was acting under a political, media, humanitarian and military 
spotlight. The stakes were high.  The political and military situation was tense, 
controversial and complex; it demanded much of Jackson's analytical, leadership 
and negotiation skills. External instructions were often contradictory or out of 
date; however he was under intense personal pressure to resolve problems which 
seemed beyond short term political solutions. There was perhaps an element of 
  105 
the cult of personality in evidence, yet he remained self-effacing and not 
triumphal. Well aware that he was acting at the crucible of world opinion and of 
the human consequences of failure, he demonstrated the ability to influence the 
development of political will whilst acting as a coordinator and leader, driven by 
instinct and experience. Shaping local and international political will would be 
important to the General if he was to secure support at home and in the wider 
international community.  Such political will would provide the means which in 
turn would deliver political and military momentum. 
 
Two examples serve to illustrate how Jackson acted in a statesman-like manner, 
even before KFOR had arrived in Kosovo. The first was that he led the ostensibly 
military, but in reality political, negotiation to secure the Military Technical 
Agreement
64
 which would be the mechanism to get the Serbs out of Kosovo and 
the International NATO-led force in. This had to be closely choreographed with 
other moves on the international stage to halt the bombing campaign, secure a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution,
65
 and to deal with the Kosovo 
liberation Army (KLA) as they were cajoled towards both disarmament and 
recognising the authority of the international military force which would soon 
enter Kosovo. Given the somewhat chaotic external drafting process for the 
MTA, the on-off nature of the talks and the multiple stands of ongoing 
negotiation between various parties, Jackson was often left with either too many 
or too few external instructions; hence he had to rely on his own instincts in order 
to reassure the Serb side and facilitate the deal which would lead to a successful 
Serb withdrawal from Kosovo. 
 
The second example was Jackson‘s handling of the potentially explosive move by 
Russia to occupy Pristina airport on 11 June amid fears about possible partition of 
Kosovo and also over the nature of the command and control relationship 
between Russian troops and the NATO-led international military force to be 
deployed in Kosovo. Ordered twice by NATO's Supreme Commander, Gen 
Wesley Clark, to counter the Russian move by securing the airport, Jackson's 
instinct was to decline. He did this on the basis that such action would be in 
breach of the agreement with the Serbs, and the Russian move - whilst politically 
symbolic - had a negligible military impact on KFOR's needs. Blocking the 
airport would entail significant military risk and risk to the wider mission.  It 
would probably have caused a confrontation with uncertain and potentially 
dangerous geo-political ramifications.  Jackson's grasp of the wider picture helped 
him to act in a statesman-like manner, in the interests of the whole, yet amid 
conflicting intelligence reports and under significant pressure from the NATO 
Supreme Commander.
66
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3. The Big Ideas: Campaign Design  
 
3.1. Approaches to the Politico-Military Relationship, Process and Strategy 
 
Striking the right tone in the politico-military relationship was vital. General Sir Rupert 
Smith, DSACEUR at the time, explained at interview that there was a ―readiness to be 
multinational and subordinate for the collective good‖.67 Many of the key players in 
Kosovo knew each other from Bosnia where initially the arrangements had failed.
68
  
Jackson had seen the difficulties in Bosnia with the relationship between IFOR and Carl 
Bildt‘s civil administration and he was not going to let this happen again.69  Here Jackson 
was clear that absolute control rested with the SRSG, he had been given plenipotentiary 
powers, and that public symbolism was important in underlining this.
70
 He went further, 
the ―single sheet of music‖ 71  was imperative and must not be jeopardised; both he and 
his successor General Reinhardt set a personal example in this respect. SRSG Sergio de 
Mello
72
 and later Bernard Kouchner had a common understanding of this critical 
relationship.
73
  On dealing with specific issues, Jackson described a two man canoe going 
through rapids.  Paddlers would change places and the ―civilian would move to the front 
in dodgy political water‖ ,74 but the soldier would take the lead on the security task. 
Equally Jackson saw no problem in trying to influence the development of political will 
given the interwoven nature of the mission; here, daily meetings with SRSG were 
important to ―help to keep things straight and avoid wedges developing‖. 75   Covey 
agreed that there should be ―no ambiguity‖76 and understood that the initial focus was on 
the military mission ―because that was where lives were at risk‖.77  Yet he was clear that 
the military mission would fail without a political process in tandem and the political 
mission could not succeed without military input. Political primacy was assured, but 
peace building was clearly not going to be easy. The initial political strategy to take 
Kosovo forward is shown at figure 4.3 below. 
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Figure 4.3 An Initial Political Strategy. Source Derived by Author from Jock Covey
78
 
 
An Initial Political Strategy 
 
The political strategy over the first year was to seek incremental progress towards a 
situation where competition for power could be conducted through non-violent 
processes. The lines of effort to achieve this were: 
 
 Nurturing favourable conditions for political dialogue:  
 
          ○   Humanitarian relief, Electrical Power, Demobilization,  
          ○   Basic Services, Public Support, Victim‘s Grievances,  
          ○   Acquiescence of Influential Leaders   
 
 Mediating conflict incrementally 
 
 Building a working coalition to run a civil administration 
 
 Containing obstructionism 
 
 Channeling the competition for power into non-violent processes. 
 
There was a clear need to sustain momentum and ―keep the train moving‖79 and this 
strategy would require KFOR‘s active involvement at every stage.   
 
 
Ensuring political primacy with, among other things, active military support, would be 
vital in taking the initial political strategy forward. In terms of working processes, Covey 
helped to flesh out the principle of political primacy by suggesting the ―primacy of the 
peace process‖80 as the overarching directive to guide all efforts in support of the mission 
strategy. This boiled down to ―we support those who support 1244, and we oppose those 
who obstruct it‖.81  All actions by mission members should be judged by this yardstick.  
This concept was fully embraced by Jackson and his staff. 
 
This international political strategy – which was internal to UNMIK and KFOR - would 
need to be meshed with the local political process.  The required outcome would be to 
establish a democratic process in Kosovo and through this to shape what ―substantive 
authority‖ meant. Important in this would be setting up consultation processes, political 
structures then first municipal and later province-wide elections.
82
   
Although local political parties were in being, there was no local or international-local 
political process at the outset.  The UN Secretary-General underlined the need for 
confidence-building through involvement of political leaders of all communities in the 
decision-making processes of UNMIK in the medium term.
83
 Political consultations, led 
by UNMIK were soon underway to form a Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) in an 
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―attempt to bring together leaders of the various factions‖.84 There would also be an 
Interim Administrative Council (IAC).
85
 The KTC was established by Siergio de Mello 
in mid-June.  After difficult negotiations, the Albanians and then later the Serbs took 
part.
86
  But this was to be far from easy and later KFOR would play a significant role in 
facilitating this process and the eventual result.  Here, General Reinhardt explained at 
interview that links between the military force and Kosovo‘s political leaders were 
strengthened by Commander KFOR‘s presence on the IAC,87 in effect he was in the 
Cabinet.  Bernard Kouchner would subsequently emphasise that it was ―absolutely 
normal‖88 for KFOR to be involved in decision making, given the scope of problems and 
KFORs involvement. However the inclusion of locals in the administration, to help 
deliver the mandate, got off to a slow start and this increased frustration and a feeling of 
impotence.
89
   
 
3.2.  Communicating the Big Ideas: A Plan For Kosovo Without An End State  
 
Jackson explained that the military approach to planning was normally to use an ends 
ways means approach, but in Kosovo that was not possible: the ends were not clear.
90
 
NATO‘s strategic guidance had been slow in coming91 so he needed to accept reality and 
get on with what could be done upstream in order to discover ways and sequence the 
available means sensibly in the interim.
92
   Reality would bring out the multi actor and 
coordination problem.
93
  The KFOR headquarters planning staff and UNMIK had to 
develop a methodology that would deal with the practical situation, the lack of direction 
from NATO
94
, the lack of an end state
95
 and of course the civilian dimension.  Part of the 
solution was simply to apply the ―supporting‖ (KFOR) and ―supported‖ (UNMIK) 
approach, familiar from conventional military doctrine; and which was unequivocally 
mandated by UNSCR 1244.  The main effort would define relationships and who does 
what; this would change over time as solutions emerged
96
 as part of the transformation 
process, but the clear imperative was to erase distinctions between different military 
objectives and civilian objectives.  These must become ―civil-military objectives‖97.  In 
delivering these, the stark reality was that, whilst retaining primacy, UNMIK lacked both 
planning capabilities and field administrators: it had to be bolstered with military staff.
98
 
 
In a lecture to the UK‘s future senior military leaders, Major General Andrew Ridgway, 
Jackson‘s Chief of Staff in Kosovo, explained how the campaign plan was developed.99 
One thing that was clear was the direction provided by UNSCR 1244 and the 
requirement to support UNMIK.
100
 The innovative planning solution was to develop an 
interim end state which would describe the sort of things that were needed during the 
initial (undefined) period before the final end state was clear. (See Figure 4.4 below). 
This would help to suggest lines of operation and the key milestones, or decisive points, 
which would be needed to take things forward.  He suggested that, by applying this 
approach, tactical, but not yet strategic, success had been achieved:
101
 partly because the 
required strategic outcome remained unclear, but also because there was no coordinated 
regional approach to planning to take account of other Balkan conflicts and synchronise 
the international response.
102
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Figure 4.4 Kosovo - Developing The Lines of Operation. Source COS HQ ARRC
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KFOR and UNMIK planners developed the detail in June 1999 and the resulting interim 
end state for Kosovo is shown at Figure 4.5 below. The military force did not possess 
either the mandate of the means to deliver the outcomes identified by the interim end 
state.
104
  Hence an integrated approach was required; all of the players would need to 
take part in each line of development to a greater or lesser extent. Therefore appropriate 
command arrangements could only come from politico-military unity of effort and this 
was needed from the outset. General Jackson later characterised the overall command 
and control process as ―weaving the strands of the rope‖,105 the result being to strengthen 
each actor‘s efforts,106 although as Jackson pointed out ―all strands have a breaking 
strain‖.107 The United Nations did not have enough planners or other capabilities on the 
scale required to conduct the ―weaving‖  process, hence a supported and supporting108 
relationship was appropriate, with KFOR providing many of the necessary means, 
particularly planning.  
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Figure 4.5 Interim End State for Kosovo in June 1999. Source COS HQ ARRC
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INTERIM END STATE
• Effective UN Administration.
• Arrangements in place for local elections.
• Refugees returned to their homes.
• Ethnic communities no longer able to intimidate each other.
• UCK de-militarised and reintegrated into society.
• Nominal FRY forces undertake agreed activities within Kosovo.
• A growing appreciation of the benefits of respect for the rule of law.
• An independent UN appointed judiciary.
• An effective UN civilian police force.
• A recovering agricultural economic sector.
• Opportunities identified for economic diversification.
• Increasing inward investment.
• Reduction in inflation.
• The encouragement of further normalisation and improvement of 
conditions in Kosovo.
 
 
Covey explained that the politico-military planning arrangement between UNMIK and 
KFOR would also extend beyond the overall plan to the detail of current operations. ―On 
specific security operations, however, the joint planning framework became completely 
fused…as part of the operational planning cycle…[they]…produced a single piece of 
paper that integrated civilian and military activities‖. 110   All options were assessed 
against the simple yardstick: ―Does this action support the larger strategy…[and if not 
why not]?‖111  Covey further explained that both political and military leaders needed a 
nuanced understanding of each other‘s business.  Political managers needed to 
understand the importance, to military commanders, of balancing risks. They needed to 
provide commanders with objectives that were achievable, within a viable timeframe, 
and worthy of the military risks. Equally, commanders needed to embrace the key 
elements of the political strategy.  This included,  
 
 ―the necessity to make incremental gains, to cultivate ambiguity about desired 
ends, to sustain the demobilization effort, to neutralize militants, and to support 
other key efforts of the political transformation effort… [T]he military 
commander has to appreciate a diplomat‘s perspective…this is a process that 
continues in time as we reshape local attitudes, interests and behavior‖.112    
 
Major General Robert Fry, a former commander of MNB(C), explained at interview that 
planning needed to be both horizontally and vertically integrated. There had to be 
political and military cohesion and cohesion in practical terms. This meant that, 
horizonally, there was no point running sophisticated operations, for example to support 
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the police in conducting a high profile arrest if the necessary capability to deal with 
evidence or the judicial process, or the means to deal with the inevitable public disorder 
were not in place.  Equally, politically, actions needed to be vertically integrated because 
every action had a political effect which had to be thought through. The natural military 
urge was to have an effect rather than spectate, however effects should not be arbitrary, 
thus there needed to be cooperation and a rigorous planning process before deciding to 
take action
113
 and this action needed to be in unison.
114
  In early 2000 General Reinhardt 
issued a set of commander‘s priorities under a general directive all of which were 
designed to provide practical support and to secure the population‘s support to the peace 
process.  (See figure 4.6 below) This built on the earlier planning work, although still 
with no political end state. In effect it provided guidance to commanders on priorities and 
a sense of direction for each of these and the requirement for vertical and horizontal 
planning was implicit.  
 
Figure 4.6 COMKFOR’s General Directive 2000-2001. Source COS ARRC115 
 
COMKFOR’S GENERAL DIRECTIVE 
2000/2001
COMMANDERS INTENT
KFOR COG
INITIATIVE 
& 
COHESION
Main Effort
To maintain a safe 
and secure 
environment for the 
people of Kosovo
Opposing COG
THE ABILITY OF 
EXTREMIST 
GROUPS TO 
BREAK DOWN 
THE WILL OF THE 
PEOPLE TO 
SUPPORT THE 
PEACE PROCESS
WINTERISATION
Desired endstate is KFOR able to:
conduct operations
assist with UNMIK‘s requests for support
―OP POLAR‖
WINTERISATION
Desired endstate is KFOR able to:
conduct operations
assist with UNMIK‘s requests for support
―OP POLAR‖
ELECTIONS
Desired endstate is to assist UNMIK
in conduction of free and fair elections.
―OP BOXER‖
ELECTIONS
Desired endstate is to assist UNMIK
in conduction of free and fair elections.
―OP BOXER‖
RETURNS
Desired endstate is the safety of any 
Serbs or other minorities who wish to 
return to KOSOVO.
―OP PRODIGAL‖
RETURNS
Desired endstate is the safety of any 
Serbs or other minorities who wish to 
return to KOSOVO.
―OP PRODIGAL‖
FRY ENGAGEMENT
Desired endstate is to acheive normal 
cross boundary relations between
KFOR/UNMIK and FRY forces.
FRY ENGAGEMENT
Desired endstate is to acheive normal 
cross boundary relations between
KFOR/UNMIK and FRY forces.
KPC RELATIONSHIP
Desired endstate is for the KPC to 
become professional, disciplined, 
multiethnic organisation serving all 
elements of society and integrated 
with UNMIK.
KPC RELATIONSHIP
Desired endstate is for the KPC to 
become professional, disciplined, 
multiethnic organisation serving all 
elements of society and integrated 
with UNMIK.
JOINT OPERATIONS
Desired endstate is for KFOR and 
UNMIK to conduct effective Ops to 
counter the threat to a safe and secure 
environment
―OP UNITY‖
JOINT OPERATIONS
Desired endstate is for KFOR and 
UNMIK to conduct effective Ops to 
counter the threat to a safe and secure 
environment
―OP UNITY‖
MINORITIES
Desired endstate is for minorities to 
enjoy quality of life equal to K 
Albanians without military security
―OP TRAVELLER‖
MINORITIES
Desired endstate is for minorities to 
enjoy quality of life equal to K 
Albanians without military security
―OP TRAVELLER‖
CITIZENSHIP
Desired endstate is the population to 
respect the rule of law and the duties 
of citizenship within a democracy.
CITIZENSHIP
Desired endstate is the population to 
respect the rule of law and the duties 
of citizenship within a democracy.
 
 
 
3.3.  An Example of Integrated Planning at the Local (tactical) level  
 
Brigadier Richard Shirreff, the commander of 7 UK Armoured Brigade explained that he 
was not given a formal mission by KFOR on which to base his planning. Therefore he 
had to derive his own based on UNSCR 1244. The question was how to use military 
force in support of the Kosovan political process?  The main issue was the security 
threat; the mission that Shirreff and his staff derived was to ―maintain security within the 
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KFOR area of responsibility as part of the UNMIK-led political process in order to create 
peace and security…‖.116 Shirreff‘s Chief of staff Major Richard Williams understood 
that they had to drive down violence in order to set conditions for a non-violent political 
dialogue, even if the strategic goal was a moving target,
117
  but this had to be done 
sensitively because "we or they can kick violence up or down".
118
  Figure 4.7 below 
illustrates the relationship between positive or negative actions by KFOR and the level of 
violence.  Therefore Williams explained that the key planning constraint was: 
 
 ―do not score home goals. When contemplating an action [or] operation, if it 
doesn‘t advance the political process then do not do it in the way that you first 
planned. Try and adjust it so that the benefits outweigh the costs, if this can‘t be 
done …do not do it.‖119 
 
Figure 4.7 Multi-National Brigade (Centre) Illustration of the Effect of Key Positive 
and Negative Actions by KFOR on the Level of Violence in Kosovo during 
February – August 2000. (Source 7 UK Armoured Brigade)120 
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Shirreff assessed the ―enemy‖ centre of gravity to be the Serbian or Kosovar ―willingness 
to use violence to achieve political ends‖.121  Therefore a concept of operations was 
developed to focus security, information, and civil-military effort to have an effect on 
this centre of gravity. This brought a significant command and control challenge and 
emphasised the need for close political direction over the various lines of operation.
122
 
Over time, the MNB(C) ―campaign plan‖123 to coordinate this effort evolved to include 
five lines of operation.  First, providing security against the external threat from Serbia, 
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in accordance with the Military Technical Agreement.
124
  Second, providing a secure 
internal environment, stopping inter-ethinic killing, protecting key sites and conducting 
operations against crime (with the police). Third, transforming the Kosovo Protection 
Corps, including training on non-military lines, keeping them usefully occupied through 
constructing infrastructure, raising their standing, ensuring compliance, and seizing 
weapons). Fourth, conducting civil military operations (CIMIC) to support infrastructure 
and help the population. Finally, an overarching activity of information operations, using 
both media and psychological operations, to project positive messages in support of the 
overall effort.
125
 Designing and executing these complex plans would demand both 
politico-military and civil-military cohesion.   
 
3.4.  Planning with local actors 
 
Military commanders made an effort regularly to meet key political players in Pristina 
and elsewhere.  Interaction with local actors, particularly the KPC/KLA, was important.  
It provided information, context, and understanding of their ambitions and ―the grounds 
of goodwill, reconciliation and multi-ethnicity‖126 which would in turn help KFOR with 
planning. As discussed above, in the political domain the KFOR commander was a 
member (with observer status) of Kosovo‘s then "Cabinet", The Kosovo Transitional 
Council. At interview General Reinhardt commented that he ―met twice a week in the 
provisional government which gave us the chance to co-ordinate our activities with the 
local leaders.‖ 127  These and frequent other meetings with local political leaders at 
province and local level were ―intended to influence and change the course of events‖.128 
Among other things, these interactions would provide opportunities to manage the 
expectations of the KPC.
129
 
 
4. Executing the big ideas: campaign execution 
 
This section will first illustrate specific examples of campaign execution in order to 
demonstrate the impact of positive actions by commanders both in the military and 
political spheres. It will then discuss more challenging issues compounded by the twin 
peril of divisions within the international and the local communities. 
 
4.1. Achieving a Positive Political Effect Through Military Activity  
 
Jackson explained that the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was established for military 
and security reasons, but with a political effect.
130
 This decision and the ensuing process 
were widely debated in capitals,
131
 but it was the best means for dealing with Ceku and 
his cohort. The former KLA had to be managed and kept visible,
132
 there was no stomach 
to fight them, and they needed to be locked into a democratic framework,
133
 yet retain 
some sense of identity,
134
 with ―only harmless tasks‖135Even though the KLA in effect 
remained as a quasi-military organisation, the KPC solution would strategically ―fix‖136 
or restrain the KLA, until such time as a different future role might emerge.
137
 For the 
short term they would be transformed into a 3,000-strong civilian defence body. This 
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would not prove to be easy particularly because the KLA was itself prone to inter-
factional killing and had strong links with organised crime.  The situation was 
particularly difficult at the outset during the key demobilisation and disarmament phase. 
This put a premium on cooperation with all agencies, not least because employment 
would need to be found for the disbanding members of the KLA who would not join 
KPC. One avenue here was for suitable individuals to join the new Kosovo Police 
Academy. This immediately emphasised the need to develop one of the "strands of the 
rope", the rule of law, and saw pressure from KFOR on the OSCE to accelerate the 
development of the a police Academy at Vucitrin which was part of the OSCE‘s remit.138 
 
The KLA committed to disbandment as a military force along a prescribed 90 day 
timetable from the signing of the Undertaking on Demilitarization and Transformation by 
Thaci with Jackson on 21 June, known as K Day.
139
 As SRSG Kouchner pointed out, the 
terms of the Undertaking and the subsequent KPC establishment were to form an integral 
part of the Kosovo peace process with much political, military, police and economic 
peace building effort over the coming years. The concept of completing demilitarization 
through the transformation of former fighting forces was well established in 
peacekeeping practice, and it became important in the Kosovo peace process as a result 
of the KLA Undertaking presented to KFOR.
140
  From K Day secure weapon sites were 
to be established and KLA members were to move to assembly areas within 7 days; 
further disarmament, including rifles, was required within 30 days (a limited number of 
side arms were permitted for protection of certain individuals); and within 90 days (19 
September) KFOR would take over weapons storage sites and KLA should have 
demilitarised.  
 
Once the KLA had been demilitarised the KPC would be subject to the authority of 
UNMIK whilst KFOR would supervise the transformation process.  Here KFOR used a 
Joint Implementation Committee both at Province level and with the KPC‘s regional task 
groups, as a mechanism to check on progress and hold members of the KPC to 
account.
141
  Progress with the KPC would help to move things along politically, it helped 
send a message to the former KLA commanders that the only way ahead was through he 
democratic route and not by force of arms.  Indeed some chose this route, however many 
members were simply thugs and self serving bandits, hence incidents, violence and 
intimidation continued.  An ICG report in March 2000 suggested that former KLA 
activity then had four pillars: political, military, police and organised crime. KLA 
supporters had a political party, the Party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo (PPDK). 
Other members had joined the KPC,
142
 and some the Police Service (KPS).  Such overt 
activities were acceptable yet the remaining element of KLA activity was ―covert and 
utterly unacceptable – organised crime and violence‖. 143  These four strands were 
interwoven but each would need to be dealt with by the International Community.  Much 
of the KLA‘s violence would be directed against the minority groups, particularly the 
remaining Serbs. Dealing with this problem would form a locus for other interwoven 
problems in Kosovo, notably the absence of geo-strategic direction, the absence of rule 
of law capacities, and challenges to KFOR‘s own cohesion, would intersect with the 
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intense difficulties faced in dealing with the minorities issue.  Here KFOR‘s actions 
would have mixed effects on the overall political situation. 
 
The vertical integration imperative explained above is neatly illustrated by the matter of 
dealing with the Serb minority. As Bernard Kouchner explained in 2001, the remaining 
Serbs were just as important as the Albanians in Kosovo.
144
 The political intent here was 
to protect the minority and to give the Serbian leadership confidence to re-enter the 
political process.
145
    Reinhard spoke for the SRSG and himself.  ―The protection of 
minorities is a key component of the UNMIK/KFOR strategy…Both the SRSG and I are 
opposed to any further Serb isolation which would result in invent greater divisions 
within Kosovo‖.  To back up these words he shifted military effort towards dealing with 
crime, particularly that against ethnic minorities.
146
  At interview General Reinhardt 
explained that KFOR‘s actions in breaking a freedom of movement imbroglio for the 
Serb enclave of Orahovac in the West of Kosovo, showed that his decisions on military 
activity helped move the political process forward.
147
 He and Kouchner visited Orahovac 
to understand the Serb minority‘s concerns.  In common with other similar groups the 
Serb community was ―armed, frightened, angry and aggressive‖.148  Serbs maintained 
their own checkpoints around the city in a form of standoff against the KFOR units in the 
area. The situation was further complicated by the presence of Russian KFOR units, 
overtly sympathetic to the to the Serb minority. Ultimately KFOR‘s stubbornness in 
Orahovac through negotiation with both the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians solved the 
freedom of movement problem and provided much needed confidence to the Serb 
population in the area. However this essentially political effort, largely brokered by the 
local Netherlands Battalion Commander, did not please his national authorities.  For 
them, this was beyond the military remit.
149 
 Nevertheless it helps to illustrate the core 
point of this thesis. 
 
Elsewhere in early 2000 Brigadier Shirreff, commander of MNB(C), recognised that 
attacks on the Serb minority were serious and could ultimately lead to wider mission 
failure
150
 for UNMIK. Therefore protecting the minorities against Albanian extremism 
had to have a high military prioritiy, if the nascent political process was to succeed.  This 
understanding was achieved through daily meetings with Jock Covey and other UNMIK 
key players.
151
  Following detailed joint planning, Operation Trojan was launched by 
KFOR and UNMIK to protect and reassure the Serb Minority population in MNB(C)‘s 
area of operations. 
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Operation Trojan – Achieving An Indirect Political and Security Effect152 
 
On his arrival in the Province, Brigadier Shirreff, Commander MNB (C) assessed 
that action was necessary to alleviate the conditions of the minority population in 
his area of operations.  The operation was designed not only to help the Serbs but 
in so doing to have a direct security, and therefore political, impact. Reducing the 
ongoing Serb exodus and encouraging their political leaders to join the political 
process was seen as a clear political imperative which needed to be achieved by 
June 2000, the 12 month anniversary of the entry of NATO and the planned UN 
review of UNSCR 1244.     
 
The focus was on the Serb population, concentrated in Gracanica.  This was 
steadily reducing in numbers due to intimidation by property agents, members of 
the KPC, thugs and arsonists. 1200 Serbs had left since October 1999.  The aim 
of Operation Trojan was to protect and enhance all vital needs of the community: 
security; freedom of movement; and access to medical facilities, markets, 
communication media, jobs and churches. A staged approach was adopted with 
limited and achievable objectives.  These included: information gathering, 
operations to protect crop planting, efforts to determine the needs of the Serbs, 
targeting of property agents, provision of a surge of medical support
153
 and 
policing the actions of the Kosovo Protection Corps in the area.  Further 
operations were intended to detain and arrest key thugs, improve road access, 
provide for mobile markets, provide a radio station provide telephones, provide a 
confidential help line, deal with property law issues and assist with agricultural 
sales and trade.   These were not all military activities, but represented a 
comprehensive approach in partnership with the humanitarian and political 
sectors.  
 
Operation Trojan provides a good example of combined civil-military planning 
directed at the needs of the minority (primarily) Serb community, achieved, in 
part through helping NGOs to focus their spending power.   The security effect of 
this essentially humanitarian work was magnified by information operations: 
Advertisements in Serb news papers, radio station broadcasts, and word of mouth 
spread by patrols on the ground were all used for this purpose, and future multi-
ethnic projects were planned.  This activity was coincident with the agreement of 
the first Serb leaders (Bishop Artimje,
154
 Dr Trajkovic, and Father Sava) to join 
the Joint Interim Administrative Structure as observers.   
 
Operation Trojan, launched with the support of the Serb community, was not without its 
challenges and Albanian extremism continued.
155
 Nevertheless this KFOR-led and 
coordinated essentially humanitarian effort provides an example of KFOR‘s efforts to  
improve the conditions for the Serb minority.  This helped reassure key Serb figures 
(Bishop Artimje, Dr Trajkovic, and Father Sava) that UNMIK and KFOR were sensitive 
to the concerns of the Serb minority.   The former decided to join the JIAC
156
 as 
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observers during the period of the operation and KFOR provided them with physical 
protection
157
 to enable their participation. Viewed at the theatre level, it is clear that the 
military effort to protect the Serb minority and its leaders delivered a direct political 
effect by protecting the peace process.  
 
4.2. Constraints on Delivering Progress 
 
Despite the positive developments indicated above there were significant constraints on 
progress.  In early 2000, Reinhardt wrote that KFOR and UNMIK‘s ―synchronised 
strategic vision‖, 158  was supported by practical assistance and joint planning. His 
strategic imperatives, drawn from UNSCR 1244 would support the political remit as 
discussed above.
159
 Now more than ever before, KFOR and UNMIK were dependent on 
each other for success.  However both faced significant constraints on helping to deliver 
wider political progress.  KFOR‘s internal challenges were driven by the multinational 
makeup of the force and differing political perspectives.
160
  At interview General 
Reinhardt explained that most nations often did not allow their troops to be moved out of 
their assigned areas; also two nations pulled out forces because it was too dangerous. A 
force of 50,000 was reduced to 39,000 in two months without coordination with him and 
yet his mission was unchanged.
161
  Many contributing governments also placed 
significant restrictions on their troops, forbidding redeployment across the province.
162
 
These restrictions were mainly to avoid risk and naturally each nation had its own 
political calculus for deploying troops.  Yet cost also played a part because nations 
wanted to protect their financial investments in local reconstruction programmes.  These 
constraints served to emphasise the absence of true unity of effort and the local nature of 
separate campaigns conducted in the MNB areas.  Brigades would take root and hence 
limited Commander KFOR‘s ability to conduct real manoeuvre and so deliver coherent 
improvement to the security situation.
163
 The problem was not confined to KFOR.  A 
contemporary NATO briefing obliquely criticised nations for inadequately resourcing 
UNMIK, explaining that,   
 
―KFOR‘s efforts would be even more effective if Kosovo had a stronger 
international police presence and a properly functioning judicial system. But 
UNMIK has been severely hampered by a shortage of financial resources and 
personnel, particularly police. The lack of an effective court system makes it 
extremely hard to crack down on criminals, giving them a feeling of impunity. 
This in turn makes it harder to deal with the most serious public order problem in 
Kosovo, the security of minority populations. These issues need to be addressed 
urgently.‖164 
 
Some KFOR contingents took a strict view on the primacy of military activities and these 
were not always coordinated directly to achieve a political effect, on occasion the reverse 
was the true.  Dr Stephanie Blair, a former UNMIK municipal administrator in 
Djacovica/Gjakova, explained that a security operation may well achieve a narrow 
military objective but, unless planned and coordinated with the civilian authority, the 
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results could be negative, particularly in view of the fragility of the political situation.  
She described an incident where the local KFOR brigade arrested a KLA member who 
was also had a self-appointed political role.  The effect of this was to inflame local 
opinion which resulted in public disturbances.  This eroded local consent and put 
UNMIK in ―a very precarious position in terms of operating, living even, in the town‖.165  
The locals‘ ―confidence in the overall integrity of the international community, be they 
civilian or military‖166  was reduced and this caused unnecessary ripples in the political 
path.  Unfortunately, such incidents of failure to coordinate were not unusual.  Dr Blair 
further commented that the Brigade Commander in question ―described himself as being 
on a ‗war footing‘ and had no comprehension of the political impact of his actions‖.167 
 
The crosscutting challenges for UNMIK and KFOR are well illustrated by the example 
of Mitrovica an ethnically divided city in the northern part of Kosovo which itself was 
part of an ethnically Serb area whose potential secession was a looming issue on the 
political agenda.
168
  Here Serbs mainly lived to the north of the River Ibar and Albanians 
to the south. The bridges across the river would provide a natural flashpoint for protest 
and violence and the opposing communities intimidated the other side‘s minorities in 
their midst.
169
  The local KFOR contingent was a French Brigade.   It is apparent that 
General Reinhardt, in common with those before and after him, was particularly 
bedevilled by this problem.  He explained that ―The challenge in Mitrovica, as in the 
whole of Kosovo, is to convince the population that there will be no partition and that it 
is possible for the two main communities to co-exist peacefully.‖170  He understood that 
part of the problem would be sustaining the international community‘s resolve and that 
the locals had to understand this or the donor money would dry up.
171
  Reinhardt wanted 
to change the situation in Mitrovica and crack down on the public order disturbances and 
violence by ethnic extremists on both sides.  However the local brigade commander 
refused to obey Reinhardt's direct instructions because he had contrary instructions from 
Paris.   France, although strongly criticised for this,
172
 did not wish to upset their ―Serb 
friends‖.173  SACEUR could not help, nor could the NATO Secretary General.174  
Equally the French SRSG would be in a difficult position over intervening with Paris.   
 
Anthony Welch a former UNMIK Administrator in Mitrovica explained at interview that 
French commanders at the tactical (brigade) level made an effort to establish a 
relationship with him, fully understood the local problem, and coordinated their activities 
where possible. Yet, irrespective of the explicit requirements of UNSCR 1244, French 
sovereign policy was not to upset the Serbs and, for the military, tactical force protection 
was increasingly a priority.
175
  There were also doubts over what outcome the UN in 
New York wanted over this part of Kosovo: should they accept the on the ground de 
facto reality
176
 of partition or push against it?
 177
 Thus, with no top level clarity on what 
was required, with inadequate UN police, and a contrary French military contingent 
concerned about casualties, (and a French SRSG), then decisive military action to quell 
and address the causes of the violence would not happen.  Actions would be limited to 
addressing the symptoms at best and passivity at worst. Equally there is no evidence of 
local military efforts to nurture the local political process. Indeed they could be accused 
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of complicity with soft ethnic cleansing.  One result was that both communities lost ―all 
faith in the KFOR troops and UN police [ability] to keep law and order effectively or to 
protect their community from the predations of the paramilitaries on the other side‖.178 
This meant that each side would retain its own defences.  Paradoxically, this approach 
was not without cost for the French military contingent given their own high casualties in 
Mitrovica.
179
  In the absence of security for the population it would not be possible for 
the international community to pursue the political or economic measures necessary to 
bring stability and build peace.
180
  The bottom line was that the coalition of the willing 
supporting political primacy in theatre would only extend so far.  It would not serve to 
help defuse the problem of Mitrovica because there was no such coalition of the willing 
at a higher level over the status of Kosovo as a whole or Mitrovica as a part of it: hence 
the incomplete answer provided by UNSCR 1244.  Ultimately this meant that UNMIK 
was prevented from fully exercising its authority in Mitrovica and Northern Kosovo;
181
 
militant Albanians and Serbs in and around Mitrovica would continue to exploit this 
situation for their own ends.   
 
5. Conclusions  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the case of Kosovo provides evidence to support the 
hypothesis that, beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders should 
provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and 
facilitate viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. During the period in 
Kosovo in question this reality of contemporary operations was demonstrated by senior 
commanders who brought in theatre political primacy to life.  They took specific actions 
to foster a healthy politico-military relationship with their civilian counterparts, who 
reciprocated with alacrity. Building on this relationship commanders‘ helped plan and 
execute significant steps to help kick start the political process as part of a holistic 
approach.  Here commanders‘ contacts with local interlocutors on both sides of the ethnic 
divide were important.  Getting the political process moving was a paramount 
requirement and notably KFOR helped to bring the Serbs to the table. Commanders also 
worked to deliver their given mission to provide a secure environment and provide 
practical support to the under-resourced civilian mission which needed significant 
assistance in order to keep the show on the road.  This is not to suggest that all was rosy. 
 
Notwithstanding an explicit mandate and significant First World troop contributions, the 
international community in Kosovo was hanging on precariously over a number of 
unresolved issues during the period in question.  These included the political outcome 
and local political process, provision of security and policing, demilitarisation, 
administration,
182
 and the ability to conduct decisive security operations. There was no 
international political consensus over a desired outcome and final status talks were a 
distant prospect.
183
 Perhaps unsurprisingly there was no Balkans-wide strategy or 
campaign plan which would have helped to coordinate efforts to deal with cross border 
political and security issues.
184
 KFOR was not able to match its apparent military 
potential due to troop contributors‘ caveats and in some cases direct political control of 
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their contingents, hence top military commanders were constrained.
185
 The case of 
Mitrovica in particular demonstrates that military support to local political primacy had 
its limits. 
 
In these circumstances politico-military planning had to be ad hoc and incremental. 
Violence against minorities remained pervasive and the population were not secure, 
particularly in minority enclaves or ethnic flashpoints.  Providing a safe and secure 
environment remained a challenge and progress was incremental.
186
 KFOR would 
increasingly be criticised for not doing enough to protect Serb minorities or go after 
extremists.  The UNMIK-led political process was slow to gain momentum, partly 
because the first municipal or province-wide elections had not yet taken place; hence 
Kouchner suggested that democracy was not implemented, nor was the ―substantial 
autonomy‖ required by UNSCR 1244.187  Also, with a few exceptions, the economic 
prospects were poor. Meanwhile, a victorious separatist army, which had significant links 
with organised crime, had to adjust, to new realities. But not all members were willing to 
do so and Albanian extremism remained a pervasive problem.
188
  Policing was poor and 
crime rife; delivery of transitional authority and with this government services was 
patchy and under resourced.   
 
5.1. Practical Results.   
 
UNMIK‘s weak capacity and KFOR‘s multi national issues help to explain the challenge 
provided to commanders in this type of operation.
189
 Despite this seemingly non-viable 
situation, Kouchner and his first two military commanders, Jackson then Reinhardt set 
the right tone.  There was a near fusion of civil and military leadership at the top.
190
  
Kouchner was clear that without a tight civil-military relationship it would not have been 
possible to ―implement politics and get a grip on the violence‖, 191  therefore ―nous 
réagissions toujours ensemble, civils et militaries mêlés‖.192 Here Clausewitz would have 
recognised a situation where the General was indeed a Statesman with a seat in Cabinet 
so that he could know and help shape, but not direct, state policy.
193
  This arrangement 
enabled innovative planning solutions;
194
 and senior leaders presented a united face to 
local interlocutors. The arrangement was ―more successful than it had been in Bosnia‖.195  
New approaches included the establishment of a political strategy designed to make 
incremental gains and an interim end state for Kosovo to provide a sense of direction and 
enable detailed planning and execution. This was taken forward by a cross-sectoral 
approach to detailed planning or ―weaving the strands of the rope‖.196  KFOR‘s mandate 
in this was principally to help take violence out of the political calculus and to support its 
weak and under resourced political partner.   
 
As the campaign unfolded, KFOR would play an important role in delivering security.  
This involved efforts to deter an external threat, protect the population and important 
sites as well as operations against extremists and organised crime which would involve 
killing or capturing of miscreants in coordination with the police.  Beyond this, KFOR 
had direct access to many of the local political players and was deeply involved in 
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nurturing the political process.  This peace building activity went beyond the UN 
Security Council Mandate and involved working on both Albanians and Serbs in the 
political dimension. On the Albanian side Ceku would be persuaded, partly through 
security operations, but also via the grind of the JIC process, that there was ultimately no 
alternative to the political route, and that meaningful activity for the KPC would at least 
sustain some form of aspiration for a different future.  Equally a small number of the 
Serb community‘s leaders were given the confidence and also physical security to 
participate in the political process.
197
  
 
Much was achieved, albeit many problems could not be solved.  Using a most basic 
yardstick; the murder rate was significantly reduced over the first year from an average 
of over 50 a week to 3-4.
198
  Of equal importance, and as a direct result of an improving 
security situation for minorities and the efforts to contain the KLA/KPC, violence for 
political ends was reduced and the local political process was underway. UNMIK and 
KFOR had ―finally won the confidence and cooperation of both Kosovo Albanians and 
Serbs‖.199  This would set the conditions for eventual elections and further developments 
to the political process both within and outside Kosovo. The challenge would remain the 
resourcing and co-ordination of the overall peace implementation process at the province 
level: without this the military, and by extension police, effort could not progress beyond 
local containment.  
 
5.2. Implications for doctrine 
 
An updated version of UK peace support operations doctrine (JWP 3-50 2
nd
 ed)
200
 
captured some of the innovations described above in terms of planning and the notion of 
adopting a comprehensive approach which is now mainstreamed, at least as a concept. 
The idea of the primacy of the peace process was also published elsewhere.
201
 Jackson‘s 
point that ―everything you do has an effect on attitudes‖ 202 took a decade to emerge in 
British stability operations doctrine; today the ―idea that all activity has influence‖203 is a 
core theme.  However the important
204
 and specific role of commanders in supporting the 
political or peace process has not been captured.  Beyond creating a safe and secure 
environment, a specific peace building role emerged whereby the military commander 
would enable political solutions by helping to secure active local engagement
205
 in the 
political process. He would do this by actively designing and conducting operations at 
the tactical level to achieve a political effect – taking violence out of the local political 
equation
206
 - and so contribute to peace building. This had not been seen before in a 
mission supporting a UN operation or as a feature of UN peacekeeping.  Here KFOR 
designed and executed security operations specifically to meet and nurture UNMIK‘s 
political peace building purpose.  In this respect the relationship was well in advance of 
that rather tentatively suggested in the UN‘s ―Capstone Doctrine‖ for complex peace 
operations issued nearly a decade later
207
 which was reviewed in Chapter 3. 
 
To bring this to life it is helpful again to envisage an ―acceptable political bandwidth for 
military activity‖ as an emerging conceptual model for the design and conduct of 
  122 
campaigns.  The basic intent is to help sustain open ended positive political progress.  
There are two subjective virtual boundaries that the commander needs to bear in mind.  
On one side there lie the requirements of the military mission and the permissions 
granted in terms of the application of military force.  Here, matters of mission 
accomplishment, military risk, acceptability and legality need to be judged.  On the other 
side lies a political boundary.  This would be an assessment of the impact on the level of 
violence and on the political process of proposed or past actions. The ability to make or 
hinder political progress is the core yard stick against which all actions would be 
judged.
208
 Practice in Kosovo in 1999-2000 suggests that these military and political 
boundaries were understood by commanders in their wider political dealings and 
campaign execution. 
 
The requirement for politico-military synergy, for the commander to be in the political 
mind, and in some cases to be the political mind, seems clear.  This mitigates for the 
relationship with the senior civilian partner, to be seen as fundamentally political.  This 
suggests that the cooperative model at this level should be described as a politico-
military rather than the more usual civil-military relationship.  That is not to say that 
broader civil-military relationships are not important; KFOR clearly demonstrated this 
with its response to the humanitarian problem and support to reconstruction efforts.
209
  
Nevertheless the core point in this thesis is that commanders need to act to secure 
political outcomes and this requires a central politico-military relationship at the top. 
Other civil-military layers can be built on this as necessary. 
 
The next chapter will discuss the case of Iraq and will illustrate some alternative 
approaches to the politico-military relationship in the wake of an intervention in 2003 
which was followed by state breakdown, an extremely violent and virulent insurgency 
and near civil war.  The US led Coalition response was at first seriously inadequate and 
suffered a series of reverses in the face of growing violence, not least because the 
Coalition failed to conceive, plan, resource and execute a coherent politico-military 
campaign.  Amongst other things this situation provided the stimulus for the 
development of a new US counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006. As discussed in Chapter 
3, this doctrine essentially embraced a population-centric state building approach which 
would necessitate a close politico military relationship at its core and the deployment of 
significant numbers of US troops and civilians in order to address insurgency and foster 
host nation solutions.  This doctrinal approach was later adopted with some success in 
2007-2008 and saw efforts to secure the population in advance of a planned hand off to 
Iraqi security forces. 
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Chapter 5 Iraq 2003-2008: Hard Lessons1 
 
“If war is a battle of wills, then counterinsurgency, which we know is the darkest and 
the infernal place in Hell itself, is the resolve of everyone's will.” Lieutenant General  
Graeme Lamb
2
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The US led campaign in Iraq, a major episode in the "war on terror‖ in the post-9/11 
era, saw Saddam Hussein's assumed possession of WMD used as a pretext to effect 
regime change. A short state-on-state conflict from 20 March to 9 April 2003 
succeeded due to the United States‘ technical and mechanical advantages.3  However 
there was no clearly understood sense of what Iraq was supposed to look like after 
regime change had been effected or how this was to be achieved after the termination 
of combat operations.
4
 The aim of this chapter is to establish evidence, from the case 
of Iraq, for the hypothesis that in such circumstances, beyond their specific security-
related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian 
interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and facilitate viable political 
outcomes in peace and stability operations. This approach needs soldiers at all levels 
to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political direction and shape 
military operations that will impact decisively on political outcomes in order to help 
generate political progress towards sustainable peace.  
 
It is now widely understood that, in Iraq, ―[t]here was no Coalition civil-military plan 
for the post invasion phase,‖ 5  this phase is known amongst military planners as 
―Phase 4‖.6 On the face of it, this is surprising7 given the plethora of debate and 
advice available from the think tank community and within the US Army itself,
8
 as 
well as the well documented post World War Two experience of reconstruction 
operations. Pre-war estimates had suggested that a significant force of 500,000 troops 
would be needed to maintain security in post war Iraq.
9
  But this did not sit well with 
US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld‘s view of military transformation which envisioned 
smaller agile units backed by technological enablers;
10
 therefore troop numbers were 
restricted. Equally, the US Administration assumed that there would be a rapid Iraqi 
political transformation, with resumption of sovereignty, governance and security by 
Iraqis. Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Coalition 
response was at first seriously inadequate in both political and military terms and 
suffered a series of reverses leading to near collapse.
11
 An approach of essentially 
ignoring the emerging insurgency
12
 would fail by early 2004. A subsequent strategic 
shift to transition, with an emphasis on building up and supporting Iraqi security 
forces, could not surmount a toxic mixture of Sunni insurgency, Al Qaeda in Iraq, 
Shiite militancy and latent Kurdish unrest, and this intensified into a sectarian conflict 
in 2006. The Iraqis would not be able to protect themselves or their political and 
economic reconstruction in the face of these real challenges.   
 
The imbalance of ends ways and means
13
 would eventually be addressed by a 
politico-military ―surge‖ during 2007-8. This ―New Way Forward‖14 strategy sought 
to deliver specific improvements to the security, political and economic situation. The 
ways would be the application of a new US counterinsurgency doctrine (discussed in 
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Chapter 3) which embraced a population-centric state building approach and 
necessitated a close politico military relationship at its core. The means would be an 
increased number of US troops, additional financial resources, diplomatic efforts and 
a new partnership with the Iraqis. The surge would provide the protection for the 
people and the process necessary to kick-start a more positive future. This might at 
least provide Iraqis with the option of not using force to resolve political questions.  
 
This chapter will focus narrowly on the political and security nexus. There is 
insufficient space to provide an historical account of a complex campaign with a 
shifting mosaic of actors, events and problems.  The security, political, economic and 
social aftermath of the Coalition Intervention in Iraq in 2003 together with an analysis 
of the various elements comprising the mandate for the civilian and military presence 
will be sketched.  However, the political lead up to war, the specific issues involved 
or the detail of military preparations and conduct during the invasion of Iraq by the 
US and UK in 2003 will not.  The discussion will focus on two periods.  The first will 
be the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) from May 2003 to June 2004 with 
Ambassador Bremer and Lieutenant General Sanchez as the key interlocutors and the 
second between February 2007 and September 2008 with Ambassador Crocker and 
General Petraeus.  As with Chapter 4, analysis of politico-military cooperation and 
campaign design will illustrate the extent of politico-military integration during 
planning and execution.  This will demonstrate the effect of positive or negative 
actions by commanders on the security and political domains. The chapter will 
conclude with a short assessment of the results of the approaches described and the 
doctrinal implications.   
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Figure 5.1 Map of Iraq.  Source Central Intelligence Agency
15
 
 
 
 
 
2. Post Invasion Iraq in 2003   
 
2.1. The Situation 
The predominant view amongst US forces was that with the defeat of Iraqi forces and 
the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime, their task was complete. However a 
security gap rapidly emerged and Iraqis seized on the opportunity to take revenge. As 
Ambassador Bremer later explained,  
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“Coalition troops had no orders to stop the looting and the Iraqi police in all 
major cities had deserted their posts.  The looting was done out of rage, 
revenge and for profit…some looting was also part of a prewar plan of 
Saddam Hussein‘s intelligence services. The unchecked violence had three 
consequences.  First … the enormous economic damage…[T]he economic 
cost of the looting [was] $12 billion, an amount equal to half Iraq‘s prewar 
GDP. Secondly, focusing …on hated Iraqi governmental institutions, the 
looters destroyed a large part of the physical infrastructure of the government.  
The Baghdad headquarters of 21 of 25 ministries were…destroyed…All the 
country‘s police stations were ransacked…Iraq‘s military bases and barracks 
in most cases were entirely disassembled - windows, doors, furniture, pipes 
and bathroom fixtures…But the most pernicious effect of the unchecked 
looting was to send a message to the Iraqi people, and to enemies of the 
Coalition, that the Coalition military would not, or could not, provide security 
for Iraqis, the most basic of government functions‖.16 
 
This message was further confirmed by significant reductions in the number of troops 
at end of April 2003.
17
 However as General McColl, former Deputy Commander 
Multi-National Force-Iraq, explained to the UK‘s Enquiry into Iraq,18 overlaying the 
physical destruction and absence of public security, a complex security situation was 
emerging.  This saw ―a threefold threat, the Sunni rejectionists, the Shia militia, the 
Al-Qaeda and their associates…were beginning to crystallise during that period‖.19 
Unfortunately these hostile elements would have access to plenty of arms and 
ammunition which the coalition had failed to destroy.
20
 
 
The civilian administration had largely disappeared and the country was in a poor 
state.  However as another senior British military officer stated, 
 
―The Coalition failed to appreciate (or find out about) the state of the country, 
prior to the invasion: the effects of UN sanctions, fear of Saddam and the 
Ba‘athist regime; broken infrastructure, impatience, revenge, inadequate life 
support, poor/non-existent communications, access to weapons, conflicting 
internal and external international and regional agendas….The Coalition failed 
to understand the dynamics of the country – Shia/Sunni/ Kurd tensions and 
malevolent influences inside the country and the region; or to exploit the 
potential benefits that could be achieved through other influencers, especially 
the Sheiks‖.21 
 
There was no political settlement or political process in Iraq.  Under Saddam the 
Sunni minority had been in charge and the majority Shiites in the South and the Kurds 
in the north were repressed.  Hitherto, membership of the Ba‘ath party had been 
essential to obtain government or other professional employment.
22
  Political 
experience was lacking. Tribal religious and organisational groups had disparate 
priorities and loyalties, with very little vertical influence or consensus about the 
appropriate use of political power.
23
  Initial negotiations to form an interim authority 
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started on 15 April with exiled Iraqi groups, local leaders and tribal leaders (although 
the main Shia groups did not participate at that stage).
24
 A UK MOD report stated that 
a process of de-Ba‘athification was also agreed,25 although the level was unclear.  
Later Bremer explained that, getting the political system going again would be 
difficult, ―[t]here are no election rolls, no election law, no political parties law and no 
electoral districts‖.26   
 
2.2.  The Mandate 
In the wake of the invasion, the legality of which remains disputed, the Coalition's 
―mandate‖ in Iraq was derived from its legal duties as an occupying power. However 
the ends were unclear with imprecise objectives and command and control 
arrangements were confused. As Lieutenant General Viggers, the senior British 
officer in Baghdad at the time, explained to the Iraq Enquiry,  
 
―we lacked clear statements from Capitals on Coalition political –military 
objectives, timelines, what the end state should look like or how we were to 
get there. At the outset, we had no clearly stated definition of what ―success‖ 
would look like for the Iraqis, the region or the international community.
27
  
 
The ways were also vague and the task of taking forward the mandate would change 
hands frequently. At the outset, Lieutenant General McKiernan, who had commanded 
combat operations (Phase 3) remained in charge. The idea for Phase 4 was that power 
would then be exercised by a retired Lieutenant General, Jay Garner, leading the 
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) under the line authority 
of General Franks‘s United States Central Command.  But this was to be short lived. 
On April 16 Franks issued a ―Freedom Message‖ saying that the US would only be in 
Iraq temporarily, and that an American civilian authority known as the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) would soon take over from the military.  This meant that 
the military means would also be reduced. On 21 April Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld, on Franks‘s advice, cancelled the deployment of 50,000 additional troops 
to Iraq; this dismayed commanders on the ground who wanted more troops to handle 
security.  
 
On 8 May 2003 the US and UK wrote to the UN Security Council confirming their 
obligations under international law and informing that they would establish a 
Coalition Provisional Authority to ―exercise powers of government temporarily, and 
as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, 
and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.‖28  Subsequently UN Security Council 
resolution 1483
29
 recognised
30
 the CPA, which would report through the US and UK, 
the joint occupying powers, to the Security Council.  It placed no other specific 
obligations on the Coalition beyond its obligations under international law.
31
 The 
resolution also put a UN SRSG onto the map.
32
 However the tenuous international 
legitimacy of the coalition enterprise meant that the peace building effort would not 
benefit from international reconstruction and transitional authority expertise such as 
had been available in Kosovo.
33
 The United Nations‘ new mission would later be 
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literally bombed out of Iraq in the Summer of 2003,
34
 and with the death of the SRSG 
Sergio de Mello, Britain‘s senior civilian in Iraq, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, later 
commented that he ―had lost a real partner.‖35 
 
In early May 2003 President Bush appointed Ambassador L. Paul ―Jerry‖ Bremer as 
Presidential Envoy and Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, ―which 
would serve as the legal executive authority of Iraq — a much more authoritative 
mandate than ORHA had held.‖36  Bremer arrived in Baghdad to replace Garner on 9 
May 2003, he reported through the Secretary of Defense to the President. Part of his 
task was to help Iraqi civil servants to get Iraqi ministries going again.
37
  On 15 June, 
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez assumed command of Coalition military forces 
with a scratch headquarters named CJTF-7.  He reported directly to Commander US 
Central Command and through him to the Secretary of Defense. Apparently ―at the 
same time, CJTF-7 served in ‗direct support‘ to CPA‖. 38  However the precise 
relationship remained vague and Sanchez‘s military task was not clearly defined.  
 
A CPA planner, Dr Andrew Rathmell, later explained that there had not been much 
focus on the phase 4: Rumsfeld had provided clear direction to Franks. The operation 
should be rapid, with a quick transition; there was no real need to plan for afterwards. 
The US administration thought that Iraq would function and survive, so they only 
planned for a humanitarian problem and not governance.  State Department (DOS) 
questions on these matters were ignored by the Department of Defence (DOD) so 
Garner‘s organisation was under prepared and under resourced.  The situation had 
been miss-appreciated; the available intelligence had been around orders of battle and 
not about how governance worked and what would happen if the regime was 
decapitated. Once in Iraq, the US administration began to see the scale of the problem. 
But they had not prepared the military units for a law and order task. They were short 
a division of ground troops, because of a difficulty gaining passage through Turkey, 
and they did not have the right equipment.
39
  
 
3. The Coalition Provisional Authority 2003-2004. 
 
3.1. Approaches to the Politico-Military Relationship by Bremer and Sanchez 
 
Bremer reported to Rumsfeld and the President; but he knew how Washington DC 
worked, so he drew his authority directly from the President in order to obtain assets. 
As pro-consul he seemed determined to make full use of that authority and his nature 
was to retain control.
40
 He was known as a hard charger
41
 and was insistent that he 
had secured his position as the ―President‘s man… with full authority over all US 
government personnel, activities and funds…empowered with all executive, 
legislative and judicial functions in Iraq‖.42  However this did not include authority 
over the military which was arguably the key element needed to plan a successful 
political strategy.
43
  
 
Both Bremer and Sanchez publicly acknowledged the requirement for cooperation 
and there is little in their published writing to suggest that this did not exist.  Yet there 
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was ―scant evidence of cooperation between the CPA and the U.S. military under 
[Sanchez‘s] watch‖,44 they did not connect and they did not really communicate.45  
Greenstock explained that ―the whole American effort between the civilian and the 
military aspects was compartmentalised, stovepiped is the word that is often used… 
The military and civilian arms were not working smoothly together‖. 46  Other 
commentators suggest that there was disunity in leadership. Thomas Ricks suggested 
that "it was very clear they hated each other. They lived in the same palace and didn't 
talk to each other."
47
 Equally Bremer was ―aggressive‖ 48  and not experienced in 
dealing with the military and was not by nature a team builder.
49
 Nor was he receptive 
to advice, even from his most senior partner.
50
 
 
Defending himself, Sanchez later stated that the military had called for the ―focused, 
synchronized application of all elements of national power‖51 in Washington and cited 
the lack of an entity with the authority to direct the interagency as the root of the unity 
of effort problem. But he seemed unable to take part in the synchronisation process at 
theatre level and was not willing to subordinate himself for the sake of unity of 
purpose and to support the man who was obviously his political master.  In June 2003, 
Len Hawley, one of a team of experts commissioned by the Pentagon advised 
Sanchez to work closely with Bremer and pointed out that they both worked for the 
same boss (CPA was a DOD entity). Whilst military orders would come from the 
military chain of command, political direction ought to have come from Bremer.
52
 
The lack of a widely accepted civil-military doctrine or the disinterest of his higher 
headquarters did not help Sanchez. The Commander of Central Command, General 
Franks, had disengaged
53
 and his staff saw the task as one essentially of drawing 
down and not ramping up.
54
 Hence the problems of unity of command and the 
absence of mass were not really identified. 
  
3.2. The CPA’s Political Policies and Plans 
 
Despite optimistic US assumptions on suitable Iraqis reassuming sovereignty, there 
was no effective long term political settlement or political structures in Iraq.
55
 
Opinions varied on whether to hand over quickly to an émigré interim government, to 
facilitate early exit,
56
 or take the time needed to establish a path to representative 
democracy before handing over sovereignty.
57
 In the event a 25 Member Iraqi 
Governing Council was established in July;
58
 but the Coalition retained sovereignty. 
Bremer characterised three major challenges:
59
 to provide security for the citizens of 
Iraq; to help the Iraqis rebuild their economy; and to help the Iraqi people put their 
country on the path to representative government.  Bremer stated that the Coalition 
military had responsibility for the first task; the CPA for the other two. However this 
compartmentalised approach would become the core problem in resolving any of 
these issues.  Bremer's early moves reflected US administration assumptions and his 
approach was to stamp his authority. His first order, ―Coalition Provisional Authority 
Order Number 1 De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society‖, 60  went beyond earlier 
assumptions concerning only the most senior regime figures.
61
 This left ministries 
unable to function, ―with no alternative sources of leadership‖.62 ORHA staff had 
already been working with some Ba‘athists in ministries who would later be banned. 
Rumsvelt and Bremer knew that banning Baathists would make running government 
more difficult.  But it was a political requirement.
63
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With his second order, "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2 Dissolution 
of Entities",
64
 Bremer also dissolved the armed forces.  Many had simply melted 
away
65
 but US forces and ORHA
66
 were working with the remainder and had 
identified 125,000 who were prepared to serve the new Iraq. The disbandment was a 
missed opportunity to "take advantage of the Iraqi army‖. 67  It put four hundred 
thousand soldiers out of work at a stroke and magnified the security problem by 
providing recruits for insurgent groups.
68
  Inevitably this led to unrest in May and 
June.  As General Petraeus later pointed out, ―most adult Iraqi males...found 
themselves unemployed, feeling disenfranchised, and angry.  This perfect storm 
represented a perfect opportunity for what became known as al Qaeda in Iraq‖.69  
Another missed opportunity at this stage was a failure also to recognise that Iraq 
remained a tribal society.  This was important because, as John Keegan put it, the 
―key to pacification lies in identifying tribal leaders and other big men‖.70   
 
Bremer later suggested that it did not help that the ―pre-war planning had been 
inadequate, largely because it was based on incorrect assumptions about the nature of 
the post-war situation on the ground in Iraq‖.71   This begs the question why, in 
theatre, such destabilising moves as de-ba‘athification and disbanding the armed 
forces were even contemplated and why the politico-military consequences and effect 
on the Iraqi body politic where not thought through? These were to be particularly 
devastating mistakes given that the necessary constabulary
72
 capabilities had not been 
put in place by the intervening powers.
73
 
 
Initially Bremer devised a ―7 Steps plan‖ for the return of sovereignty (see Figure 5.2 
below). This drew some fire because it implied a long nation building timeline and the 
Administration wanted a swift handover of sovereignty prior to the US presidential 
election in November 2004.
74
 The plan, which would have run in tandem with market 
reforms, was seen as impractical by both military and civilian officials in the field.
75
 
There were also political difficulties, as Greenstock pointed out, with (the Shia 
religious leader) Sistani,
76
 although these were brushed aside by Bremer.
77
 
  141 
Figure 5.2 Bremer’s 7 Steps Plan – “Iraq's Path to Sovereignty”.  Source: Author 
derived from Bremer
78
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eventually, over the summer of 2003, Bremer‘s team designed a strategic plan called 
―A vision to empower Iraqis‖.79 The ambitious80 ultimate goal envisioned was, 
 
―a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective and 
representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and 
protected freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but 
no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or international security‘.81  
 
Sanchez‘s CJTF-7 planners were instructed to help refine the CPA plan which was 
sent to Congress on 23 July 2003
82
 in order to secure funding and support.
 83
  A vision 
document was produced with objectives familiar from Kosovo and similar to the CSIS 
strategic task framework (discussed in Chapter 3).
84
 Bremer stated that the plan 
included objectives, metrics and timetables for a number of sectors. Security was 
identified as the top priority. Iraqis would need to be able to defend themselves. 
Essential services would be needed to improve their everyday lives. The conditions 
needed to be created for the eventual transition to a market economy. Oil production 
needed to be restarted, a currency, a banking system as well as commercial and 
investment laws needed attention. Representative government was needed but first, an 
understanding of democratic principles and a constitution were required.
85
 The 
planners understood that ―These objectives are intertwined: none can be pursued in 
Basic premise: Iraqis should be given responsibility for their own security, 
economic development and political system as soon as possible. However there 
was no political system, constitution or electoral process in place. 
 
Step 1. Create 25-member Governing Council (GC) broadly representative of Iraqi 
society. 
Step 2. Governing Council names preparatory committee to devise constitution 
writing process. 
Step 3.  Day-to-day operation of Iraqi government put in the hands of Iraqis. Every 
Iraqi ministry run by an Iraqi appointed by Iraqis. They set policy. 
Step 4.   Write Iraq's new constitution 
Step 5.  Popular ratification of the constitution. 
Step 6.  Elect a government.  
Step 7.  Dissolve the CPA.  
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isolation. Political and economic progress depends in part on security, but should it 
self help to create a safer environment‖.86  
 
From July to October the plan was further elaborated
87
 as ―a truly systematic planning 
tool that brought together civilian and military lines of operation‖ 88 which was used 
to measure progress.  Subsequent CPA reports would trumpet successes across the 
sectors: many of the milestones had been met or exceeded.
89
 The plan codified reality 
by capturing ongoing Coalition programmes but it did not provide a structured 
response to the underlying problem, deliver a sense of political progress, an 
improving security situation or real capability. ―The coalition had failed to produce an 
integrated political–military plan for Iraq. This meant that the CPA had to fit such a 
plan retrospectively on to activities already under way in the summer of 2003‖.90   
 
An accelerated
91
 timetable was announced on 15 November,
92
 after much debate in 
Washington and Baghdad, and with a rapidly worsening security situation (see figure 
5.3 below). The multi-year occupation was abandoned and a more rapid transition 
strategy would see sovereignty handed over by July 2004. This was a surprise to many 
in the CPA.
93
 The planning effort shifted to transition, not reconstruction, and the lead 
would go from DOD to DOS. Therefore the imperative was to produce a good enough 
government and security apparatus, in a hurry. Development of the Iraqi Civil 
Defence Corps was accelerated to get ―boots on the ground‖.94  The idea was to get 
Iraqis to take responsibility and ownership of decisions but General McColl suggested 
that this was uncomfortable for CJTF-7, which was a war fighting force unused to 
working with emerging security forces.
 95
 
 
  143 
Figure 5.3 Iraqi Political Process 2004-5 – Key Milestones. Source UK MOD96 
 
 
Throughout the CPA period there was a shortage of civilian planning capacity and 
field administrators, it remained "always a work in progress".
97
  As Lieutenant 
General Viggers, then UK‘s senior officer in Baghdad, explained, ―At the outset, the 
CPA had no machinery or processes to turn policy decisions into coordinated delivery 
at national level and in the regions. [The] CPA was disjointed, stove piped and 
reactive. This improved over the first few months as the different elements of the CPA 
became familiar with combined working‖.98 He further commented that ―the military 
contribution to reconstruction was vital – coordination with the civilian agencies 
inside the CPA, and with contractors had not been thought through at the outset‖.99 
 
3.3. Campaign Design under CJTF-7 
 
Sanchez had seen politico military realities in Kosovo,
100
 although his account of that 
campaign reads more as that of a bemused outsider than a committed participant. His 
experience was not apparent in his approach in Iraq where, according to one 
commentator, he appeared overwhelmed by the situation and the strategic problem 
hence he focused on quantifying tactical progress and did not have a "strategic or 
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political thought".
101
 There is little evidence of Sanchez‘ conceptual thought in terms 
of operational level campaign design. Neither a campaign plan nor commander‘s 
intent was communicated to the divisions on the ground in the early stages.
102
 He 
wanted to ―ensure that the presence of American soldiers is felt‖,103 but presence 
alone could not be described as a concept of operations.  Lieutenant General Viggers 
explained that initially military planning under Central Command and CJTF-7 went 
ahead in isolation from CPA and was not fully synchronised with ―civilian aspects 
(governance, reconstruction, the economy, medical, education etc) until much later‖.104  It 
seems apparent that what passed for operational art did not embrace the concept of 
political primacy or actively supporting a political process and advising political 
masters accordingly. Sanchez was clearly not comfortable taking instructions from 
civilians.
105
 According to Andrew Bacevich‘s review of Sanchez‘s account ‗Wiser in 
Battle‘ the book contains  
 
―little to suggest that he understood the actual nature of the problem in Iraq … 
[his] distaste for politics, which is intrinsic to war and from the outset played a 
central role in this particular conflict, indicates that understanding lay beyond 
his ability‖.106  
 
The CPA's change agenda for Iraq drew violent reactions from the Iraqi population 
which the military would be unable to handle.  More fundamentally, the coalition 
structures lacked the politico military gearing needed to handle this both at the 
planning and execution stages. Unhelpfully, at the working staff level, the CPA was 
often ―at odds‖ 107  with its military partner.  Part of the friction was caused by 
fundamentally different conceptions, and hence pacing, of what the US was doing in 
Iraq. The CPA was focused on long term change and the military was solely 
concerned about exit
108
 and keeping the peace.
109
 Worse, planners in Baghdad‘s 
protected ―Green Zone‖ were increasingly disconnected from life outside.110   Many 
in the US military, including rising stars Petraeus and Mattis, understood the problem 
and that what had been unleashed meant that others were belligerent in the face of 
unrest.
111
 Hence there would be a need to see people as the centre of gravity and to 
empower them.
112
 However more broadly and despite the legal obligations of the 
occupying power, there was a sense that creating a safe and secure environment was 
not what the US military should be doing.  
 
3.4. Campaign Execution 
 
Campaign execution would not be easy given that the coincidence of political policy 
and military un-preparedness would allow an insurgency to grow. Delivering a 
coordinated politico-military response would also be difficult because some CPA 
agencies ―did not…understand how the military could contribute [and were] reluctant 
to engage in detailed planning prior to launching a task.‖113  
 
As the security situation worsened Sanchez described four major thrusts of enemy 
attacks: direct action against coalition forces; attacks on politicians; attacks on the 
international community, particularly the United Nations and the Italians; and attacks 
designed to split the coalition.
114
  But apparently Sanchez did not join up the dots and 
realise that he faced a guerrilla campaign.
115
  The attack on the UN on 19 August 
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2003 was a particular blow to the UN
116
 and to the enterprise in Iraq.  The coalition 
lost a bridge to grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the Shi'ite community,
117
 and the 
absence of security allowed Muqtada al Sadr time to build up his Shia militia.
118
  
International organisations and NGOs began to pull out. 
 
The divisions deployed across Iraq had not been brought into the planning by CPA 
and CJTF-7 and were concerned about managing the practical impact of excessive de-
Ba‘athification and free-market economic policies,119 which would put people out of 
work.
120
  In the absence of central direction the division commanders were left to 
make their own tactical choices.
121
 Under Major General Petraeus in Mosul there was 
no security gap.  He understood that consent would be finite and that there was a 
relationship between governance, service delivery and security. Hence money was 
important
122
 in order to deliver this and kick start the economy.
123
 Andrew Rathmell 
explained that ―buying people off‖ 124 drew some criticism from CPA; but arguably it 
worked.  Petraeus used his military dominance effectively to secure politico-military 
ends. Conscious of the limited time available he gave Iraqis a stake by drawing them 
into the team.  Petraeus had studied counterinsurgency and understood the direct 
relationship between military activities and their effect on attitudes. His key question 
was ―Will this operation produce more bad guys than it takes off the streets by the 
way it's conducted?‖125   
 
Immediately after the invasion Mattis, the commander of the USMC division saw it as 
his job to set up a working government;
126
 however the rug was effectively pulled by 
the disbandment of the army and the de-Ba‘athification process without consultation 
by CPA.  Mattis later carefully prepared
127
 his team for its return to Iraq early in 2004. 
His approach was to be culturally sensitive, aiming to win popular support through a 
tough approach, but without excessive force. The Marines would fight the insurgency 
not the insurgent, because "the people are the prize".
128
 However events drew the 
Marines into a bloody confrontation in the city of Falluja following the deaths of US 
contractors there which caused an over reaction down the political chain of command.  
Washington and Bremer wanted action
129
 and Sanchez did not attempt to prevent this. 
Consequently, whilst knowing that ―this is what the enemy wants‖,130  Mattis was 
instructed to deal with Falluja and the results of the assault on this insurgent 
stronghold were predictably bloody.  The focus on Falluja would prevent the 
execution of earlier counter insurgency orientated plans and cause a strain on the 
coalition.  
 
Elsewhere consent promotion was not a priority.  Tactics were often more aggressive 
and not leavened with political subtlety. In the Sunni Triangle, ―Saddam‘s 
Heartland,‖131 Major General Odierno, commander of the 4th Infantry Division, took a 
very firm line, using tough tactics, including the use of artillery, to deal with security 
problems.  The security situation was clearly becoming difficult, but Andrew 
Rathmell suggested that "he did stoke the insurgency".
132
  A further problem was the 
absence of intelligence,
133
 environmental knowledge or cultural understanding.  The 
proliferation of roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) would make US forces 
wary about operating amongst the people to gain intelligence. This led to bad 
targeting, indiscriminate searches, poor prisoner handling facilities and hence at every 
stage alienated Iraqi people.
134
 In some cases permissiveness would see widespread 
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abuses committed by uncomprehending US soldiers against Iraqi prisoners.
 135
 No 
effort had been made to prepare soldiers for operations in what amounted to a failed 
state with an unfamiliar culture.   
 
3.5. Campaign Results under CPA and CJTF -7 
 
Sovereignty was passed from CPA to the interim Iraqi government on 28 June 2004, 
the CPA disbanded and Bremer left Iraq that day.  The overall impact of the CPA and 
CJTF-7‘s efforts was a deteriorating security situation which prevented economic and 
political reconstruction in Iraq as discussed above. The CPA‘s underlying political 
assumptions and resulting programmes had been bold and needed time which was not 
available.
136
 The planning and execution of a coordinated campaign took too long. 
After the fact Bremer was critical of the US military for taking a rosy view of the 
security situation.
137
  But this might be seen as a smokescreen for his decision to 
disband the Iraqi army.  In 2005 Anthony Cordesman argued that these factors 
―sowed many of the seeds of both the present low intensity war and many of the 
current uncertainties in Iraq‖.138  
 
In Iraq during 2003-4 military support to the political process was inadequate; 
nevertheless the military had a confused and inadequate political partner which was 
attempting a gargantuan task.
139
 As Andrew Rathmell explained, the civilian 
leadership only ―sporadically acknowledged the causal linkages between security 
and…political and economic reforms. The military leadership…did not do a good job 
of conceptualizing the campaign as an integrated political–military effort, sometimes 
failing to put tactical military operations in the broader political context‖.140 Also the 
confused command and control arrangements, which only came together in 
Washington, and constant staff shortages
141
 did not facilitate civil military planning in 
theatre.    
 
The haste to achieve military exit and a military transformation agenda which reduced 
available ―boots on the ground‖ was a further structural problem. Post combat 
inactivity permitted a security gap to emerge which became progressively wider.  
Looting, which some troops regarded as a ―jolly redistribution of wealth‖142  reduced 
Iraqi ministry level capacity and also encouraged more serious crime. The removal of 
Iraqi capacity through CPA Orders 1 and 2 decapitated ministries and left large 
numbers of men of fighting age with a grievance as outlined above.  Looking back, 
these decisions seem inexplicable, but they were discussed within a narrow politico-
military circle in Washington, London and Baghdad without apparent dissent.
143
  The 
CPA‘s economic policies would also remove jobs.  Equally, the effort to train Iraqis 
was slow to deliver real capability.  The inability to defuse security problems meant 
that the coalition lost local support.
144
  These issues sent a negative message to the 
Iraqi people as a whole and as the security situation deteriorated it became 
progressively harder to deliver reconstruction
145
 in order to make peoples lives better.  
Whilst the political message about shortage of troops was apparently passed, there 
seemed little capability or will to address this in Central Command
146
 or Washington.  
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4. 2004-2006: Transition 
 
With the dissolution of the CPA, the US civilian political and reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq were subsumed into the US Embassy under Ambassador Negroponte. The 
military command and control structure was revamped: a 4 star headquarters, Multi-
National Force-Iraq under General Casey would oversee the mission in Iraq with two 
subordinate three star headquarters; a Corps HQ to fight the insurgency and the Multi 
National Security Transition Command-Iraq to train and equip Iraqi security forces.
147
 
MNF-I operated in support of Iraqi Ministry of Interior but initially had Iraqi ministry 
of defence forces under command. The arrangement was authorised under U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546.  The British Deputy Force Commander, 
General McColl, explained that there was a change in politico-military attitudes; 
Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey ―were determined that they would be 
entirely interwoven in [their] approach.".
148
  
 
A campaign plan was developed with four lines of operation: security, governance, 
economic development and strategic communications (in 2005 a fifth, coalition 
transformation, was added).  Casey instituted a Campaign Assessment Steering Board 
which included political input from the embassy and senior civilian participation. The 
strategy was to transition responsibilities to the Iraqi Transitional Government and 
exit.  However, Iraqi security forces had failed in combat in early 2004 and it would 
take time to build their capability. US forces would need to hold the ring in the 
meantime and then withdraw to a series of large bases as ―Provincial Iraqi Control‖ 
was achieved across Iraqi. However this became increasingly difficult as significant 
combat power had to be diverted from early 2005 to mentor Iraqi units and provide 
essential combat enablers such as intelligence and air support.
149
 
 
There was some political progress although violence remained a restraint. An historic 
election took place in January 2005 to select a Constitutional Convention. Another in 
December 2005 would elect a parliament.  Although the elections had an Iraqi face, 
MNF-I was instrumental in delivering election logistics and a relatively secure 
environment to enable voting. However a political follow-up by the Iraqis would 
continue to be hampered by their own internal divisions, and the escalating violence. 
The security situation continued to deteriorate, as Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb 
who was Deputy Commander MNF-I at the time, explained to the Iraq enquiry, there 
were four interwoven threats to stability.  These were crime and corruption; Iranian 
backed militias; ―Saddamists, who continued to unpick any feeling of success;‖150 and 
Al-Qaeda, supported by the Sunni insurgency.  Sectarian tensions were also 
mounting.  
 
The turning point in the campaign was the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara 
by Al Qaeda in February 2006.
151
  It became clear that neither the Iraqis nor the US 
would be able to contain the Shia-Sunni civil war of murder and ethnic cleansing 
which followed. Lieutenant General Lamb explained that, since 2003, the security 
situation evolved ―from the war to civil disorder to an insurgency on steroids, to 
sectarian violence.‖152 In August 2006, he further explained that the  
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―Americans in Anbar were…experiencing about 80 attacks a day. The 
governor, Mahmoud, was besieged in the Green Zone in Baghdad. His council 
had either gone to Jordan or had been killed. Ramadi was broadly lost. There 
were no policemen in Hit….Al-Qaeda had claimed Anbar as a caliphate…. 
Mosul always remained potentially…unstable … and Baghdad just was in the 
throes of beginning to get the full measure of the vehicle borne IEDs and the 
attacks that were being placed upon it.‖153 
 
In the face of these difficulties Casey and Ambassadors Negroponte and Kalilzad 
were not in conflict with each other, they were collaborative.  Yet the transition 
strategy with US troops training Iraqis and ―commuting to war‖154 from ever fewer 
large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) was failing to deliver a positive political 
effect: the IEDs in particular gave the sense of ―failing and a failing nation‖.155  With 
time running out until the expiration of the UN mandate and the US presidential 
election at the end of 2008, it would simply not be possible to produce enough 
capable Iraqi security forces to master the violence.  For the US, the ends ways and 
means were not aligned.  The strategy was not appropriate for the situation. The 
objectives were not realistic and appropriate forces and resources were not 
available.
156
 The strategic initiative
157
 had been lost. Could it be regained? 
 
5. The Crocker-Petraeus Team In Iraq in 2007-2008: “Relentless”158 
 
―In the end, Iraqis will decide the outcome of this struggle. Our task is to help them 
gain the time they need to save their country.‖ General David Petraeus159 
 
In January 2007 President Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq which would lead 
to a surge of some 20,000 extra American forces together with an expanded political 
and economic effort.  Former retired Army General Keane, supported by Lieutenant 
General Petraeus among others, had advocated a new strategy to deliver both political 
and security progress through protecting the population, in particular in Baghdad,
160
 
something the extant transition strategy could not achieve.
161
 It would be “one last 
shot at success‖.162  Promoted to four star general, Petraeus was selected to command 
MNF-I with a temporary US troop level increase from about 135,000 in January 2007, 
to about 168,000 at its peak in October.
163
 The surge included a strong political and 
economic element at its core and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, an experienced 
Arabist,
164
 was selected to head the US Embassy team. This section will cover the 
period from Petraeus‘s arrival in Baghdad on 10 February 2007 until his departure on 
16 September 2008.   
 
5.1. The Politico-Military Relationship 
 
There was immediately a close working relationship between Crocker and Petraeus 
and they both recognised they had to approach the enterprise together to deal with the 
pressure produce political objectives and provide focus for the multidisciplinary 
team.
165
 Speaking in London in 2010 Petraeus lauded Crocker as his "wonderful 
diplomatic wingman‖;166 (earlier he had characterised Odierno, the Corps Commander 
as his ―operational wingman‖).167  He saw the campaign as a ―truly civil-military 
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endeavour‖168 and both he and Crocker ―work[ed] hard to achieve civil military unity 
of effort…as part of a comprehensive whole of government approach. [It] had to be a 
true team effort-military, civilian, coalition, and Iraqi. And [we] wanted there to be no 
doubt that there was an un-shakeable commitment to teamwork at the top".
 169
 
 
Petraeus was always scrupulous about deferring to Crocker in public
170
 and his 
Deputy Graeme Lamb explained that "Crocker understood the relationship and forced 
the embassy to do that as well and to set the conditions for the untidy mess of 
politics".
171
 As David Kilcullen, Petraeus‘s counterinsurgency advisor put it, Petraeus 
and Crocker were ―in each other‘s heads‖.172  In the absence of a formal system to 
bring the convergence of approaches and actions, the environment created by Petraeus 
and Crocker enabled people to exploit opportunities that only they could see in their 
own domain; as Lamb explained, ―above all you need a shared understanding, with 
that you can go off in different directions, but you know you are."
173
 
 
Although theirs was an attitude of cooperation, not conflict, one insider commented 
that "Crocker seemed to be the junior partner".
174
 Their personalities were 
compatible
175
 and Crocker ―was clearly supporting what Petraeus wanted to do (and 
providing advice and guidance as appropriate when the military mindset became too 
prevalent)‖.176 Equally, Crocker was clearly the master of regional and local political 
issues.
177
 But at lower levels, this was not easy, and there were inevitable tensions, 
partly because many foreign service officers had been sent to Baghdad without 
specialist knowledge or training
178
 and according to Andrew Rathmell, who was there 
at the time, it was "them and us at various times".
179
 
 
5.2. The Big Ideas.180 
 
5.2.1. The Political Strategy.  
 
President Bush‘s January 2007 strategy update, ―The New Way Forward‖ 181  had 
envisaged a US political and military surge (20,000 soldiers) into Iraq.  The top level 
objective was a "unified, democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, 
and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror".
182
  There were to be specific 
security, legislative and economic goals.  But what was the heart of the problem?  
Testifying to Congress in 2007 and again in 2008 Petraeus explained the 
"fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and 
sectarian communities for power and resources."
183
  In the face of an extremely 
violent insurgency, the US could not ―kill or capture [its] way out‖184 but instead 
needed to address the underlying factors.
185
  Crocker‘s testimony echoed Petraeus‘s,  
 
―Iraqis are facing some of the most profound political, economic, and security 
challenges imaginable. They are not simply grappling with the issue of who 
rules Iraq, but they are asking what kind of country Iraq will be, how it will be 
governed, and how Iraqis will share power and resources among each 
other….[But] We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the pursuit of 
national reconciliation‖.186 
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There is no specific evidence of a US political approach on the ground; there were 
some "vague ideas about pushing forward the political process but not a clear, 
structured overall plan".
187
 But this would be a political struggle and Crocker 
explained that to resolve it Iraq needed time
188
 with help at the local and national 
levels and these would need to be connected together.  There was also recognition that 
from a political and military perspective, Baghdad was the centre of gravity, it needed 
to be secure to enable government to work.
189
 Nationally, there was a need to get the 
political process moving, find political accommodation and ultimately reconciliation. 
To achieve this end some significant pieces of legislation, such as an oil law, needed 
to be in place.  At the local level, much of the problem was still about service 
delivery.  Petraeus recognised the need to protect both the political process and 
political progress: this could not be done without protecting the people,
190
 hence he 
explained that the military side would need ―to improve security so that the Iraqi 
government can resolve the tough issues it faces and so that the economy and basic 
services can be improved‖.191  
 
5.2.2. The Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) and the Campaign 
Plan 
 
The overall plan, in theatre, to enable the above vision to secure Iraq and build was 
initially developed through a Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) established by 
Crocker and Petraeus and jointly led by Col H R McMaster and David Pearce.
192
 This 
joint team comprising military, diplomatic, economic, development, and prominent 
think tank experts, would establish what would be needed both to secure Iraq and 
build confidence for the political line of effort.  There was a need to get buy in from 
Washington, including influential think tanks. Andrew Rathmell, a member of the 
team explained that The JSAT process was "touted as zero-based, but I sensed at the 
time there was already a clear set of ideas".
193
  Nevertheless as Petraeus stated, it was 
important to get a ―common understanding of the tasks at hand, to refine goals and 
objectives, and to determine how to bring the tools and our respective agencies 
possessed to bear on the problem".
194
 The JSAT dismantled the earlier campaign 
planning assumptions and, as Alexander Alderson explained, suggested an updated 
approach using the template in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency.
195
 
 
On the ground, the key operational change was already clear.  Much of the conceptual 
thinking on the security line of operation
196
 had been done at the end of 2006 by the 
Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Odierno
197
 and had resulted in a request for 
more troops which became the ―surge‖. 198  Petraeus acknowledged at his Senate 
Confirmation hearing in January 2007 that the situation was dire and there was no 
military solution.
199
 Now, to secure the population, US units would provide what he 
termed a ―persistent presence‖200 in areas they had cleared. Applying the precepts of 
FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, clearing and holding would then provide the opportunity 
to build and for Iraqis to ―make the political deals and compromises necessary for 
long-term stability‖.201 
 
The JSAT delivered a report which was then drawn on by MNF-I, MNC-I and U.S. 
Embassy staff to refine the campaign plan.  The purpose of this holistic joint civil 
military plan was to lay out the steps that all agencies needed to take and, as Petraeus 
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put it, to detail ―how actions in one area, such as security or reconstruction, enabled 
and complemented efforts in other areas, such as political reconciliation".
202
 The key 
goal was to deliver a lasting Iraqi political accommodation
203
 leading to Iraqi political 
reconciliation in the longer term.
204
 The joint campaign plan comprised four lines of 
operation: political, security, economic and diplomatic.
205
 All four were underpinned 
by strategic communications which would sell their message and help build 
confidence (both in Baghdad and Washington).  A significant shift from the earlier 
plan was the inclusion of diplomatic and regional aspects in the political line of 
operation, and the focus on reintegration and partnership with the Iraqis.
206
 The main 
effort for all of these lines was focused on achieving the political goal of 
accommodation.
207
 For the military, the tactical effort would be on securing the 
population and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi Security Forces. The work was 
entirely collaborative although initially there was some resistance, from within the US 
Embassy and MNC-I to changing from the earlier transition and counter-terrorism 
strategy, which had reflected the US need to cut its losses,
 208
 towards the new 
approach.  
 
5.3. Executing the Big Ideas 
 
"The political line of operation was our main effort…to which we subordinated 
our other activities…If, for example, a military operation was assessed as likely to 
produce short-term gains in security but to undermine our long-term political 
efforts, we didn't conduct it ... this could not have been achieved had we not 
planned civil and military activities together." General David Petraeus
209
 
 
Petraeus issued written ―counterinsurgency guidance‖ under 25 headings on how the 
campaign should be fought. The main headings are briefly summarised at figure 5.4 
below and reflect the advice provided by FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. A schematic 
complemented these instructions (see figure 5.5 below) and this illustrated both the 
complexity of the challenge and the need for an integrated approach.  Petraeus and 
Crocker sought to execute the plan ―as one, [they] linked arms, pursuing the same 
mission and objectives and jointly asking for the resources we needed‖.210  They 
communicated with Washington together (by video conference or in person), they 
made key decisions together and met all visitors together. They insisted on the same 
approach at lower levels across Iraq and created civil military cells to synchronise 
effort on specific functional activities.
211
 Crocker assured Congress that ―I am 
constantly assessing our efforts and seeking to ensure that they are coordinated with 
and complementary to the efforts of our military‖.212  Petraeus maintained a constant 
watch on progress, using visits to the field and the daily Battlefield Update 
Assessment (BUA) sessions to ask detailed questions and give direction. He later 
commented that after a few months he and Crocker were leading organisations ―that 
worked nearly as one, a joint civil-military counterinsurgency organisation 
[comprising] diplomats, soldiers, intelligence professionals, [and] development 
experts...‖.213  
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Figure 5.4 Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency 
Guidance. Source: Petraeus.
214
 
 
Secure and serve the 
population 
Live among the people Hold areas that have been 
secured 
Pursue the enemy 
relentlessly 
Employ all assets to isolate 
and defeat the terrorists 
and insurgents 
Generate unity of effort 
Promote reconciliation Defeat the network, not 
just the attack 
Foster Iraqi legitimacy 
Punch above your weight 
class 
Employ money as a 
weapon system 
Fight for intelligence 
Walk Understand the 
neighborhood 
Build relationships 
Look for sustainable 
solutions 
Maintain continuity and 
tempo through transitions 
Manage expectations 
Be first with the truth Fight the information war 
relentlessly 
Live our values 
Exercise initiative Empower subordinates Prepare for and exploit 
opportunities 
 Learn and adapt  
 
 
 Figure 5.5 Anaconda Strategy vs AQI.  Source: Petraeus
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There was of course a difference between dealing with the irreconcilable and the 
reconcilable amongst insurgent and militia groups.  Communal warfare (between sects 
or sub-sects) was another problem needing specific tactics to break the cycle of 
violence at every stage.
216
  Both kinetic and non-kinetic operations were needed to 
drive a wedge between these barely distinguishable groups and protect the population.  
A significant proportion of the military effort was directly focused on disrupting Al 
Qaeda in Iraq and the Shia militia extremists.
217
 Once the surge forces were in place 
in June 2007, a series of operations were initiated in Anbar province and to defeat Al 
Qaeda safe havens in critical towns in the belts surrounding Baghdad from whence 
attacks on the population came.
218
 Initially this was difficult because the level of 
violence, and the number of US casualties, had to increase in order to force out the 
insurgents.
219
 Careful strategic communications were needed to explain this. At the 
same time a dialogue was conducted with "insurgent groups and tribes".
220
  
 
Relentless Special Forces operations to kill or capture key individuals and dismantle 
insurgent networks also helped to change the political dynamic. Lieutenant General 
Stanley McChrystal, the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC) applied "collaborative warfare,"
221
 using every available intelligence tool to 
understand
222
 the networks then generate high tempo operations against ―al-Qaeda in 
Iraq, the Sunni insurgency and [irreconcilable] Shia militias‖.223  These operations 
were so effective that they removed insurgent capability faster than it could be 
regenerated. Lieutenant General Robert Fry later suggested that this attrition of Al 
Qaeda-Iraq and Jaish Al Mahdi would help create space for understanding in the 
Sunni community, subsequently with the Shia, and that a different way forward was 
now possible.
224
 
 
The "Anbar awakening", starting in late 2006,
225
 saw the rejection of Al Qaeda by the 
Sunni tribes in Anbar province, and a successful US effort to capitalise on this and 
develop momentum for "a chain reaction of awakenings"
226
 in other areas of Iraq. Al 
Qaeda had simply gone too far
227
 with the tribes in Anbar province with a horrific 
degree of brutality including murder and kidnapping and rape.  A number of tribal 
sheiks realised this nihilistic approach meant a struggle for their survival. They started 
to form their own militias to fight Al Qaeda
228
 and approached the coalition for 
help.
229
  Petraeus grabbed the opportunity: "this was the opening we needed".
230
 A 
series of risky
231
 coalition initiatives would seek to foster tribal cooperation, form 
tactical alliances,
232
 and build trust whilst concurrently conducting kinetic operations 
against Al Qaeda based on the information provided by the tribes. Training, 
equipment and funding was provided to help the tribes protect their people. Once 
areas had been cleared infrastructure governance and the rule of law could be 
rebuilt.
233
  
 
A Force Strategic Engagement Cell, which had been created by Petraeus‘s deputy 
Lieutenant General Lamb, oversaw the political reconciliation effort and eventually 
helped to manage, train and equip some 103,000 so-called ―Sons of Iraq".234   There 
was a dramatic reduction in violence between October 2006 and August 2007 in the 
previously lost Anbar province.  Petraeus characterised this as a local rejection of Al 
Qaeda and their willingness to volunteer to serve in the army or police.
235
 Reaching 
out to the Sunnis was not universally popular
236
 but it was effective
237
 and reduced 
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violence, helping the US to gain some form of strategic success.
238
  One difficulty was 
that using tribal militia would undercut central government, so effort would be needed 
to link the local to the national.  Also the tribes were not trained or equipped to the 
previously accepted standard, resulting in immature police.
239
  However the ethical 
issues were surmounted by the practical imperative to improve security. The initiative 
enabled civic life to be re-established, "then it spread into Baghdad and elsewhere‖.240  
According to Petraeus, the Anbar Awakening ―had a transformative effect on the 
security environment…serving as the basis for the subsequent political progress…".241 
Crocker explained that his challenge then was to link this progress to the central 
government.
242
 
 
Another ―unexpected stroke of good luck‖243 for the Coalition occurred on  29 August 
2007 when the militant Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his Mehdi Army militia 
for to ceasefire for six months.
244
 This followed violence between the Mahdi Army 
and Iraqi forces in the holy city of Karbala, during which more than 50 Shia pilgrims 
gathering for an annual festival had been killed and another 275 wounded. This move 
may have reflected Al-Sadr‘s understanding of a need to distance his forces from 
violence or face being destroyed as a military player and marginalised as a political 
one. He would later acquiesce to Iraqi forces re-entering the Sadr City Shia area in 
Baghdad.
245
  Preceding Moqtada al-Sadr‘s ceasefire, the Force Strategic Engagement 
Cell had also made moves towards reconciling some (not all) of the Shia milita. Lamb 
explained to the UK‘s Iraq enquiry that by ―July 2007…the situation was 
stabilising…the insurgency… Ansar Al Sunna, Jaish Al Islami, Jaish Al Mujahideen, 
the 1920 Brigade…[were] now beginning to contest Al-Qaeda and see them for what 
they were‖.246   The problem was far from solved but these developments would 
provide Iraqis with a political choice which they could not have had a year earlier. 
 
The effective defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Shia militia extremists and the Anbar 
Awakening would help to shape the political landscape during 2007-8.  The next 
challenge would be to convert these developments into a political accommodation. To 
this end Crocker and Petraeus attended weekly Iraqi ministerial meetings on the 
security situation and there would also be daily meetings with ministers on specific 
topics.
247
  Just as Jackson had described in Kosovo, Crocker and Petraeus would swap 
places in the canoe; as Petraeus put it, "changing chairs during the meetings ... as we 
shifted from predominantly diplomatic to predominantly security issues ...".
248
 Their 
positive engagement sought to ensure that Prime Minister Maliki and his ministers 
recognised their political responsibilities
249
 and worked for the whole of Iraq,
250
 not 
sectarian advantage.
251
 It was also important to ensure that gains secured at the local 
level were acted on nationally; to ensure that the Iraqi Army was used impartially; to 
keep the Iraqis to the agenda and to recognise the political decisions they, the Iraqis, 
had to take.
252
  Political progress was hard fought for by Ambassador Crocker and his 
team and the overall thrust was to help the Iraqis hold their nerve and enact the 
necessary legislation to drive progress and reconciliation.  
 
The US political engagement effort was not confined to the Green Zone.  Division and 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commanders were engaged at provincial and district 
level across Iraq; by late 2007 they were expected to be taking the lead, or ideally 
supporting, at every level.  Battalion commanders would help district councils; BCT 
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commanders would help mayors or city leadership.
253
 There was not a great deal they 
could do politically, but they provided energy, practical support and moral pressure.  
The ―warrior-builder-diplomat spirit‖254 which Petraeus encouraged saw efforts across 
Iraq by US forces to get basic governance and commercial life going again. Damaged 
infrastructure was repaired and schools refurbished.
255
 Achieving this demanded 
effective civil military cooperation: BCT commanders and Provincial Reconstruction 
Team leaders coordinated to ensure that ―they‘re complementing each other, not 
competing‖256  on the provincial capacity development effort.  
 
Resolving the situation in the South East of Iraq would become both a problem and an 
opportunity in 2008.  Despite acute domestic political pressure to withdraw from 
Iraq,
257
 senior British officers understood that the US needed British forces to hold on 
in Basra for the sake of wider campaign coherence.
258
 The decision to take forward 
"Provincial Iraqi Control" in Basra in December 2007 was greeted with significant 
scepticism amongst some US military and diplomatic planners.  They were proved 
right several months later when the situation in Basra deteriorated.  Disregarding 
deliberate planning for a long term solution, Prime Minister Maliki decided to act 
immediately.
259
  The Iraqi ―Charge of the Knights‖260 operation in Basra launched in 
March 2008 would provide MNF I with an opportunity to support an Iraqi political 
move and demonstrate Iraqi success. However the success was not guaranteed at the 
outset. The Iraqi prime minister's move was a surprise to the coalition and the local 
British headquarters was not initially in a position to provide the assistance needed to 
ensure Iraqi success. British policy was to transition and not conduct Counter 
Insurgency.
261
  MNC-I
262
 therefore rapidly had to fill the gap.
263
 Maliki probably 
realised that the US would not let him fail and Petraeus supported him.
264
 Thus Maliki 
gained the political credit. This episode drew visceral criticism of the UK in Baghdad, 
perhaps with some justification: ―the short version is that the Brits have lost Basra, if 
indeed they ever had it".
265
 Petraeus nevertheless saw the danger of a schism in the 
coalition and as Alexander Alderson, who was there explained, he quietly but 
effectively stamped out criticisms in Baghdad.
266
 
 
5.4. Campaign Results under Crocker and Petraeus 
 
The effective defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sunni reconciliation and containment of Shia 
militancy would enable a changed political dynamic in Iraq.
267
 In testimony to 
Congress in July 2008, the US Government Accounting Office (GAO) confirmed that 
progress had been made against the president's security legislative and economic 
objectives. Violence had decreased about 80% from 2007, Iraqi security forces were 
more capable of leading their own operations, but over 90% still needed coalition 
support and the "security environment remain[ed] volatile and dangerous".
268
 GAO 
attributed the improved security to the increase in US combat forces, the creation of 
Iraqi and non-governmental security forces and the Shia Mahdi Army‘s ceasefire. Iraq 
had passed legislation dealing with the return of Ba‘athists to government, amnesty 
for detainees and provincial powers. However the sharing of oil revenues, disarming 
of militias and rules for provincial elections were not resolved. Iraqi budget execution 
remained a problem, oil production was below target, water production was improved 
but electricity supply remained at approximately 50% of demand. Overall the 
situation remained fragile and reversible.
269
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According to Graeme Lamb, Petraeus ―was able to present [the] sense that…it is hard 
but not hopeless and we can see how this is unfolding‖.270  In a letter to the troops on  
7 September 2007, sent shortly before he and Crocker briefed Congress, he explained 
that the situation was complex, but operations since surge forces were available in 
mid June had produced rapid progress. The number of attacks had declined to a level 
not seen since mid-2006; beyond the security gains, Iraqis were being helped to get 
basic services going and provide local governance.
271
 This engendered confidence 
amongst the people. This was further helped by efforts to facilitate local 
reconciliation. "Local Iraqi leaders are coming forward, opposing extremists, and 
establishing provisional units of neighbourhood security volunteers. ... [Which] are 
being integrated into legitimate security institutions".
272
 Petraeus underlined the 
significance of these efforts and pointed out that "extremists cannot survive without 
the support of the population".
273
 Yet, despite these positive developments there were 
significant constraints on progress, attacks by Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups 
and militia continued on both coalition and Iraqi forces. Iraqi governmental capacity 
was limited with reconstruction ongoing and corruption still a problem. There 
remained "a climate of distrust and fear that stems from the sectarian violence that did 
so much damage to the fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and into 2007".
274
  Petraeus was 
careful to explain however that progress was not uniform and some areas remained 
particularly challenging. 
 
Ultimately Petraeus was clear that protecting the population helped Iraq avoid civil 
war and provided space to resolve the fundamental political issues.
275
  Testifying to 
Congress again in April 2008, he indicated that a number of factors in the security 
arena had contributed to this progress. Both the US and Iraq had conducted a surge, 
with Iraq adding 100,000 soldiers and police in 2007. US and Iraqi forces had been 
actively employed on counterinsurgency operations to ―safeguard the…people, pursue 
Al Qaeda…combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local reconciliation and 
to enable political and economic progress‖.276 There had been a change of attitudes 
among some parts of the population who had turned against Al Qaeda and many now 
contributed to local security. "The popular rejection of Al Qaeda and and its 
ideology…helped transform Anbar … from one of the most dangerous areas…to one 
of the safest".
277
  A continuing Shia ceasefire also contributed to the reduction of 
violence and the rejection of extremism in some Sunni areas would begin to be 
mirrored in Shia areas.
278
  What he did not say was that politico-military cooperation 
had been fundamental to designing and executing the campaign.  
 
Petraeus complained openly that national reconciliation had not worked out as a 
rapidly as he had hoped. There was "halting progress [on] initiatives such as the oil 
framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba'athification reform";
279
 he did however 
recognise the "truly fundamental"
280
 nature of these issues for Iraqis, and commended 
the seriousness of ongoing efforts to secure agreement. It is interesting that Petraeus 
chose to make such explicit comments regarding the political process; the fact that he 
did indicates the depth of his involvement in political issues whilst Crocker was 
clearly entirely happy with this approach in the light of their common endeavour. 
 
The changed dynamic in Iraq, where ―ethno-sectarian competition [was] now more 
through debate and less through violence‖, 281  enabled an evolving relationship 
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between the Coalition and Iraq.  Perhaps it was not yet clear that Iraq was on what 
Petraeus termed ―an irreversible trajectory to national reconciliation and sustainable 
economic development";
282
 however the surge had set the conditions for progress and 
change.
283
  Ian Rigden, the lead campaign planner in MNF-I in 2008-9, recalled that 
the ―ball was now with the Iraqis‖.284  The next joint campaign plan, developed in 
2008 shifted the US strategy again to partnership working towards transition.
285
  At 
the time of writing, the outlook remains unclear.  An Iraqi parliamentary election was 
held in March 2010, however this did not deliver a decisive result for either Sunni or 
Shia parties
286
 and negotiations continue over the formation of a new coalition 
government.  In the meanwhile tensions simmer, notably over the management of 
members of the Awakening groups, who face uncertain support from the Shia 
dominated caretaker government and attacks by Al Qaeda.
287
  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
6.1. Reflections on the Campaign 
 
This case of Iraq has outlined two vivid examples which support the hypothesis that, 
beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders must provide direct 
support to civilian interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and facilitate 
viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. Moreover it is clear that 
the military needs a willing and capable civilian partner to provide the political lead in 
this endeavour. 
 
The external atmospherics over the invasion as well as a specific political timeline 
driven by the 2004 US Presidential election did not help the civilian CPA or military 
CJTF-7 in 2003-4. The US Administration was unable to follow Thompson‘s first 
principle that the government must have a clear political aim;
288
 nor did it identify the 
emerging insurgency or act accordingly. As Hoffman pointed out, ―90% of insurgency 
is political, social, economic and ideological‖,289 but under Sanchez‘s watch many of 
the US military retained a focus on war fighting.  They were unable to advise the 
political side on the likely security effects of political decisions and they were unable 
to coordinate civil-military action. Instead, the security challenge was compounded by 
the political decisions and military actions.  For example, if disbanding the army truly 
was the only viable option, why did the military not insist on a disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration programme?  As Dobbins pointed out this is the 
norm in post conflict scenarios;
290
 and it would have enabled the military to stay in 
touch with former Iraqi commanders rather than have them emerge as adversaries.  
 
There was plenty of effort,
291
 on an ad hoc basis, by the under resourced and separate 
civilian and military teams which were working to unrealistic timelines and with an 
over ambitious programme.
292
 That it took time for cooperative working to emerge is 
not surprising.  With a bifurcated chain of command there was no unity of command 
or real attempt to engender a team approach to deliver unity of effort or unity of 
purpose.
293
 It would be a mistake to blame the military commander alone, he did not 
have a receptive political partner and the forces under his command were collectively 
not prepared for what they would face.  Few saw the need to help grip the political 
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situation, Sanchez did not engage meaningfully with the Governing Council
294
 over 
security issues and some early opportunities engage the tribes were missed.  
 
Inter agency efforts were not well integrated.
295
  There was some understanding of the 
need for the political and military cogs to fit together but these were never really 
meshed at either the policy or delivery levels. For the US military, as explained in 
Chapter 3, state building or counter insurgency doctrine had not been seriously taught 
since the Vietnam imbroglio.  In 2003-4, although there were some notable 
exceptions, neither the body of the US military nor most of its leadership saw 
―shaping…economic and political conditions‖296 or any form of peace building as part 
of the military role.  Equally some in the CPA were unhappy with generals being 
involved with politics.
297
 The military focus was on combat operations (which had 
been successful) and then exit. There was evidence of the attempted application of the 
available inter agency doctrinal ideas,
298
 but this was too late and failed in execution. 
Instead of delivering a seamlessly executed plan leading to a positive local political 
impact this would increasingly become a blame game.   
 
Although beyond the scope of this study, it remains to be seen whether the initially 
disastrous approach was due to idiosyncratic behaviour,
299
 systemic failures or a 
combination of the two. What is clear is that the Coalition ―did not understand the 
scale of the forces they were releasing in Iraq‖. 300   This strategic error was 
compounded by attempting a major state building effort, which would require both 
peace building and security measures, without a unified civil military approach and 
unified leadership at the country level or the necessary military and civilian resources: 
in short the ends, ways and means were out of balance.  
 
Lessons were learned however and these were captured in an extraordinary multi 
actor effort develop a doctrine to address the systemic issues of countering insurgency 
(as discussed in Chapter 3).  With improved ways emerging, but a dire situation in 
Iraq, a bold attempt to secure success revised the ends with a new ―surge‖ strategy 
enabled by enhanced military and civilian means.  The senior diplomat and the senior 
soldier chosen for the enterprise immediately forged a watertight working partnership. 
This was not without difficulty or strain at the lower levels; but it enabled joint 
planning and action.  The military truly did support the political effort, on occasion, 
particularly at the local level, they were the political effort; in turn coalition political 
moves were synchronised with military action. This approach, which included the 
―kinetic‖ as well as the softer side of the US military, all designed to protect the 
population, delivered tangible improvements to the security situation and hence 
provided political space for reconciliation.  It was helped by a fortuitous 
accommodation with both Sunni tribes and Shia militia and it engendered a degree of 
Iraqi political reconciliation and some economic progress.  Iraqis were slowly moving 
to a position where confrontation could be conducted without recourse to violence. 
 
6.2. The General as Statesman? 
 
Having written a doctorate on the impact of counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Petraeus 
had learned the hard practicalities between 2003 and 2005. He had then been 
instrumental in developing a new counterinsurgency doctrine and changing the force 
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posture of the US Army during 2006. He had helped advocate one more effort, the 
surge, to deliver potential strategic success in Iraq by "making the political space for 
the Iraqi government to start governing Iraq".
301
 He was politically astute and 
understood how to play the political scene in Washington, in Coalition capitals and on 
the ground in theatre.  Petraeus‘s reports to Congress focused on the security problem 
and actions of Coalition and Iraqi military; whilst he acknowledged the links to 
politics, he did not as a rule develop these, leaving this to Crocker.  
 
There is no question that Petraeus was a political actor in Iraq. His letters to the troops 
in Theatre revealed the true politico military nature of the campaign and the critical 
military role in enabling political progress.  He was active locally, mostly out of the 
public eye to drive the peace process forward.  There was also a public element which 
saw Petraeus engaging both with the man on the street
302
 and at national level.  On 16 
May 2007 he wrote an open letter to the Iraqi people in which he asked them "to take 
an active role in the rebirth of your nation ... to reject violence and the sectarianism 
that fuels it".
303
 
 
In Crocker, an experienced Arabist, Petraeus had the right US Ambassador.  Petraeus 
continually reinforced the point that he was subordinate to Crocker,
304
 but equally 
Crocker seemed to know what was required of him.  Their relationship "defines a new 
standard of understanding and effectiveness".
305
  Petraeus and Crocker had an "image 
of cooperation"
306
 and a politico-military focus.
 
Where did this leave political 
primacy?  There is a sense that Crocker and Petraeus, both anointed by the US 
President and Congress, together carried the mantle of political primacy - given that 
political decisions were taken together. Here Petraeus truly was a political actor, 
participating in the political process; he understood state policy on three levels, in 
terms of the US, the Coalition, and the Iraqis.  Clausewitz would have approved. 
 
6.3. Doctrinal Implications 
  
This thesis argues that the military should support political primacy and the political 
process in theatre as an essential enabler for strategic success.  This did not happen 
during the CPA-CJTF-7 period in Iraq.  Hence the positive doctrinal lessons which 
emerged centre on case studies of how not to do it.  Even after new doctrine had been 
developed, this still did not fully address the matters of providing a truly unified chain 
of command or the practicalities of supporting political primacy to deliver political 
outcomes.  This left Petraeus and Crocker ―banging together the skulls of 
subordinates‖307 to achieve unity of effort and a continuing reliance on ―compatible 
personalities‖ 308 at all levels to achieve strategic goals.  That said, the 2007-8 period 
provides a good example of actively designing and executing security operations 
specifically to enable a peace building purpose.  Military leaders at all levels 
influenced, negotiated and helped to deliver real practical progress. This thought 
leadership would in turn have a beneficial effect on the national political process 
because the calculus was changed from one of pure sectarian interest to one where 
national considerations applied and violence was progressively removed from the 
political equation. 
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Chapter 4 suggested an ―acceptable political bandwidth for military activity‖ whereby 
subjective boundaries comprising military and political factors would guide 
commander‘s actions as they judged potential actions designed to secure political 
progress.  The case of Iraq suggests that the situation is in fact more complicated.  A 
series of factors need to be kept in balance if there is to be productive military activity 
within a civil-military context. These are: coalition military; external political; local 
political and local military.  All of these factors need to be kept in balance if campaign 
progress (with local security and political progress inherent in this) is to be delivered. 
 
However, beyond the matter of the judgements a general must make, this chapter has 
demonstrated, above all else, the value of collaborative planning, decision-making and 
action at the politico-military interface.  Whilst the matter of unity of command 
remains cloudy, unity of purpose can be delivered through a collaborative approach as 
demonstrated in Iraq. With this and a holistic people-centric approach it is possible to 
deliver real political effects, notably the beginnings of a political settlement, and thus 
create momentum, delivered by the people themselves, rather than external actors.  
The military role in this facet of contemporary peace and stability operations is not yet 
adequately captured in doctrine. 
 
Chapter 6 will now examine a stabilisation operation initiated following invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001 as part of the ―war on terror‖ in response to 9/11.  It will outline 
on the post-invasion arrangements which became a NATO mission with a supportive 
UN mandate but a relatively weak UN presence.  The chapter will illustrate the 
largely positive recent impact of new US doctrine and lessons from Iraq.  It will 
discuss the increasing realisation, in the teeth of a worsening insurgency, that in order 
to facilitate eventual exit, the International Community needed to engage in state 
building to bring Afghanistan into some form of stability.  Yet this would be intensely 
difficult without adequate security and Afghan leadership.  As with Iraq, this would 
demand significant external military effort to control the situation, whilst building 
Afghan security, and to enable civilian delivery of governance capacity, with 
economic and social measures.  Together these efforts were designed to separate the 
insurgent from the people.  This unfinished work underlines the requirement for 
politico-military cooperation and the need for reintegration of some insurgent 
elements which ultimately could support a political settlement in Afghanistan. 
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Chapter 6 - Afghanistan 2001-2010  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The attacks on the United States by Al Qaeda on 11 September 2001 (9/11) prompted 
a rapid US-led campaign starting on 7 October to destroy the terrorist organisation Al 
Qaeda's base in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime which supported it. After the 
intervention a UK-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as a coalition 
of the willing, was eventually established in the capital, Kabul, during December 
2001.  As the then UK Chief of Defence Staff put it, the force‘s role was to ―facilitate 
the political process‖ 1  and provide a stable seat of government, 2  effectively as a 
partner, for The Interim Administration of Afghanistan.  Under the Bush 
administration there was little or no interest in ―nation building‖3 in Afghanistan and 
ISAF was separate and distinct from ―Operation Enduring Freedom‖, a United States-
led coalition which was conducting operations throughout Afghanistan with the intent 
of rooting out Al Qaeda sanctuaries as part of the ―war on terror‖. 4  Over time, 
command of ISAF was transferred to NATO and from 2003, with UN authority, ISAF 
began to expand its stabilisation remit across the country.  The international 
community, in various guises, also commenced a reconstruction effort and supported 
the establishment of a unitary Afghan state.  Debate ranged over how and to what 
extent this exercise should be attempted. Some protagonists wanted to build a liberal 
democracy, yet according to Professor Anthony King in reality this was ―an 
ideological vision which undermines the achievement of a doable military mission‖.5   
 
External efforts to root out extremists and transform Afghanistan's society and 
infrastructure provoked an insurgent backlash by the Taliban, particularly in the south 
and east of the country, and over time development in these areas became virtually 
impossible unless protected by significant military force. Therefore the essential 
dynamic in Afghanistan became a struggle to build Afghan security forces and 
governance structures in the face of a growing insurgency which was fuelled in part 
by a lucrative drug trade.  A US focus on Iraq from 2002 proved to be a strategic 
distraction which denied the resources and attention that Afghanistan needed thus 
exacerbating the challenge. Hence intervening forces found themselves forced to hold 
the ring in an increasingly bloody campaign and counter insurgency efforts in 
Afghanistan got off to a slow start.  Nevertheless some of the learning on countering 
insurgency in Iraq would prove to be relevant to Afghanistan; notably a population-
centric focus and efforts to deal with the insurgency not the insurgent.  However 
establishing stability could not be straightforward given an increasing insurgent threat 
plus a weak, corrupt and manipulative Afghan leadership with insufficient governance 
capabilities to deliver stability at the national or local level.  
 
Another problem (and a challenge to this thesis) was the absence of a single political 
supremo, representing the international community, who could pull together the 
assortment of actors needed for a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency 
effort in Afghanistan.  That these actors did not necessarily have a shared 
understanding of the problem underlined the inherent difficulties in joining up a 
"comprehensive approach" at the Theatre level. The Afghan national leadership 
meanwhile found difficulty connecting to the local level and has been slow to come to 
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terms with the prospect of political reconciliation with some elements of the Taliban 
as part of a path to stability.
6
  These issues, compounded by waning strategic patience 
amongst troop contributors in the light of mounting Afghan and international 
casualties and costs, leading to persistent questions over whether the  war was worth 
fighting or could be won,
7
 have provided real problems for successive ISAF 
commanders. They have experienced difficulty in establishing the extent of their 
political direction and often had to act as de facto coordinator of the overall 
international effort.   
 
This chapter will provide evidence from the case of Afghanistan for the hypothesis 
that in the above circumstances, beyond their specific security-related tasks, military 
commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors, in order to sustain 
the political process and facilitate viable political outcomes in peace and stability 
operations. This approach needs soldiers at all levels to co-operate with other relevant 
actors, respond to political direction and shape military operations that will impact 
decisively on political outcomes in order to help generate political progress towards 
sustainable peace. This is not an easy or obvious path in Afghanistan given the 
security situation and coordination challenge. However this chapter will demonstrate 
that the hypothesis does have validity because helping to enable Afghan political 
solutions, at all levels from local and national, as well as providing the means to 
maintain a semblance of security, represents the only path to exit with some degree of 
strategic success. Shortage of space precludes a full historical treatment of the 
campaign in Afghanistan to date. Therefore after outlining the situation in 
Afghanistan and capturing the initial actions by the first ISAF commander, Major 
General John McColl (UK) (December 2001 to June 2002), the chapter will focus on 
two commanders. First, General David Richards (UK) (4 May 2006 to 4 February 
2007 and then General Stanley McChrystal (US) (15 June 2009 to 23 June 2010). 
 
2. Post Invasion Afghanistan  
 
In December 2001 Afghanistan was a failed state which needed a government, an 
administration and security provision. These essentials needed to be in place, and the 
country stabilised, before substantial reconstruction efforts, including infrastructure 
health and education could begin.
8
 A 2001 World Bank Report summarised the social 
and economic situation. 
 
―Afghanistan—suffering from more than 20 years of conflict, a three-year 
drought, loss or degradation of most of its infrastructure, depletion of its 
human resource base, and erosion of social capital—is one of the poorest and 
certainly the longest-suffering country among the members of the World 
Bank. With an estimated seven million people vulnerable to famine and 
millions already displaced from their homes (domestically or as refugees to 
neighboring countries), Afghanistan faces a dire humanitarian emergency. 
This requires an immediate, concerted response from the international 
assistance community (led by the UN). In addition the political situation in 
Afghanistan is fluid, and what will emerge in the short run is hard to predict.‖9 
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But would the necessary political, governance and security arrangements be in place 
to enable reconstruction? Once the Taliban regime had been ousted, there was no 
peace agreement or capability to govern in Afghanistan.  The remaining parties would 
need to find a political settlement in Kabul and between Kabul and the provincial and 
regional levels. In terms of governance, General McColl explained to the House of 
Commons Defence Committee that, in 2001–02, ―there was nothing in the 
ministries—no desks, no people, no middle-class—the politicians were people who 
had been at war with each other for … years; there was simply no governance at 
all‖.10 
 
Figure 6.1 Map of Afghanistan.  Source Central Intelligence Agency
11
 
 
 
 
 
In early 2002 the security situation was becoming increasingly perilous, particularly 
beyond Kabul which had an international security presence.  Whilst no longer running 
a national government, the Taliban had not gone away. Although there was no single 
cohesive focus of leadership for the emerging insurgency, there were a number of 
different groups who would cooperate to different degrees in different areas. Members 
of the former government under Mullah Omar had gone to the South. Whereas the 
Haqqani network and Hizb-e Islami operated in the East. There was also difficulty 
over the border area between Pakistan and Afhanistan which provided a refuge for 
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insurgents. Local practice allowed tribal movement across the border (known as the 
Durand line)
12
 and Afghan groups in Pakistan had links to Al Qaeda and the powerful 
Haqqani network.
13
  
 
Additional sources of instability were the narcotic industry (90% of the heroin in UK 
originated in Afghanistan),
14
 friction between rival militia groups and a permissive 
environment for banditry.
15
 According to ICG, there was a plentiful supply of 
weapons, money and influence from Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Russia, China, India, 
France, the United States and elsewhere.
16
 ICG further suggested talk of ―Pentagon-
created warlords‖.17 Whether true or not, there certainly were warlords controlling 
swathes of territory
18
 and not in accordance with international norms.  There were 
plenty of people with combat experience
19
 in Afghanistan.  However those in the 
police or army could not be regarded as an effective stabilising influence. Nor were 
they under the authority of any effective institutional structure. 
 
3.  The Evolution of the Mandate, the Afghan Government, and International 
Military Engagement 
 
The interdependent establishment of the international ―mandate‖ in Afghanistan, as 
well as Afghanistan‘s government and international military engagement has taken 
time to evolve and continues to develop. Initially it was important to fill the political 
void,
20
 particularly in view of the influence of Warlords who would otherwise claim 
political legitimacy.
21
 In December 2001 Afghan political leaders, with UN and 
international community representatives met at Bonn to form an interim, post-Taliban 
governing regime and to set up a framework for reconstruction including physical, 
political, and economic aspects. The Bonn Agreement sought international help to 
prepare new national security forces and called for an interim international force at 
Kabul which could be expanded later.
22
 It also prepared the way for a UN mission in 
Afghanistan.  
 
As envisaged by the Bonn Agreement, the first International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF), a UK-led
23
 coalition of the willing, was authorised by the United 
Nations Security Council on 20 December 2001 by Resolution 1386.
24
 This Chapter 
VII authorised mission was to ―assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the 
maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim 
Authority as well as the personnel of the UN can operate in a secure environment‖.25  
Nations participating in ISAF were also called to ―to help the Afghan Interim 
Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed 
forces.‖26 A Military Technical Agreement between the Afghan Interim Authority and 
ISAF on 31 December 2001 gave ISAF freedom of movement throughout 
Afghanistan and authorized the use of force to protect ISAF and its mission.
27
 The 
three way partnership between the Afghan Interim Authority, ISAF and the UN was 
completed with the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) by UN Security Council Resolution 1401 (2002) on 28 March 2002. This 
―light footprint‖28 mission had a political role to assist in drafting a constitution and 
organising elections. It was also mandated to manage humanitarian, relief, recovery 
and reconstruction activities. 
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Political reconstruction efforts included a Loya Jirga in 2002 to appoint a transitional 
government and a new constitution was ratified by the 2003 Loya Jirga. This 
restructured the government as an Islamic republic consisting of three branches, 
executive, legislative and judicial. In December 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first 
democratically elected president of The Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the National Assembly was inaugurated after elections in 
December 2005.  Karzai was re-elected in November 2009 for a second term. 
 
General McColl – Supporting the Early Political Process 
  
General John McColl, the first ISAF commander (then a Major General), 
stated at interview
29
 that there was a role for the theatre level commander to 
act in a political fashion at both the local and international levels: the 
operational art was now about the politico-military aspects of the campaign. 
The challenge was to balance the permanent tension between the desire to 
make progress in theatre on one hand and how much to air the difficult 
political issues with those you serve at home on the other.  Sometimes he 
needed to define how to fill that gap. The means to do so are the military force 
and the ability to influence.  Specifics needed to be calibrated depending on 
the circumstances as they unfolded. McColl was heavily involved in politics in 
the early days of ISAF,
30
 particularly before the signing of the military 
technical agreement when he acted as a go-between to establish a political 
process between members of a febrile coalition which became the Interim 
Administration. Here he had to judge how to treat each player. The degree to 
which he was able to do this primarily depended on the level of understanding 
in the UK. Some in the chain of command were nervous, yet ministers 
understood because they saw the immediacy of the political issues; therefore 
he could be open with them during ministerial visits. There was no question of 
―educating‖ politicians because the levers that needed to be pulled, the 
chances available, and the risks entailed were all foreign to them. Therefore 
politicians would offer little direction beyond ―make it a better place‖; indeed 
ISAF had deployed without a clear mission or role.
31
 Hence he obtained the 
overall political intent from the UK Prime Minister's press statements, which 
evolved over time. Judging how much to fight his corner over specific issues 
such as the potential expansion of ISAF, which was discussed from 2002, 
would depend on the context; and unreasonable demands were best avoided.  
 
McColl had a sound relationship with the SRSG Brahimi;
32
 a ―wise old man 
who had been involved in Afghanistan for a long time‖.33 The SRSG‘s role 
was to coordinate not command, but McColl saw the requirement to reinforce 
the SRSG's position and enhance his authority. This was helpful in 
coordinating the international community. Behind-the-scenes facilitation of 
political events was also important. An emergency Loya Jirga in 2002 was 
enabled by the international community, nevertheless the general avoided the 
limelight and was careful to keep ISAF behind the scenes during these 
political events.  He was also responsive to the short term needs of the Afghan 
government, helping Karzai to make things happen.
34
 
 
  176 
Following up on the Bonn Agreement, with the London Compact in 2006 the 
international community acknowledged the requirement for multi-year engagement in 
Afghanistan and committed to both an expanded ISAF and development assistance.  
Aid pledges amounted to $10.5 billion and the compact established ambitious five 
year development, security governance, reconstruction and counter narcotics 
―outcomes, benchmarks and mutual obligations in an attempt to coordinate efforts and 
create greater synergies between the [GIRoA] and the international community‖.35 
This was followed by further commitments through an  Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS),
36
 a Conference in Paris in June 2008 and the 
Afghanistan Conference in London in January 2010.
37
 The most recent conference, in 
Kabul on 20 July 2010, saw a significant commitment from Karzai
38
 to a transition of 
security responsibility and lead for military operations from ISAF to the Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) by the end of 2014.  In return for continued 
international support and aid, the conference also saw ambitious Afghan commitments 
to: improve governance; deal with corruption; address narcotics; implement womens 
rights; increase economic development; improve financial management; and a 
programme to ―reintegrate those insurgents who agree to renounce violence and sever 
ties to Al Qaeda‖;39 as well as a trade agreement with Pakistan. 
  
A practical reality influencing ISAF has been the presence of the separate US military 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, as well as drone strikes against targets 
in Pakistan; both part of the US ―War on Terror‖ and operating to a separate campaign 
plan. This has led to ambiguity and suspicions amongst the local people, the 
humanitarian community and international partners, given that the short term goals of 
counter terrorism could be inimical to the longer term interests of building peace and 
stability.
40
 This situation required continuous attention by ISAF commanders in an 
effort to maintain coherence and de-conflict specific activities.
41
 
 
With ISAF having initially provided a cocoon and a sense of international legitimacy 
to develop a political process in Kabul during 2001-2002, the natural question for the 
international community was how, and when, could the reach of government, and 
with it stability, be extended across Afghanistan?  The North Atlantic Council 
eventually agreed that NATO should take on ISAF in August 2003 and ISAF's 
mandate was expanded by UN Security Council Resolution 1510
42
 to include the 
whole of Afghanistan in October 2003.  Although at that time NATO did not realise 
that it was taking on a virulent insurgency.  Remaining under UN authority, NATO‘s 
Operation Plan envisaged 5 Phases to deliver stability: 1. Assessment and Preparation 
(2003); 2. Geographic Expansion (2003-2006); 3. Stability (2003 – ongoing); Phase 4. 
Transition (planned to be incremental); and 5. Redeployment. The aim of 
stabilisation, mainly centred on the use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, was to 
assist the Afghan government in extending and exercising its authority.
43
  Beyond 
this, views amongst nations differed on whether the mission was essentially one of 
support to reconstruction and governance,
44
 with minimal exposure to the risks of 
combat, or a full blown counter insurgency effort. This would become an issue later 
on as the insurgency deepened and the imperative to develop and support viable 
Afghan security forces became clearer. 
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The NATO ISAF mission gradually increased in size, first in the North in 2003 and 
the West in 2005.  Further expansion into the largely ethnically Pashtun and Taliban 
dominated South and East in 2006 would see a step change in terms of scale and 
conflict intensity (the East had been under control of the US Operation Enduring 
Freedom).
45
 The 2006 expansion also included taking on much of the role of training 
the Afghan Army, previously conducted by US forces. This would involve the 
creation of NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams to help develop the Afghan 
army.
46
 Lieutenant General (later General) David Richards (UK) was selected to 
command ISAF and he would soon find that, whilst the military mission had 
expanded, military resources were insufficient and the concomitant local political 
process and progress were missing. 
 
4. ISAF under General Richards (4 May 2006 to 4 February 2007) 
 
4.1. Politico-Military Relationships  
 
At interview Richards agreed with the hypothesis that supporting the peace process is 
a professional imperative for commanders and that they should help to find workable 
local political outcomes.
47
 He had applied this approach as a Commander in East 
Timor, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan.
48
 He also explained that ―military activity that 
is not underpinned by clear and properly resourced political objective will count for 
little‖.49 However, the practicalities in Afghanistan were that he received little or no 
direction and guidance on the political interface or how to improve it. Indeed some in 
the chain of command actively tried to limit his political role; Richards contrasted this 
with his US counterpart who had regular VTC contact with the Secretary of Defence. 
Therefore, following instinct, he had simply accepted a political role as an implied 
task. He created expressly political organs and concepts such as the Policy Action 
Group and the Afghan Development Zone concept whilst adopting a more active 
coordinating role in Kabul than was expected or had been evident before. He had 
learned on previous operations not to ask before initiating such initiatives, so he took 
risks, knowing that he would never get formal authority to do them.
50
 
 
Richards‘ principal political problem was that there was ―no single international 
approach‖51 to the Afghan government. He was a direct partner to the UN Mission‘s 
SRSG Tom Koenigs (Brahimi‘s successor from February 2006), but there was a limit 
to the latter‘s authority and reach. Later Richards called for a ―single political 
leader‖52 to improve unity of effort across the breadth of the international counter 
insurgency effort.
53
 In reality, Richards‘ primary political interlocutor was President 
Karzai and he developed a strong and supportive relationship with the head of state.  
As a Theatre Commander, but without the authority to compel other actors, Richards‘ 
mantra was ―Listen-Influence-Coordinate‖.54  The process of listening and being seen 
to listen with leaders at the local, regional and international level was very important. 
This effort encompassed Tribal Elders, President Karzai (often several times a day), 
President Musharaf of Pakistan and visiting political leaders.
55
 Richards spent much 
of his time understanding what they wanted and persuading them of his intent. He 
explained that he then used the ―power of the military headquarters coordinate and 
implement, in a way that no one else seems to be able to do‖.56 
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ISAF under NATO, was of course, not in charge of the Afghan campaign as a whole. 
Therefore arguably it could not legitimately provide guidance to its commanders 
beyond the security domain. Hence NATO‘s overall direction remained vague. It was 
widely understood, however, that the desired outcome was a stable, secure and self 
sustainable Afghanistan. This would require a democratic government, which could 
deliver basic services, a sustainable security environment, a market economy to 
provide for social needs and reduce poverty with a decrease in poppy cultivation and 
the trafficking of narcotics.
57
 In these circumstances Richards‘ approach was that, as a 
Theatre commander in a counter insurgency operation charged with providing 
security to enable political and economic development, a high political profile was a 
necessity along with his security role.
58
 Coordinated political engagement by the 
Commander and his subordinates was needed at the regional, national government 
and local levels. Richards explained that ―constructive engagement with all elements 
of the Afghan government‖59 was needed first to help get the local political process 
moving and secondly to energise the spectrum of cross government activity needed to 
deal with the insurgency. At the local level, engagement with tribal elders, using 
Shuras,
60
 was needed in order to understand local issues, justify and explain NATO‘s 
actions,
61
 and begin separating irreconcilable hard core Taliban from those who could 
be reconciled and drawn into the government‘s influence. 
 
The specified military task of expanding the NATO presence into the south and east, 
was as Richards explained, relatively straightforward. More challenging was the 
problem of converting military gains into wider operational impact, to ―create the 
right operating ‗environment‘ for this … we had…to achieve …unity of effort‖.62 
This was achieved by creating a new government mechanism, the Policy Action 
Group (PAG), to bring key Afghan and International Community players together, 
―systematically, to discuss and agree the way ahead‖.63 Karzai had tended to run 
Afghanistan ―like a tribal elder by a mobile phone‖64 and individual Ambassadors or 
ministers would do deals which were unknown to others.
65
 Richards explained that 
there was no process or records and it was ―absolutely anarchic‖. 66   Therefore, 
leveraging the impact of rioting in Kabul on 29 May 2006, he persuaded Karzai that a 
war cabinet or Policy Action Group (PAG) would improve top-level governance and 
coordination,
67
 with a specific focus on key aspects of the insurgency.
68
 Richards 
explained that the PAG would also help to expand
69
 ―the writ of the government into 
all areas‖.70 (The structure and composition of the PAG is explained at Figure 6.2 
below).  
 
The PAG was chaired by the President with ministers in attendance as well as 
international participants (ISAF, the US Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan 
(CFC-A), UNAMA, European Union, and relevant national embassies). Individual 
ministers chaired implementation and coordination groups in the following areas: 
intelligence, security, strategic communications, and reconstruction and development 
and governance.
71
 The PAG met every week and was serviced by a secretariat 
provided by ISAF and the UN, without which it would not have functioned.
72
 At its 
first meeting on 9 July 2006 the PAG considered objectives
73
 across the span of 
government and international activity (Governance, Political Engagement, External 
Issues, Diplomatic Issues, Security, Development, Communication and Social 
Issues).
74
  The PAG certainly improved matters but it did not deliver real ―hyper-
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connectivity‖75 to achieve both unity of purpose and unity of effort. Also, as Brigadier 
Phil Jones, the military advisor to the SRSG at the time explained, in Afghanistan, 
―there was no peace process and no political primacy in one person, so there was no 
clear guiding light‖.76 
 
Figure 6.2 The Policy Action Group. Source: Richards
77
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The influence of Pakistan was another political problem which needed to be 
addressed.  To provide a means of bringing Afghans and Pakistanis together to 
"discuss matters of mutual security interest," and to enable collaborative security 
efforts in border areas, Richards emphasised and enhanced
78
 the role of the Tripartite 
Commission.  This included senior military representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
ISAF and the US led coalition. A Joint Operations Centre was established to assist 
with information sharing as well as an Operational Coordination Group.  Richards 
also visited Pakistan in order to establish a working relationship with President 
Musharraf. 
 
4.2. Campaign Design under Richards 
 
General Richards‘ recipe for campaign success was ―Reconstruction and 
Development, Governance, Pakistan relations, cloaked in Security, all done 
synergistically‖ (RGDPS).79  On the security side the key problem was dealing with 
the Taliban and separating them from the population. An irreconcilable Islamic 
fundamentalist hard-core who wished to return to power in Kabul, had to be destroyed 
or interdicted. Those whose motivations where about local power and money, and 
who fed off tribal feuding banditry and narcotics,
80
 had to be disrupted and deterred. 
A third group of locally recruited part-timers whose sole objective was to earn 
money
81
 would simply need to be engaged and provided with alternatives.
82
 The 
military effort would buy space and time
83
 but the problem was pulling all of the 
RGDPS elements together in time and space. 
 
With the expansion of the NATO presence, Richards gave direction in July 2006 to 
plan and implement focused military-led action in support of GIRoA in specific 
geographic Afghan Development Zones (ADZ) (See Figure 6.3 below). Focused 
action was necessary because ISAF lacked the force levels, and there was insufficient 
development funding,
84
 to operate everywhere. The key would be to select areas 
where examples of good governance, reconstruction and development could work 
within a secure environment in order to restore the confidence of the people
85
 and 
convince them to support GIRoA. This would counter the Taliban‘s powerful claim86 
that the GIRoA and International Community were not delivering.
87
 In these zones all 
GIRoA and international community efforts would be focused; this would form a 
stable base from which the government could extend its reach, thereby undermining 
support for the insurgency. The intent was through unity of effort to secure the 
Afghan population from the Taliban and others; to provide the population with the 
incentive, means, resolve and courage to stand up to the insurgents. ISAF would align 
its operations with those of the government and with the expectations of the local 
citizens: they would seek to reinvigorate traditional forms of influence and authority; 
local views would influence priorities and build a sense of ownership.
88
 The ADZ 
concept would create political space by the application of military force in support of 
governance and development initiatives. ADZs would be selected on the basis of 
geography, demography and available forces together with the capability of the 
government and international community to deliver progress on the ground and to 
plan, coordinate and lead operations supported by ISAF. Effective partnering of 
ANSF by ISAF would be important. The bottom line, however, remained that, whilst 
this allowed NATO to seize the initiative in the selected areas,
89
 the available 
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resources were slim; Richards admitted that they ―were making the best of a bad 
job‖.90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  182 
Figure 6.3 Afghan Development Zone Concept. Source Richards
91
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4.3. Campaign Execution under Richards 
 
During the summer of 2006 ISAF‘s expansion into the south was soon challenged by 
the Taliban.  At Kandahar they prepared defences to threaten the city and Highway 1, 
the main road between Kabul and Herat in the West. Canadian forces, backed by the 
US
92
 (with non-NATO forces) eventually defeated the Taliban, although not without 
difficulty.
93
 Richards explained that the political stakes were high; losing this battle 
would have meant disaster for the NATO operation, and arguably NATO‘s own 
survival. Had the Taliban entered Kandahar, ―the consent of the Pashtun population 
[in the South] to President Karzai and the International Community would have been 
lost, he would almost certainly have fallen from power‖.94 However, notwithstanding 
the seriousness of the military position, the difficulties of multinational operations 
were soon evident, ―very few nations, over focused on their own narrow problems, 
were prepared to come to the Canadians assistance‖.95 In the end the result of this 
conventional battle
96
 was significant; the Taliban suffered a comprehensive tactical 
defeat, despite reinforcing their position.‖97 NATO had provide that it could fight, 
which was an important signal,
98
 and the Taliban were forced to disperse and alter 
their tactics relying on infiltration, suicide bombs and ―'asymmetric' attacks‖. 99 
Nevertheless despite this tactical success, a shortage of troops, both Western and 
Afghan, meant that NATO could not completely hold the ground that they had 
cleared,
100
 and this would become a perennial feature.
101
  
 
An ISAF-wide operation in the winter of 2006-2007 (Operation Oqab) sought to 
establish and expand selected focus ADZs along Afghanistan's ring road – Highway 
1.  The first phase was to secure the selected areas.  The second phase was to disrupt 
insurgent infiltration and exfiltration activity, in coordination with Pakistan.  This 
increased security would then allow governance, reconstruction and development to 
be improved demonstrating that the government was better able to meet the needs of 
the people than the alternatives; thus separating the population from the insurgents. 
There was an effort to ensure an Afghan face and to partner with the expanding 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Adopting an integrated approach was also 
important, but difficult. 
 
Another crosscutting challenge was delivering an integrated politico-military counter 
narcotics effort.  There was no real International Community consensus over policy 
either on poppy crop eradication
102
 or dealing with the trade by eliminating factories 
and distribution networks. The genuine dilemma was whether to eradicate crops 
(favoured by the US),
103
 but risk losing local consent and influence; or to accept the 
reality of the problem and seek to replace the poppy as a crop.
104
 This would need 
alternative legal livelihoods and infrastructure as part of the wider economic picture 
as well as counter narcotics institutions.
105
 Meanwhile the Taliban and narco-warlords 
were well linked and the Taliban drew income, and hence arms, from the trade
106
 so 
this needed to be dealt with.
107
 Figure 6.4 below provides an overview of the security 
situation and poppy cultivation in 2007-8. Clearly some broad parallels can be drawn 
between the two, particularly in the southern and eastern provinces. 
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Figure 6.4 Overview of Security Situation and Poppy Cultivation 2007-2008. 
Source BBC and UN
108
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Campaign Results under Richards 
 
Richards attempted to apply a number of classic features familiar from Templer‘s 
handling of Malaya in the 1950s. Demonstrating the power of leadership, advocacy 
and military organisation to catalyze political solutions, he was instrumental, assisted 
by Chris Alexander (UNAMA DSRSG),
109
  in establishing a political structure
110
 the 
Policy Action Group
111
 to get things moving in Afghanistan. This war cabinet, with a 
supporting committee system,
112
 improved coordination and unity of effort in the 
counter insurgency campaign.
113
 There were evident sensitivities over this from some 
political quarters, but those same critics were not able to provide an alternative to the 
jury-rigged international and local structures in Afghanistan. However it enabled 
Karzai to set his priorities,
114
 and according to a UNAMA report, it ―increased levels 
of cooperation and coordination both between GoA and the international community 
and among each of those groups‖.115 On the ground, a version of the ―ink spot‖116  
strategy initiated by Richards would begin to solve the insurgency problem through 
the Afghan Development Zone concept.  He commented that these zones were ―about 
joint action and unity of effort, not just development‖. 117  However the aim of 
―restoring Afghan people‘s confidence‖118 was continually frustrated by the difficulty 
of getting Afghan delivery, difficulty coordinating efforts, a shortage of troops and, in 
non-US areas, a simple shortage of money.
119
 Another recurring problem highlighted 
by commanders was that the shortage of ground troops meant there would be times 
when air power had to cover the gap. This tended to cause civilian casualties and 
collateral damage.
120
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The struggle to convince a critical mass of the Pashtun population, many of whom 
were struggling for survival, that their best option was to support the government
121
 
and not the Taliban, or warlords, was far from over. As Richards commented: ―if you 
are an Afghan who has spent thirty years fighting, you have learned not to put your 
faith in the wrong side‖.122  Information operations could help to counter negative 
perceptions but, as Richards pointed out, they had to be ―founded on substance and 
not spin‖.123 Delivering the substance through real governance, supported by Afghan 
security, was difficult and hence it was perhaps not surprising that the Taliban were, 
according to a SENLIS assessment, ―increasingly able to fill the political space‖ and 
provided de-facto government in large areas
124
 of the Pashtun belt in the south (see 
Figure 6.5 below); albeit that the Pashtuns do not naturally follow the Taliban‘s form 
of Islam.  Areas that had been taken by NATO often could not be held.
125
 Moreover 
the porous uncontrolled border with Pakistan
126
 provided ready access to recruits, 
funding and ideological support from Al Quaeda.
127
 According to the UN Secretary 
General, this state of affairs, indicated, ―an insurgency emboldened by their strategic 
successes, rather than disheartened by tactical failures.‖ 
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Figure 6.5 Insurgent Activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2007. Source: 
SENLIS Afghanistan.
128
 
 
 
 
 
At the national level the legitimacy of the GIRoA continued to be undermined by the 
perception of widespread corruption, despite attempts through the PAG to address 
governance and reconciliation. The perception that the government was unable to 
provide security also grew, partly due to attacks but also the increasing level of 
civilian casualties.
129
 At the national level line ministries were over bureaucratic
130
 
and only able to spend approximately 60% of their budgets,
131
 internal government 
coordination remained poor and legislative progress was slow. At the sub national 
level service delivery saw little progress. The shortage of Afghan human capacity
132
 
remained a pervasive problem throughout. Some coordination was achieved between 
the international community and the GIRoA through the PAG; nevertheless there was 
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no unanimity of views amongst the NGOs and international organisations and the role 
of the UN was not always clear: was it to take a back seat or a more active 
coordinating role?
133
 On a positive note there was improvement in the education and 
health sectors,
134
 but overall progress remained hampered by the lack of local capacity 
and implementing plans and policies.
135
 
 
As Richards explained, ISAF had successfully expanded into areas where ―previously 
there had been few or no international forces, extending the writ of the Afghan 
government in the process‖.136 Nevertheless the paucity of Afghan National Army 
troops and the corrupt and ineffective nature of the Afghan National Police meant that 
success in delivering a secure environment to enable reconstruction in these areas was 
mixed. Numbers present for duty were often below 50% of the authorised strength 
(then 70,000).  In early 2007 insurgent activity levels were on the increase particularly 
in the South using well-prepared IEDs and attacks against high profile targets. In the 
North, attacks on NGOs increased. This meant that many Afghan army troops were 
required on fixed force protection roles in garrisons and outposts.
137
  
 
In Kabul, HQ ISAF was the dominant organisation, military or civilian, because it had 
new ideas and the power to implement them. Although this would cause some 
resentment because it indicated that other approaches were wrong or ―not invented 
here.‖ 138  Richards own prognosis in 2007 was that the campaign was ―winnable‖.139 
Security had been stabilised, there was economic growth, significant spending on 
reconstruction and development, ISAF was being reinforced, and 78% of the 
population were still in favour of ISAF's engagement whereas the Taliban only had 
10% support.
140
 The ingredients for success were in place but the expectations of the 
people were high and time to effect meaningful change was running out. NATO was 
not winning the information war. There was no strategic plan and messages were not 
consistent with audiences.
141
 The Taliban were mounting an increasingly effective 
information campaign whilst NATO, at both the operational and strategic levels, was 
finding it increasingly difficult to counter this with coordinated master messages.
142
  
So, would the military effort be able to hold the ring and sustain consent whilst 
waiting for the other elements of the campaign to deliver?
143
  
 
5. ISAF 2007 – 2009: a deepening crisis and a developing understanding 
 
During the period from mid-2007 until mid-2009 the pattern of the essentially Pashtun 
insurgency continued in Afghanistan. In terms of geography, insurgent activity tended 
to correspond to the spread of NATO, albeit the intensity was on the increase. The 
insurgent objective remained to undermine the government and to make the 
alternatives look better. Here the problem was not so much that the insurgency was 
strong but the government was weak; legitimate economic activity was stifled by 
corruption; and tribal society lent itself to the sort of parallel structures offered by the 
Taliban. They applied available tools, including the information domain, to achieve 
this effect. The Taliban were notably effective in magnifying the effects of non-
combatant casualties, many of which they caused, but which were readily seized upon 
by the media.
144
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NATO simply did not have enough troops (around 50,000 during 2008) and some 
were restricted by caveats.  Therefore combat power was focused specifically to 
separate insurgents from the people and this needed to be synchronised with state 
building activities including counter narcotics, governance and reconstruction 
activities. There was clear recognition for the need to align planning: there was no 
sense in conducting military clear and hold operations without the necessary civilian 
agencies in place for the build.
145
 However coordination amongst international 
military and civilian actors remained challenging.  The NATO campaign plans had 
lines of development for security, social / economic development and governance; 
with information as a crosscutting activity. But NATO did not own the whole 
problem. Another problem explained by David Couzens, an ISAF campaign planner 
at the time was the fact that military planning was partly conducted at Brunsuum in 
the Netherlands.  This did not help in securing buy-in from UNAMA and there were 
doubts whether the planning had traction with the regional level of command in 
ISAF.
146
  
 
The ISAF Commanders (McNeil and later McKiernan) were not in a position to 
deliver governance or political change.
147
 Responsibility for this lay with the UN 
agencies under UNAMA and with the Afghans.  Arguably the NATO Senior Civilian 
Representative should have helped deliver the political connections to do this.
148
 Yet 
NATO was undergoing its own internal debate. Eventually, in April 2008 NATO 
agreed a ―Comprehensive Political Military Plan.‖149  This was to guide NATO‘s 
civil-military activity in relation to Afghanistan at the strategic political level.  But 
there seemed no real sense of securing a clear political end in Afghanistan.  David 
Couzens remarked that ―the political was not part of it‖. 150  Inevitably some 
participants were beginning to highlight the need for outreach to certain insurgent 
groups, because as a senior British officer commented, "no insurgency ends without 
this‖.151  Nevertheless here was no effective work on reconciliation and no local buy 
in to that. The SRSG Kai Eide, although a former Norwegian Ambassador to NATO, 
―seemed to have a fundamental dislike of NATO‖152 and did not seize the opportunity 
to work closely with NATO, preferring to preserve the independence of UNAMA and 
conduct his own efforts independently.  Hence although there were frequent 
coordination discussions
153
 the UN and NATO‘s political effort was ―not delivering 
much‖.154 Moreover, uncertainty given the election approaching in 2009 had also 
affected political progress.
155
 
 
In terms of Afghan politics, Karzai‘s focus was on Kabul and not the provinces. 
Perhaps under rated by the media, he had a huge task. Pressed by many international 
interlocutors he tended to walk a tightrope attempting to keep all happy but tending 
not to follow up on undertakings made. He saw advantage of the EU with its 
resources and links to the World Bank.  Hence the EU had political and economic 
influence.
156
 With NATO he was as cooperative politically as he could afford to be.  
However a recurring theme of deep concern to Karzai was the incidence of civilian 
casualties.  Eventually ISAF addressed this through a new tactical directive, limiting 
the use of force, but this did not completely solve the problem. UNAMA and others 
saw NATO‘s approach as ―too kinetic‖. 157   The problem of excessive losses of 
international convoys also had effects on the local population.  These issues would 
  189 
eventually help ISAF to begin thinking more broadly about the perceptions of the 
locals and what was meant by security.
158
 
 
In 2008, after 8 years in Afghanistan, the international community began to 
understand
159
 the complexity of the situation and the needed response. Improved 
understanding did not deliver immediate change but (as with Iraq and the surge) this 
would start to shape thinking, particularly in the US, on the art of the possible.
160
 Had 
there previously been any doubt, it was obvious that the elusive Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban were successfully feeding off the actions of the international military forces. 
The battle space was now the people and hence any notion of "shattering the 
cohesion" of the enemy was meaningless.  A different approach was needed; just as 
Clausewitz had described war as the ―continuation of politics by other means,‖161 then 
so to politics it needed to return in Afghanistan.  But this needed to be facilitated and 
here it was important to understand that, as Graeme Lamb a seasoned British 
commander put it, ―everything we do needs to set the conditions for a successful 
political outcome‖.162 
  
General McKiernan had seen the need to change the approach to the insurgency, this 
would need more troops, and he had requested these. In February 2009 his US boss, 
General Petraeus (now Commander Central Command), publicly mapped out the 
elements of a culturally sensitive population-centric counter insurgency approach for 
Afghanistan, applying lessons from Iraq, separating irreconcilables from reconcilables 
while making the latter part of the solution.  He stressed the need for a comprehensive 
approach and hence the need for unity of effort.
163
 Finally, in March 2009 the US 
administration updated its approach to Afghanistan: President Barack Obama 
recognised that the mission had been under resourced
164
 and stated that, 
  
―we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the 
future…To achieve our goals, we need a stronger, smarter and comprehensive 
strategy."
165
 
 
To implement this regional strategy Obama appointed Richard Holbroke as his special 
representative and agreed the deployment of more US troops.  Obama‘s policy 
objective was however short on detail and could be interpreted as either an 
engagement strategy, a containment strategy,
166
 or both. Unfortunately this did not 
offer any real clue as to the political outcome required in Afghanistan, albeit Obama 
mentioned a requirement for reconciliation. In large measure it would be left of the 
generals, first McKiernan
167
 and later his replacement McChrystal to map out what 
needed to be done and to judge this against practical realities. Notwithstanding 
NATO's security-oriented mandate, the reality was that no other actor had the 
capacity or reach across Afghanistan to do this; but securing unity of effort would 
remain a problem.
168
 
 
In July 2009 the British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, led the charge on 
mapping out a political solution for Afghanistan. In a speech at NATO headquarters 
he averred that whilst military operations could ―deny insurgents the space to 
operate‖, 169  ―strategic progress relies on undermining the insurgency through 
  190 
politics‖.170 This meant developing a political strategy to deliver reintegration and 
reconciliation of suitable insurgents and to cater for the needs of the wider population. 
This would depend on "credible, clean local government at provincial and district 
level that works with the grain of tribal Afghan society".
171
 At the grassroots level, the 
Afghan government needed to deliver alternatives to fighting.
172
  At the higher level 
irreconcilable ideologues had to be separated from those who could be taken into the 
political process. To reassure the population, security had to be provided by effective 
Afghan forces; governance had to be delivered; and Shuras of local elders needed to 
guide the delivery of international aid.
173
 Finally, viable relations had to be 
established with Afghanistan's neighbours, particularly Pakistan, in view of the cross-
border movement of insurgents and Pakistan's own Taliban insurgency in the north-
west of the country;
174
 regional countries needed to support an independent 
Afghanistan.
175
 
 
6. ISAF Under General McChrystal 2009-2010 
 
6.1. Politico-Military Relationships 
 
General Stanley McChrystal took command of ISAF and US Forces in Afghanistan 
on 15 June 2009.  He was selected partly due to his counter insurgency expertise
176
 
but also his special forces background, which had included the synchronisation of 
multiple effects, notably in Iraq.
177
 This would also be needed for operations against 
Al Qaeda, including in Pakistan.  An extraordinary, charismatic, analytical and 
straight talking figure, McChrystal's biggest difficulty would be that, in Afghanistan, 
in contrast to Iraq, there was no politico-military alignment. Nor was policy at the 
strategic, operational execution, and tactical levels fully aligned and this created a 
―weak seam‖.178 Obtaining the politico-military synergy and effective unity of 
command created by the Crocker-Petraeus team in the US led coalition in Iraq simply 
was not possible in Afghanistan.   
 
There was no unified stabilisation policy and no single individual was answerable for 
international efforts on governance or social and economic reconstruction.  UNAMA, 
was, as Lieutenant General James Dutton (UK) the ISAF Deputy Commander put it, 
―enthusiastic but not an organisation‖179 and its leadership did not have the confidence 
to work outside its very restrictive mandate.  In terms of a local political partner, the 
international community had effectively committed itself to Karzai during 2004 to 
2005; a situation cemented by an imperfect election in 2009
180
 which saw Karzai 
returned for a second term as president.  The international community, led by the US, 
nevertheless decided to continue to support this elected administration partly because 
it shared, at least in principle, the same aims and objectives.
181
  Frequently criticised, 
and lacking a prime minister to help carry the load, Karzai would see upwards of 50 
national ambassadors or visiting ministers, as well as those of NATO and the EU who 
pushed individual lines to Karzai.  Hence the ISAF Commander, as the single most 
powerful international actor in Afghanistan, would face the challenge of delivering 
the military part of a comprehensive counter insurgency solution whilst operating with 
a fissiparous set of international political actors and a local partner, under severe 
pressure, whose legitimacy was questionable. 
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Notwithstanding these difficulties, according to McChrystal‘s deputy, General Dutton, 
he was ―hugely ambitious to sort out Afghanistan‖.182 Occasionally fiery yet 
possessing humility and an inclusive approach in the search for ideas, McChrystal 
entirely understood the civil-military nature of the problem and was determined to 
obtain the necessary civilian support.  Arguably the ISAF commander was best placed 
to support (and influence) Karzai and the international community.   
Yet McChrystal did not seek to become a "Templar" figure; instead, respecting 
civilian political primacy, he took his place in the weekly cabal including the SRSG, 
NATO Civilian Representative and ambassadors from US, UK, EU, France and 
Germany.  Intended to act a guiding body for Karzai and others, the group was not 
however particularly successful.
183
   
 
6.2. Deriving an updated campaign strategy: the big ideas184 
 
US Secretary of Defence Gates, and later the NATO Secretary General, directed 
McChrystal to produce an assessment of the campaign after 60 days in post. Shortly 
before issuing his report, McChrystal and US Ambassador Eikenberry published a 
new Civilian-Military Campaign Plan to integrate US efforts across the country.
185
 
Whilst not an internationally agreed document, this plan outlined the situation and US 
intentions.  The strategic goal remained as Obama had outlined in March.
186
 In terms 
of ways, the report stated that ―our every action must help secure mobilise and support 
the Afghan people and their government to defeat the insurgency‖.187  It stressed the 
need for Afghan leadership and underlined the scale of the challenge facing both the 
Afghans and the international community as well as stressing the need for adequate 
means.
188
  This report presaged part of McChrystal‘s own assessment. 
 
McChrystal delivered his unequivocal confidential assessment of the situation, which 
was subsequently leaked to the press, on 30 August 2009.
189
 The assessment, in itself 
an impressive thesis on contemporary counter insurgency, which clearly drew on the 
tenets of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, advocated a population-centric approach to 
generating political momentum in Afghanistan.  It was inherently demanding of 
international political will.   McChrystal summarised the situation as "serious… [with] 
a resilient and growing insurgency [and] a crisis of confidence among Afghans…A 
perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us 
against the insurgents‖. 190 The threat was organised, determined, insurgent groups 
who sought to ―expel international forces, separate the Afghan people from GIRoA, 
and gain control of the population‖.191 Much of this crisis of confidence stemmed 
from inadequate governance at the national level and a failure to connect with the 
people. The government was weak and endemically corrupt, comprising thinly 
disguised interest groups.
192
   
 
McChrystal explained a number of recurring themes emerging from his civil-military 
expert team's analysis: the objective was the will of the people, this required 
interaction with the population and a focus on delivering stability; ISAF's 
conventional warfare culture was a problem; ultimately Afghans had to defeat the 
insurgency; unity of effort had to improve significantly, both within ISAF and across 
the international effort; and protecting the people meant ―shielding them from 
insurgent violence, corruption, and coercion".
193
 Less clear was his view on how this 
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approach would create political space for an Afghan political settlement to emerge or 
how NATO would assist in that process, although he commented that ―…a political 
solution to all conflicts is the inevitable outcome. And it‘s the right outcome‖.194  
McChrystal explained the need to change the campaign strategy and the operational 
approach. This had to be credible and sustainable, it needed to be properly resourced 
and executed through an "integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign 
that earns the support of the Afghan[s]… and provides them… a secure 
environment‖.195  
 
By the time McChrystal was in Kabul, many of the ideas suggested by the Bonn 
agreement on social engineering to change the Afghan way of life had in effect been 
abandoned.
196
 The ideas themselves were worthy but change would need to come, as 
General Dutton put it, ―from the inside out and not be provided from the outside 
in.‖197  McChrystal‘s 60 day report focussed simply on the essentials needed to get 
Afghanistan on a path to stability.  Whilst the assessment was sobering, McChrystal‘s 
view was that ISAF could achieve the mission. The ways would be an updated 
people-centric indirect strategy
198
 and of course the additional means, both military 
and civilian would be needed.  In articulating these needs, McChrystal had in effect 
explained to the political community what needed to be done more clearly than any 
politician had hitherto. He forced the pace on the need to address the totality of the 
insurgency with a ―full spectrum‖ approach applied by a diverse group of actors and 
stated that ISAF must "preserve, bolster and help focus this diverse partnership‖.199 
No aspect of the situation or the campaign could be reviewed in isolation; this wicked 
problem, comprising interconnecting relationships had to be viewed holistically. And 
the main actors were the people, the government, ISAF, the insurgency, and external 
players.
200
 
 
The people-centric approach included a new operational culture. ISAF had to reduce 
its preoccupation with force protection and get closer to the people; it had to improve 
its understanding of and respect for their culture; personal relationships were required 
with Afghan partners; and the risks needed to be shared. McChrystal stated that 
insurgencies typically were concluded by a combination of military and political 
effort which drove host nation reconciliation with some insurgent element.
201
 
Although beyond its responsibilities, ISAF must be ―in a position to support 
appropriate reconciliation policies‖. Insurgents would have the choice to ―fight, flee 
or reintegrate‖.202 For its part, ISAF would need to work on reintegrating fighters and 
lower level leaders in coordination with the government. 
 
The overall ISAF strategy resulting from McChrystal's assessment included four 
elements. First, to deepen integration and partnering with the Afghan national security 
forces; this would enable faster Afghan capacity development with a view to taking 
on security. Second, supporting governance at all levels would be as important as 
security. Third the initial focus would be ―gaining the initiative and reversing the 
momentum of the insurgency‖.203 Finally, ISAF would prioritise resources where the 
population was most threatened.
204
 Gaining the initiative would later enable ―strategic 
consolidation‖ as Afghan capacity increased and the insurgency diminished over 12 to 
24 months.  McChrystal‘s approach to facilitating political outcomes at the Theatre 
level would, he argued, deliver strategic success. 
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After protracted consideration
205
 lasting into December 2009 the Obama 
Administration finally decided to provide McChrystal with an additional 30,000 US 
troops in addition to the 68,000 US and 39,000 troops from other nations already 
deployed.  There would also be additional civilian assistance.  Obama‘s dithering left 
the international community dangling, was hardly propitious and wasted critical 
time.
206
 Worse, the caveat was that this US force level would only remain for 18 
months,
207
 hence a political timeline for extraction began to emerge.
208
 
 
6.3. Campaign Design: Communicating The Big Ideas209 
 
The key themes in McChrystal's assessment where addressed in a new ISAF 
Campaign Design.  This is shown at figure 6.6 below which explains the Ends, Ways 
and Means.  The ambitious Ends were, 
 
 ―Phase 3 ends when the insurgency is defeated and no longer able to threaten 
the survival of GIRoA, Afghanistan is stabilised, legitimate governance 
extends to local levels, socio-economic programs benefit the majority of the 
Afghan people, and GIRoA, with ISAF in support is capable of assuming the 
lead for the provision of security.‖ 210 
 
The people were the objective and this was explicitly communicated through the 5 
Lines of Operation and the operational objectives for each. The lines of operation 
were: Protect the Population; Enable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); 
Neutralize Malign Influence; Support Extension of Governance; and Support Socio-
Economic Development. A requirement for strong civil-military cooperation and 
strategic communications was infused throughout. In demonstrating the totality of 
military and civilian effort required, the campaign design reflected a ―full spectrum‖ 
approach to countering the insurgency, albeit the difficulty of integrating these 
remained as discussed above. The first security line of operation, Protecting the 
Population, required effort to be prioritised in areas of high population density, 
primarily Pashtun populations. Civilian casualties also had to be reduced. The second 
military line of operation, Enable ANSF, demanded the delivery of indigenous 
security forces (both in terms of capacity and capability) to be accelerated and 
expanded. Partnering was needed at every level. The Neutralise Malign Influence 
effort required corruption to be pinpointed, the influence of narcotics to be reduced 
and illegitimate governance replaced with legitimate instruments. The fourth line of 
operation, Supporting the Extension of Governance, was intended to secure popular 
support by empowering sub national leaders in providing effective population 
security. It would also enable reconciliation. The final line of operation, Support 
Socio-Economic Development, also sought to gain popular support, here by creating 
security conditions for community economic development.
211
  As pursuit of these 
lines of effort shifted from security to stability, so the responsibility for delivery 
shifted away from ISAF.  
 
With this explicit approach McChrystal went beyond the doctrinal suggestions in FM 
3-24 and FM 3-07 and used words that had not been used before to communicate his 
intent.  The military role was to stem the insurgency whilst concurrently developing 
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Afghan security forces so that these can take responsibility for their own security. The 
idea was that this would be easier once the insurgency has been reduced.
212
  However 
in order to deliver the operational objectives, this military plan also required deep and 
extensive coordination with all other actors to make progress along all lines and 
deliver stability.  It was understood that whilst it was relatively easy to provide 
security (given adequate resources), issues such as governance development where a 
longer term proposition,
213
 and, critically, there was no unity of command: parallel 
chains of command
214
 for the military and civil efforts persisted.  Furthermore this 
approach demanded more of the UN‘s mission and arguably stretched its mandate 
well beyond Brahimi‘s light footprint approach. 
 
Figure 6.6  ISAF Campaign Design 2009-2010. Source CSIS
215
 
 
 
 
 
6.4. Executing the Big Ideas.  
 
From the outset, McChrystal was determined to effect a cultural change in the whole 
way that ISAF operated.  For his approach of defeating the insurgency, not the 
insurgent to succeed, it was important to have his whole command understand the 
rationale for protecting and connecting with the people.  This needed a mixture of 
strict controls on the application of force and guidance on how to operate.  The 
political imperative was to reduce civilian casualties
216
 whilst also fighting the 
insurgents.  Thus restraining the use of force was an urgent priority and McChrystal 
updated McKiernan‘s earlier Tactical Directive,217 his intent was to reduce reliance on 
―kinetic‖218 activity and bring a substantial focus on providing security to the Afghans 
through ―courageous restraint‖219 over using force.  This would be at the expense of 
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higher risks for his own units. Beyond modifying the use of force, McChrystal‘s 
thoughtful Counter Insurgency Guidance, a 7 page document packed with clear 
instructions, stressed that the people were the objective, ―protecting the people is the 
mission...ISAF will succeed when GIRoA earns the support of the people‖.220  To 
achieve this, ISAF‘s operating culture had to shift from killing insurgents to getting 
the people involved in their future.  Every action mattered, be it interacting with the 
people, driving, flying, patrolling, using force or using money.  Insurgent attacks had 
to be seen for what they were: ―a secondary effort to discredit the government and 
provoke a... response that alienates the people‖221   Beyond issuing guidance, the 
Commander and his team also reiterated these points at every opportunity and in 
every forum
222
 throughout the theatre. 
 
NATO had agreed in April 2009 that the ISAF commander should focus more on 
civil-military cooperation.
223
  Although he was not in charge, this would in theory 
help McChrystal integrate the military with the multinational diplomatic and 
economic effort.  One of McChrystal‘s early moves was to adjust the practical 
command and control arrangements in HQ ISAF in order to give his headquarters a 
more comprehensive and strategic role working ‗outwards and upwards‘.  This 
facilitated closer liaison with UNAMA and the rest of the International Community.  
Understandably, in common with many multinational missions, the ISAF NATO 
headquarters was oversized and could not be as efficient as a purely national (or small 
coalition) structure.  
 
A physical troop presence was the first essential element of providing a sense of 
security for the Afghan people; but much more was needed to secure the will of the 
people. McChrystal explained that ―an effective ‗offensive‘ operation ... is one that 
takes from the insurgent what he cannot afford to lose – control of the population‖.224 
Hence they had to be persuaded their government‘s control was enough to prevent the 
return of insurgents. This meant delivering security, local governance
225
 and 
international aid. General Dutton saw examples of this being successfully achieved 
across the country, but he stressed the need for rapid follow-up once a "security 
space" had been established.
226
 ISAF did not formally take on the non-military lines 
of operations in those areas where the security situation precluded civilian 
organisations from operating.  But he saw ISAF having a responsibility to help deliver 
good governance and there is no doubt that, in Kabul, McChrystal was active
227
 in the 
role of ―primary integrator‖ 228 in order to ensure that the needed follow up could 
happen. 
 
But was any of this going to deliver a lasting political reconciliation in Afghanistan 
and what was the military role, if any, in supporting this? Some Taliban members 
were ideologically motivated, whilst others were more tribally and financially 
motivated or simply intimidated. A relevant military role was to assist with 
reintegration of those fighters who were not so ideologically committed and wished 
become part of the lawful security forces.  In the light of his experience supporting the 
Anbar Awakening in Iraq (discussed in chapter 5), a retired British General, Graeme 
Lamb was employed to develop and facilitate a reintegration programme
229
 which 
would promote, and in reality be closely linked to, reconciliation.
230
  This approach 
had been at the core of campaign design in Iraq.  In Afghanistan, ISAF‘s broader 
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security efforts on countering insurgency and building Afghan forces put it in contact, 
particularly at the tactical level, with fighters who could potentially be integrated into 
legitimate forces or found alternative employment.  At the operational/strategic level 
there would also be more senior players who would be relevant to reconciliation. 
Dealing with this latter group would be a sensitive issue within NATO, with UNAMR 
and with the GIRoA; nevertheless the military could clearly play some supporting 
role,
231
 particularly in areas where others were unwilling to go. 
 
6.5. Campaign Results under McChrystal 
 
President Obama fired McChrystal was on 24 June 2010, following unflattering 
remarks about members of the US Administration and its conduct of the war made by 
McChrystal and members of his inner team and reported in a Rolling Stone magazine 
article.
232
 McChrystal was rightly criticised for this gaffe, and paid the price.  Civilian 
control of the military was, rightly, reasserted.
233
  McChrystal‘s undermining of 
political trust should not however mask the clarity of his analysis and prescription for 
Afghanistan.
234
 He was prepared to attempt a seemingly impossible task against 
unclear and shifting strategic ends.
235
 McChrystal‘s drive and enthusiasm rapidly 
changed perceptions on the art of the possible in Afghanistan, albeit many of his 
policies were a continuation of those of his predecessors.  The debate surrounding his 
departure reveals that notwithstanding his blunder, significant external-to- theatre 
difficulties
236
 remained in executing the rather vague strategy and tentative 
commitment offered by Obama and the West.  Some pundits have suggested that in 
fact McChrystal had recognised the impossibility of his situation and the shortage of 
time to effect his strategy in the face of pressure to remove US and other troops from 
Afghanistan.
237
 Indeed he had reportedly briefed NATO Defence Ministers on his 
―serious concerns over levels of security, violence and corruption within the Afghan 
administration‖ 238 and critical shortages of NATO capabilities to address these issues.   
This was not helpful for a ―face saving exit‖.239   
 
Professor Michael Clarke recently stated that historically a prerequisite for successful 
counter insurgency was the ―complete unity of view between political and military 
establishments‖ 240  and mused that this was increasingly absent in the US. Some 
commentators point out that the increasing international political tendency to speak of 
deadlines for withdrawal merely plays into the hands of a resilient foe that could 
simply wait.
241
 One commentator has written of a ―conceptual withdrawal‖242 having 
already occurred in Washington. In these circumstances the needed improvement to 
unity of effort in theatre appears largely illusory.  McChrystal did not benefit from a 
Kouchner or Crocker figure.  The senior civilians present, notably the UN SRSG Kai 
Eide and US Ambassador Eikenberry, although all seemingly working together, 
apparently did little to help.  Indeed Eikenberry has been repeatedly criticised for 
obstructing McChrystal‘s policies behind the scenes:243 a strange state of affairs given 
that ISAF was clearly the US‘s most effective delivery mechanism in Afghanistan.    
 
In assessing the results of the changes instituted by McChrystal it is important to 
remember that NATO is still conducting Phase 3 – the ‗stabilisation‘ phase – of its 
plan. Hence the desired political impact had not yet been achieved. Moreover the 
additional troops authorised by Obama were still in the course of deploying. The 
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NATO mission had not yet moved to the planned Phase 4, when troops could start to 
withdraw. As General Dutton, McChrystal's deputy explained, NATO‘s objectives for 
this phase where that the insurgency no longer threatens the survival of the 
Government, legitimate governance extends to local levels, socio-economic 
programmes benefit the majority of the Afghan people, Afghanistan is stabilised, and 
the Government can assume the lead for security provision (albeit with ISAF 
support).
244
  McChrystal had reported that the Taliban and other insurgents‘ 
momentum had been halted (if not reversed).
245
 But the other conditions had not been 
met.
 246
  Anthony Cordesman recently provided a succinct summary of the overall 
situation in Afghanistan, viewed from a Western perspective. 
 
―More than eight years into the war, the last Presidential election is still a 
political nightmare, the legislative election is in limbo, and Afghan power 
brokers have become far stronger while Afghan capacity in governance has 
made limited progress.  Nearly 40% of the population is partially dependent on 
UN food aid for basic subsistence, and most Afghans have to do anything they 
can to survive – whether this involves opium or what the West calls 
corruption. It is the Taliban that established the real rule of law in many areas, 
and the civil authorities and police remain largely corrupt and ineffective in 
much of the country. As for human rights, traditional Afghans remain 
traditional Afghans, and issues like the rights of women make token progress 
at best outside the areas where such rights already existed before the Taliban 
took over.‖247  
 
Against this reality, McChrystal had designed a pragmatic campaign with a limited 
objective which could deliver, as Cordesman put it ―a meaningful form of victory‖248 
for the West and in Afghan terms.  Part of the challenge here was holding the Afghan 
government to account.  The lack of a credible government was arguably 
Afghanistan‘s biggest problem 249  and this was hardly propitious for successful 
counter insurgency.  This was complicated by the reality that individual nations‘ 
motivations differed; and Karzai was effective at ―divide and rule‖.250  But, as Graeme 
Lamb explained, ―the one guy who's established a positive relationship with Karzai is 
McChrystal".
251
 
 
Views on the state and capability of the Taliban vary.  Irrespective of their military 
capability, there seems little doubt that they remain extremely effective in the local 
and global information domain, particularly over the matter of exploiting civilian 
casualties. Here, despite McChrystal‘s efforts, a steady stream of civilian casualties 
continued and were exploited by the Taliban (including those they had caused). 
Taliban attempts to further spread their influence beyond Pashtuns
252
 and into the 
North and West have also been reported.
253
  On the ground they do not enjoy wide 
popular support and do not win force on force engagements with ISAF; yet the 
Taliban are effective at coercion. Hence simply being more popular than them is not 
enough. Intimidation has to be reduced partly by killing hard core Taliban but also by 
reconciling those suitable.  Part of the solution here may be arming local militia which 
would provide security and economic livelihoods therefore reducing the number of 
Taliban recruits.  Here the military commander is once again drawn into political 
territory. 
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As one example, Operation Moshtarak, the first significant operation launched by the 
US and UK after Obama‘s ―surge‖ of 30,000 additional US troops, commenced in 
February 2010 in Helmand province.
254
  Analysis suggests that McChrystal‘s strategy, 
―political-led, population-centric, and more fully in partnership with ANSF,‖255 was 
being successful.  In simple terms this would shape, clear, hold and build on territory 
previously dominated by the Taliban.  Planning stressed meeting the needs of the 
locals and the emphasis was on rapid delivery of sustainable governance
256
 which had 
primacy during execution. Notably the operation was also initiated by the Afghans 
after joint planning with ISAF and partnering was made a reality at every level.
257
 
Civilian casualties were kept to a minimum through McChrystal‘s policy of 
courageous restraint.
258
  However patience was required, in one area (Nad-e-Ali), this 
operation was part of the culmination of 18 months stabilising and shaping work.  As 
a British intelligence officer put it six months earlier. ―The government enjoyed no 
instinctive loyalty from the local population ... the Taliban was much better able to 
engage with traditional and tribal society than ISAF or the government.‖ 259  This 
meant they could provide functional governance in large areas.  Never a homogenous 
whole, Afghanistan's regional ethnic and sectarian divisions meant that delivering 
effective governance here would have to reflect the realities of Afghan power 
structures. These would need to be co-opted rather than transformed to provide an 
alternative to the Taliban
260
 and tensions between local and national priorities would 
need to be managed.
261
  The key point emerging from this example is that other 
similar operations in contested areas would need a similar amount of commitment, 
resources, understanding and above all, time.
262
 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
7.1. The General as Statesman? 
 
The case of Afghanistan has provided significant evidence to substantiate the 
hypothesis that beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders 
should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors, in order to sustain the political 
process and facilitate viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. This 
approach needs soldiers at all levels to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond 
to political direction and shape military operations that will impact decisively on 
political outcomes in order to help generate political progress towards sustainable 
peace. 
 
Generals Richards and McChrystal (and McColl at the outset) found themselves 
filling a political void in Afghanistan.  This is a de facto reality and Richards 
commented that ―in certain phases of a conflict, a soldier may be best suited to 
playing the lead role.  Often only he has the organisational strength to pull the issues 
and key players together‖. 263   Whether McChrystal was ultimately suited to an 
essentially political role
264
 is a moot point.  He did deliver a clear eyed assessment 
and a robust, nuanced civil-military plan which he executed energetically.  Both 
McChrystal and Richards saw that the narrow military task could not be achieved 
without setting the necessary political and economic conditions,
265
 and taking risks
266
 
to do so.  They indirectly supported political primacy in this endeavour, even though 
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it had no properly identified or capable torch bearers beyond questionable authority of 
Karzai, the President of Afghanistan.
267
  Worse, they were hampered by the absence 
of a strategy that could provide ―a coherent Information Operation framework from 
top to bottom‖.268   Richards commented that ―it is no good individual countries 
having a strategy without an international one which is devolved to theatre for 
execution‖.269  This meant that a strategy of securing stability, based on a rather vague 
NATO operation plan, had to be assumed by commanders. They had a sense of where 
they were going but often could not ask the big questions of capitals. Politicians 
would tend to visit to find out what was going on rather than to help provide direction 
– and of course the political rug could be pulled.  Lacking the advantage enjoyed by 
Templer, the soldier-statesman in Malaya who, as pro-consul, with the absolute power 
to coordinate,
270
 conducted a single nation‘s campaign with considerable freedom,271 
they both worked to improve unity of effort.  This naturally needed political and 
diplomatic interaction and sadly this was not enhanced by the incoherent political 
guidance provided by the international community which meant that no one 
ambassador predominated and the generals essentially became the chief advisor to 
Karzai.
272
  But beyond this they both influenced the political process itself, in order to 
deliver political progress towards reconciliation and stability just as Petraeus had done 
in Iraq and Jackson and Reinhardt in Kosovo.  
 
Looking to the future of the campaign, with neither unity of command or unity of 
purpose firmly established, the challenge for the military leadership is only increasing 
at the time of writing.
273
 Irrespective of the prevailing security situation in 
Afghanistan and progress being made, the external political agenda is now moving 
rapidly towards transition.  This would see phase 4 of NATO's operation plan 
occurring at different times in different places across Afghanistan as Afghan capacity 
comes on line. The political and military tone will inevitably change as Afghans 
increasingly take the lead, and make moves or mistakes that are uncomfortable for the 
West.  It remains to be seen whether the combination of the NATO-led force, 
Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Afghan security forces can hold the ring in 
order that reconstruction, governance and economic activity may provide a sceptical 
population, particularly in the Pashtun areas, with a choice that they feel able to back.  
Relying on coercion, the Taliban is not a particularly strong insurgent movement 
because they struggle to capture the hearts and minds of the population.  Pressure 
continues to mount for Afghans to take real responsibility for security
274
 and for a 
negotiated settlement.  The former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband is 
quoted as saying ―now is the time for the Afghans to pursue a political settlement with 
as much vigor and energy as we are pursuing the military and civilian effort‖.275 
Karzai has called for a ―peace jirga‖276 and, if the Afghans can achieve this, there 
could be real substance in senior military practitioners‘ belief that an acceptable level 
of success could be achieved in Afghanistan and that the campaign is "eminently 
winnable".
277
  Providing of course that the West sustains political will.  Beyond this, 
the choice will be one of containment
278
 and arming selected groups to keep the 
Taliban at bay.
279
 
 
As Anthony Cordesman put it, the war ―may well still be winnable, but it is not going 
to be won by denying the risks, the complexity, and the time that any real hope of 
victory will take.‖280  Speaking to the House of Commons Defence Committee in June 
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2009, General McColl clarified the inherent problem of stability operations and the 
response:  
 
If you analyse the future threats that we might face, they are largely bracketed 
around the concept of instability, and the lines of operation that deliver you 
strategic success in respect of instability problems are economics and 
governance; the security operation simply holds the ring. […] we have 40 
nations in the alliance. Each of them has three or more departments involved 
in this issue of the Comprehensive Approach.
281
 We then have at least ten 
others who are critical players in the country. We have international 
organisations—another 20—we then have NGOs, who run into their hundreds. 
Then on top of that, of course, we have the Afghan National Government. […] 
Therefore, what we have to have is a concept which enables to us co-
ordinate…in a coherent way, and the Comprehensive Approach, as we have 
heard, is the language of common currency in Afghanistan and in many of 
these theatres, because it is commonly understood that we need to work 
together.
282
 
 
So where does this leave the theatre commander? The case of Afghanistan has 
demonstrated that campaign design and execution has been oriented to underpinning 
political progress in Afghanistan (although this is not the stated military objective).  
The paradox is clear: NATO‘s commander has neither the mandate nor means to act 
on all aspects of the problem; but nor does anyone else.  McColl explained that part of 
the problem for NATO here is that it needs governance and economics to deliver 
strategic success and it does not control those so best you can do is organise the plug 
ins to influence the process.
283
  Here there also has to be an important assumption that 
the Afghan administration shares, at least in principle, the aims and objectives of the 
international community and in particular NATO.   Then, in the absence of a true 
political supremo, the theatre commander has to fill the role of ―master integrator‖ if 
he is to succeed.  Beyond this he has to play a role in the political discussion on the 
way ahead particularly in terms of delivering self sustaining security forces that can 
guarantee adequate security and facilitating reintegration and so nurturing 
reconciliation.  Further complicating factors here were that some international forces 
were participating in the war on terror whilst others were ―providing the political 
space‖284 for peace building.  However there was no political authority over both as a 
unified campaign.
285
 So the ends ways and means were again out of balance.  
 
7.2. Doctrinal Implications 
 
The international community could not have delivered the progress that has been 
achieved in Afghanistan, however halting and incomplete it may be, without generals 
taking an active and assertive role in the political process and specifically designing 
their operations to secure political ends. This may offend sensibilities in the salons of 
NATO, the UN and some capitals.  However the reality of contemporary peace and 
stability operations suggests that the international community cannot deliver 
satisfactory leadership and coordination arrangements, except in rare circumstances. 
So it is time that doctrine became more honest in the way it addressed the politico-
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military challenge.  Evasive wording designed to secure a consensus draft will no 
longer suffice. 
 
The next chapter will conclude this thesis by drawing together the strands from the 
introduction, the reviews of doctrine for peace support operations, stability operations 
and counter insurgency as well as the three case studies on Kosovo, Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  The conclusion will highlight the recurring themes surrounding political 
direction, politico-military coordination and the statesman-like role often required of 
generals in complex circumstances.  Frequently, the imperative becomes to conduct 
military security operations whilst at the same time nurturing consent and building 
popular support and confidence, dealing with the parties to the conflict, establishing 
or helping to establish coordination structures, getting the local political process 
moving, and as military diplomats
286
 resolving disputes amongst international actors.    
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
 
“and he shall appear to the  envious a scholar, a statesman and a soldier. …He professes 
to have received no sinister measure from his judge…”  William Shakespeare1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis has discussed the problem of politico-military arrangements during 
contemporary peace and stability operations.  Asking the question: ―The General as 
Statesman?‖ the thesis has explored the professional need for Theatre Commanders and 
their subordinates to support viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations as 
typified by the UK military approach.   It has examined the hypothesis that in these 
operations, beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders should 
provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and 
facilitate viable political outcomes.  This requires soldiers at all levels to co-operate with 
other relevant actors, respond to political direction and shape military operations that will 
impact decisively on political outcomes in order to help generate political progress 
towards sustainable peace.  Successive chapters which have reviewed the relevant 
doctrinal literature and then conducted case studies of operations in Kosovo, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, suggest that there is ample evidence to support the hypothesis and therefore 
that doctrine needs to be refreshed to reflect actual practice.  Moreover further study is 
needed on the wider application of such a doctrine by the United Nations and the 
preparation of civilian leaders for politico military relationships.  Here it is important to 
underline the distinction between the broad brush of civil-military interaction and the 
more specific politico-military interaction implicit in this hypothesis. 
 
This chapter will first review the main arguments presented in the preceding chapters.  It 
will then evaluate the material discussed in the case studies against the three tenets of the 
model identified in Chapter 2.  These are: that primacy of the political or peace process is 
the dominant theme for coordination of politico-military activity; that military 
commanders at all levels must accept to some degree a role as a political actor; that 
civilian leadership must provide a politico-military framework and political guidance for 
the military, but if this wanting then military commanders need to act to fill the void, at 
least in terms of coordination.  Having reviewed the case studies, the doctrinal 
implications which flow from these will be discussed.  The final part of the chapter will 
present two questions that merit further study.  First, how might the successful elements 
of the politico-military approach described in this thesis be applied to United Nations 
doctrine and practice? Second, how should potential senior civilian leaders in peace and 
stabilisation missions be prepared for their politico-military role?  This will be followed 
by a summary of recommendations 
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2. Review of the Main Arguments by Chapter 
 
This work addresses operations which are commonly but not exclusively referred to as 
Peace Operations,
2
 Peace Support Operations (PSO),
3
 Stability Operations
4
 or Counter 
Insurgency
5
 (see glossary).   Chapter 1 outlined the context for contemporary conflict 
which increasingly sees intra state conflict as the norm.  Should the International 
Community, or part of it, decide to intervene, these complex ―new wars‖,6 which may 
become ―hybrid threats‖ where ―conventional, irregular, and criminal capabilities are 
integrated operationally and tactically at the lowest level possible‖,7 demand a complex 
response.  Accepting both the reality of this ever more challenging and uncertain,
8
 type of 
conflict and the continuing likelihood of intervention, this thesis takes a ―neo realist‖9 
stance and postulates the hypothesis that global intervention operations would be more 
efficient if military support was provided to developing political solutions as well as the 
more traditional military security and combat related missions.  This builds on 
Clausewitz‘s view that ―War is not an independent phenomenon but the continuation of 
politics by different means…According to this point of view, there can be no question of 
a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to 
solve it‖.10  Therefore, as Rupert Smith suggested, the challenge is to establish military 
objectives within political objectives.
11
 This thesis develops this and proposes the use of 
the military instrument to ease the forward progression of political solutions.  
 
Doctrine stresses the need to adopt ―a comprehensive approach‖,12 using a variety of 
actors to resolve underlying problems in conflict situations.  This means ―a broader multi-
agency and, often, multinational response‖,13 and the military force is part of this.  This 
demands civil-military structures to oversee field operations and find answers beyond the 
security domain.  Here, this thesis goes further and argues for improved cooperation at 
the politico-military nexus at the theatre level.  The guiding idea is that it is better to 
move beyond stasis and to nurture what might be termed a ―viable peace‖14 and that this 
can only be done with active military support to the political peace process.  Hence the 
question posted by the title of this thesis.  Chapter 1 suggests that an improved politico-
military approach would benefit not only the Western coalition which has conducted a 
number of recent interventions but also the United Nations and the broader community of 
regional organisations which have to contemplate stabilising conflicts in their own back 
yard.  Finally Chapter 1 provided a framework for the remaining chapters. These would 
first address the relevant military doctrines of the UK, US, UN and NATO in order to 
establish what guidance exists and second examine case studies of the politico military 
arrangements following interventions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan in order 
demonstrate how generals operated in practice and establish evidence for the hypothesis. 
 
Chapter 2 examined the relevant aspects of Carl von Clausewitz‘s work to establish the 
essentially political nature of war, how military means must relate to this reality and 
suggested that this remains relevant.  A review of contemporary British doctrinal 
literature and its antecedents revealed that whilst there is much emphasis placed on the 
principle of political primacy and political solutions, there is no guidance provided to 
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commanders in terms of how to support such primacy, the political process or political 
outcomes.  The chapter then suggested the three tenets of a model (already discussed 
above) to test against the case studies.   
 
Chapter 3 addressed the issues surrounding multinational military approaches to the 
crucial politico-military relationship and support of the political process, particularly in 
the influential US, UN and NATO communities.  This addresses two distinct imperatives.  
First is the requirement to sustain progress in state building practice by the US (and 
NATO) in the face of arguments to focus on war fighting (combat operations).  Second, 
bearing in mind the global scope and scale of UN operations, the requirement to support 
the UN in building on progress in complex peacekeeping through integrated missions is 
particularly important.  This might be assisted through harmonising doctrine and practice 
so that military support to peace building could better facilitate political outcomes. In 
common with the examination of UK doctrine, Chapter 3 found that increasingly useful 
US, UN and NATO doctrinal guidance exists although it does not adequately deal with 
the issues raised by the hypothesis.  The doctrine reviewed variously implies such 
challenges for the general, yet does not provide sufficient guidance on specifically how 
he should support the political process, or how others should view this.  Additional 
challenges will include what to do if civilian capacity is absent or incomplete; or if 
civilian political instructions are lacking, or over-complex?  Turning from doctrine to 
contemporary field practice, these questions were examined in the succeeding case 
studies. 
 
This thesis suggests that practice is ahead of doctrine and the case study chapters 
illustrate this.  Chapter 4 analysed operations in Kosovo in 1999-2000 where a NATO 
military force was directly mandated to support a UN civilian mission under a United 
Nations Security Council Resolution.  The SRSG was Bernard Kouchner,  his Principal 
Deputy (PDSRSG) was Jock Covey and the military commanders were Lieutenant 
General Mike Jackson and later General Klaus Reinhardt.  The case of Kosovo 
demonstrated significant and successful innovations in politico-military cooperation 
(which had been largely absent 4 years earlier in Bosnia).  This helped to engender and 
sustain local political progress and wider peace building activities. This was relatively 
straightforward given the clear mandating arrangements
15
 and minimal violence against 
the international community.  Military commanders generally demonstrated a good 
understanding of the relationship between military actions and politically positive or 
negative effects.  This suggests that there is an ―acceptable political bandwidth for 
military activity‖ and that the mission leadership team need to judge the mix of military 
and political actions needed to keep the political process on track, accepting 
imperfections, and maintain positive progress towards eventual military exit.  This also 
demands that senior civilian actors understand the military commander‘s latent potential 
to support the peace process. 
 
Chapter 5 illustrates the case of Iraq after a Coalition intervention in 2003.  The periods 
covered are from 2003-2004 (Ambassador L Paul Bremmer and Lieutenant General 
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Ricardo Sanchez) and then 2007-2008 (Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David 
Petraeus). Initially, despite incidences of successful practice, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority and its military counterpart CJTF-7, were on separate orbits with no unity of 
command or purpose.  They lacked the ability to mesh together and understand or 
respond to the politico-military realities of the situation which the Coalition had 
unleashed in Iraq, and were unable to deliver security, reconstruction, or political 
progress in the face of mounting violence.  This situation was compounded by the 
introduction of political policies which aggravated the economic and security situation
16
 
and basically made Iraq ungovernable. The result was state breakdown, an extremely 
violent and virulent insurgency and near civil war.   
 
In 2007 a revised people-centric state building approach (drawing on new doctrine as 
discussed in Chapter 3) was applied in Iraq.  This saw a tight politico-military 
relationship at its core and increased civilian and military resources.  What amounted to 
joint leadership by the US Ambassador and the military commander set the tone for 
politico-military cooperation at all levels.  After a difficult start, the new approach 
increasingly delivered improved security and, with this, a positive impact on peoples‘ 
lives.  The result was to kick start political progress, change the political calculus for 
Iraqis and to provide at least the possibility of alternative path away from mass violence.  
The case of Iraq demonstrated, above all else, the value of collaborative planning, 
decision-making and action at the politico-military interface.  Whilst the matter of unity 
of command remains cloudy, unity of purpose can be delivered through such a 
collaborative approach. With this and a holistic people-centric approach it is possible to 
deliver real political effects, notably the beginnings of a political settlement, and thus 
create momentum, delivered by the people themselves, rather than external actors.  The 
military role in this facet of contemporary peace and stability operations is not yet 
adequately captured in doctrine. 
 
Chapter 6 examined a stabilisation operation initiated following invasion of Afghanistan 
in 2001 as part of the ―war on terror‖ in response to 9/11.  The periods reviewed were the 
initial arrangements in 2001 (SRSG Lakdar Brahimi and Major General McColl), then 
2006-2007 (SRSG Tom Koenigs and General David Richards) and 2009-2010 (SRSG 
Kai Eide (mostly) plus an assortment of other Ambassadors with varying degrees of 
influence and General Stanley McChrystal).  Having started as a coalition of the willing, 
the International Security Assistance Force evolved into a NATO mission with a 
supportive UN mandate but a relatively weak UN presence.   With strategic drift and a 
worsening insurgency in 2008, there was an increasing realisation that the International 
Community needed to engage in state building to bring Afghanistan into some form of 
stability.  Yet this would be intensely difficult without adequate security and Afghan 
leadership. Also the medley of international actors in Afghanistan, which is notable for 
the variety of contributing nations and civilian agencies including the UN and EU, 
inevitably means a difficult coordination challenge.  Here the NATO military 
commander, although not formally in charge of the whole effort, has taken on a key role 
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in designing a complex civil-military effort to deliver local political momentum.  He was 
then faced with the role of ―master integrator‖.17  
 
As with Iraq, the plan for Afghanistan demands significant external military effort to 
control the situation, whilst building Afghan security, and to enable civilian delivery of 
governance capacity, with economic and social measures.  Together these efforts were 
designed to separate the insurgent from the people.  This unfinished work underlines the 
requirement for politico-military cooperation and the need for reintegration of some 
insurgent elements which ultimately could support a political settlement in Afghanistan. 
At the time of writing the desired political effect of kick starting a political settlement has 
not been achieved.  Hence, against a difficult backdrop of waning international patience,  
there remains a focus on holding the ring militarily, whilst building Afghan security 
capacity and also attempting to get governance, economic and social measures in place 
and so separating the insurgent from the people. This underscored the core requirement 
for successful politico-military cooperation and a process of political reconciliation in 
Afghanistan. 
 
3. Application of the  Model to the Case Studies  
 
This section addresses each of the tenets of the model identified in Chapter 2 and 
considers the extent to which the experience of Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan 
demonstrate their validity. 
 
3.1.  Tenet 1.   Primacy of the political or peace process is the dominant theme 
for coordination of politico-military activity. 
 
The ―primacy of the peace process‖,18 as voiced by the PDSRSG Jock Covey was the 
guiding idea within the politico-military coordination process in Kosovo during the 
period studied.  Ensuring political primacy with, among other things, active military 
support was vital in taking the initial political strategy forward. This boiled down to ―we 
support those who support [UNSCR] 1244, and we oppose those who obstruct it‖.19  All 
actions by mission members were judged against this.  This concept was fully embraced 
by the military commanders who fostered a healthy politico-military relationship with 
their civilian partners.  Joint planning and execution led to significant steps to help kick 
start the political process, which itself was shrouded in strategic uncertainty given that the 
future status of Kosovo was unclear.  In these circumstances actions by the military and 
political elements were carefully considered, together, in order to judge their effect on the 
political process.  As a rule, actions which would not support the political effort were 
avoided.  Commanders also worked to keep the show on the road and deliver their given 
mission which was essentially to provide a secure environment and provide practical 
support to the civilian mission.  The latter was under-resourced and needed significant 
assistance simply in order to operate.  This is not to suggest that all was rosy.  At a more 
tactical level some KFOR contingents took a strict view on the primacy of military 
activities and these were not always coordinated directly to achieve a political effect. This 
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was particularly notable in the case of Mitrovica where there was no international 
consensus on a way ahead and hence the political primacy of UNMIK was not fully 
sustained by local French military commanders who operated under specific instructions 
from Paris. 
 
Initially in Iraq there was, in practical terms, no local Coalition political primacy over 
Coalition military activity, there was no unity of command, unity of purpose was lacking 
and plans differed across the politico-military divide, particularly in terms of the timeline.  
In another sense political primacy was simply assumed by the Administrator of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority.  However the military commander did not see it as his 
role to support the political purpose: his focus was security and exit.  Actions on one side 
of the political or military divide were not considered jointly. Worse, there were 
significant political actions with a negative security effect.  Hence for example, a political 
de-ba‘athification policy would see ministries crippled and also the disbandment of the 
armed forces had obvious security effects.  But the absence of a real political-military 
discourse in theatre meant that such issues were only discussed after the fact.  As an 
example, a political over-reaction
20
 to the deaths of US contractors in the city of Falluja 
drew US forces into a bloody confrontation which the overall military commander, 
Sanchez, did not attempt to prevent.
21
  This particular move would prevent the execution 
of previously planned population-centric security tactics by the local military 
commander. In sum, there was political primacy of a sort, but this did not result in 
beneficial political outcomes. 
 
Lessons were learned from the initial experience and the situation improved over time.  A 
new ―surge‖ strategy in 2007 saw the military commander, General David Petraeus, 
explicitly subordinate himself to the US Ambassador Ryan Crocker.  The military 
component remained the dominant instrument for planning and execution at all levels; 
although, intellectual and political primacy remained with the political side.  This 
combination enabled collaborative planning, execution and decision making at all levels.  
Military and other efforts were judged first against their political effect. This was not 
without its difficulties but the result was to deliver a population centric politico-military 
strategy for the Coalition in Iraq that explicitly sought to kick start the Iraqi political 
process with a view to engendering confidence and eventual reconciliation.  This strategy 
of protecting the population would avoid civil war, provide breathing space for capacity 
building, reconstruction and, ultimately, resolution of some of the fundamental political 
issues facing Iraq.  
 
In Afghanistan, the situation was different.  There was no obvious politico-military 
alignment, nor was policy at the strategic, operational execution, and tactical levels fully 
aligned.  Difficulties with the security situation meant that the external focus was 
invariably on military attempts to gain the upper hand rather than the political process. 
Nevertheless both General Richards and General McChrystal saw the imperative to 
enable coordinating activity which would help get the political process moving.  
McChrystal‘s campaign design further shifted the effort to a holistic approach.  This was 
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demanding of political involvement and was intended to deliver human security through 
military, governance and economic effects.  It was designed to protect the people and was 
an indirect attempt to kick start the political process.  Another politically related facet was 
ISAF‘s increasing involvement in activities to reintegrate some members of the Taleban 
using government sponsored programmes. Again this would lead to a political effect. 
 
Military commanders in the field at the theatre level operate in the cockpit of political and 
practical reality.  They understand that political outcomes are needed to generate some 
form of strategic success; therefore they instinctively tend to support the political process 
even if this implies making assumptions, taking risk or deviating from a strict 
interpretation of instructions.  Analysis of the application of the ―primacy of the political 
or peace process‖ suggests that it is a practical approach to shaping the politico-military 
relationship, and through this, supporting political outcomes.   However it is not 
necessarily easy to deliver unless specifically mandated or where a mutual understanding 
exists between senior civilian and military figures in theatre.  Unsurprisingly it is more 
difficult where mandating arrangements and the absence of resources leave a situation 
which is unclear; or where not all troop contributing nations wish to comply with the 
common theme.   Whilst the relevant political authorities should address these mandating 
problems, the unresolved issues need to be accepted as an operating reality for military 
commanders and doctrine should address this reality.  
 
3.2. Tenet 2.  Military commanders at all levels must accept to some degree a 
role as a political actor and must support the political process.  This is a 
professional imperative. 
 
Clausewitz suggested that the commander in chief should become a member of the 
cabinet in order that he could understand state policy, (not direct it), and thus organise his 
military operations accordingly.
22
  The title of this thesis suggests that the contemporary 
general may have a similar role as statesman, at least in terms of the theatre he 
commands. 
 
In Kosovo it is clear that both commanders during the period reviewed saw that they had 
a political role and the importance of sustaining the political process.  Jackson in 
particular was well aware that he was under global attention and that failure would have 
significant human consequences.  He was able to influence political will and secure 
support at home and in the wider international community.  KFOR had direct access to 
many of the local political players and was deeply involved in nurturing the political 
process. Locally both Jackson and Reinhardt were influential in the political scene, 
particularly helping to guide the victorious KLA away from violence and also reassuring 
the minority Serb population.   Their contacts with local interlocutors and efforts to assist 
the people on both sides of the ethnic divide were important.  Notably KFOR helped to 
contain the militant elements of the KLA and to bring the Serbs to the political table. This 
peace building activity went beyond the UN Security Council Mandate and involved 
working on both Albanians and Serbs in the political dimension.  At a level below the 
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theatre commander in Kosovo, the picture was patchier. Some tactical commanders 
displayed considerable political acumen and personally helped to move the political 
process forward. Others followed a more traditional military-security rather than a 
politico-military paradigm and their efforts did little to support the political process, 
indeed there were reverses.  Here caveats imposed by troop contributing capitals had a 
significantly negative influence which proved impossible for the Theatre Commander to 
resolve.    
 
In Iraq, the initial period examined saw a commander, Sanchez, who was disinterested in 
a political role, preferring to immerse himself in military tactics.  Whereas, during the 
second period, Petraeus was an effective political actor.  Sanchez had seen politico-
military realities before (for example in Kosovo) yet he had a poor relationship with 
Bremer, his political boss, who in turn was not adept at grasping politico-military issues.   
Sanchez‘s focus on war fighting and Bremer‘s disinclination to consult meant that 
politico-military issues were not seen as such.  Hence decision making was flawed and 
this had both security and political implications.  Beyond the mechanics of establishing 
constitutional arrangements, the delivery of a political settlement did not progress. 
 
Later it is clear that Petraeus was an important political actor, fully participating in the 
political process; he understood state policy on three levels, in terms of the US, the 
Coalition, and the Iraqis.  Whilst he was entirely self effacing and deferential to all 
political authorities, especially his ―political wing man‖, Ambassador Crocker, Petraeus 
took on the mantra of a statesman.  This was particularly notable with his skilful 
advocacy regarding military issues in order to sustain the political consensus and obtain 
the resources he needed back in Washington DC and from the wider coalition.  A recent 
newspaper editorial suggested that ―The skill of [Petraeus] is to use his reputation as a 
military tactician to conceal political manoeuvres‖.23   Although generally sticking to 
military matters, he was also fully involved in the specifics of influencing the local 
political process in Iraq.  Petraeus‘s correspondence revealed the depth of the politico 
military nature of the campaign and the critical military role in enabling local political 
progress towards a political settlement for Iraq.  In these circumstances it seems that 
Crocker and Petraeus together carried the mantle of political primacy - given that political 
decisions were effectively taken together.  Here Clausewitz would probably have 
approved. 
 
In Afghanistan. Generals Richards and McChrystal found themselves filling a political 
void (as did McColl at the outset).  Political primacy could only be indirectly supported 
given the absence of a truly empowered pro-consul figure, the melange of international 
actors in Kabul, along with the questionable authority of Karzai, the President of 
Afghanistan.
24
  Here Richards realised that he needed to take on a political role in order 
to galvanise the political process in the counter insurgency campaign.  He was 
instrumental, in establishing coordination structures (see section 3.3 below), beyond this 
he engaged Afghanistan‘s neighbour Pakistan to initiate dialogue over political issues.  
Later Richards commented that ―in certain phases of a conflict, a soldier may be best 
  219 
suited to playing the lead role.  Often only he has the organisational strength to pull the 
issues and key players together‖.25   
 
McChrystal, although in the end found wanting
26
 in terms of his handling of the US 
Administration, whose trust he undermined, perhaps in frustration, was generally an 
adept and skilful advocate for the totality of the politico-military efforts needed. Whether 
these could be delivered in time to bring Afghanistan to some state of stability remains a 
moot point.  Irrespective of McChrystal‘s suitability for an essentially political role, he 
quickly delivered a frank and realistic assessment of the situation and a pragmatic, 
nuanced civil-military plan.  He saw that the narrow military task could not be achieved 
without setting the necessary political and economic conditions,
27
 and taking risks
28
 to do 
so.   Hence his campaign design was inherently political, ―our every action must help 
secure mobilise and support the Afghan people and their government to defeat the 
insurgency‖.29  Whilst he was undoubtedly energetic, McChrystal was of course not in 
charge of the overall effort to execute the plan.  This meant that he, and his deputy, had to 
be active as ―military diplomats‖30 behind the scenes to defuse political difficulties 
amongst the international actors and with the government in Kabul in order to maintain 
momentum. 
 
So what?  The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the contemporary Theatre 
Commander is definitely a political actor who can deliver political effects in theatre and 
at home. What Jackson, Reinhardt, McColl, Richards, Petraeus and McCrystal did was to 
nurture something febrile.  This was necessary because they were deployed in difficult 
political and military circumstances and they alone had the power to produce a result 
amid ambiguity.  Attempting to escape this reality or removing the military from the 
political debate would only tend to delay political progress and, to take up Rupert Smith‘s 
argument, reduce the utility of the forces deployed.  Accepting a role as a political actor 
has to be seen as a professional imperative.  Theatre Commanders need a highly nuanced 
understanding of political factors influencing the intervening force, the local situation and 
the possible solutions.  They also need to design their operations specifically to help 
achieve those political solutions and they need to be active advocates and diplomats to 
ensure progress and coordination.  The commander may or may not have the attributes of 
a statesman but he definitely needs a seat at the cabinet table in theatre and he should be 
used to support and influence the political process. 
 
3.3. Tenet 3.  A politico-military framework is needed to enable coordination to 
secure political ends.  If this is missing then military commanders need to act 
to fill the void, at least in terms of coordination.   
 
The requirement for politico-military synergy, for the commander to be in the political 
mind, is clear as argued above.  This mitigates for the relationship with the senior civilian 
partner, to be seen as fundamentally political.  This suggests that the cooperative model at 
this level should be described as a politico-military rather than the more usual civil-
military relationship.  The overall requirement for a comprehensive approach, to draw all 
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actors together, in response to contemporary conflict also seems incontrovertible.  In an 
ideal world, the comprehensive approach (or integrated) would be a reality and this 
would enable the narrower focus on the politico-military decision making core as argued 
by this thesis.  However, invariably there are difficulties over mandating and practical 
issues which mean that this may not be the case.  Nevertheless the military commander 
needs to find a path through this if he is to secure strategic success. 
 
The keys to successful politico-military coordination in Kosovo were, first, the 
empowering mandate which required both the UN and NATO to cooperate with each 
other, and second, the fact that many of the key personalities knew each other from 
earlier operations in Bosnia and had learned from the difficulties encountered there.  The 
mandate enabled joint planning and execution of operations to rapidly become a reality, 
albeit the military side needed to provide planning capabilities to assist the under-
resourced civilian mission.  A truly cooperative approach was adopted and when the 
military or political side needed the advice or guidance of the other, this was immediately 
available.  Here there was no need for commanders to attempt to fill a void and the 
politico-military relationship remained in a good state of health. 
 
In Iraq the situation in 2003-2004 was different and more difficult. Initially the Coalition 
did not have a clear political aim.  The civilian side, as Andrew Rathmell put it, only 
―sporadically acknowledged the causal linkages between security and…political and 
economic reforms‖.31 Although attempting a state building effort, which needed both 
peace building and security measures, there was no unified civil military approach and 
the civilian side were unable to provide consistent political direction.  On the military 
side, despite the fact that, ―90% of insurgency is political, social, economic and 
ideological‖, 32  the US military planners in Baghdad remained focussed on combat 
operations and exit.  Unable to see the broader political context or advise the political 
side on the security effects of political decisions, they could not successfully cooperate in 
order to coordinate politico-military action.  Rather, the security problem was worsened 
by the uncoordinated political decisions and military actions.  For the US military, state 
building or counterinsurgency doctrine had not been seriously taught since Vietnam. 
Hence, although there were some notable exceptions, neither the body of the US military 
nor most of its leadership saw ―shaping…economic and political conditions‖33 or any 
form of peace building as part of the military role.   
 
Later, in 2007-2008, following the decision to conduct a politico-military surge in an 
attempt to stabilise the situation, the senior US diplomat and soldier chosen for the task 
forged a strong working partnership and required their subordinates to follow suit. This 
was not without difficulty or strain at the lower levels; but it enabled joint planning and 
action.  The theatre level planning team was completely combined and the military truly 
did support the political effort; in turn coalition political moves were synchronised with 
military action.  On occasion, particularly at the local level, the military forces were the 
face of the political effort. This approach, which included the ―kinetic‖ as well as the 
softer side of the US military, all designed to protect the population, delivered tangible 
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improvements to the security situation and hence provided political space for 
reconciliation and progress towards a political settlement.  It was helped by a fortuitous 
accommodation with both Sunni tribes and Shia militia and it engendered a degree of 
Iraqi political reconciliation and some economic progress.  Iraqis were slowly moving to 
a position where confrontation could be conducted without recourse to violence. 
 
Throughout the period since 2001 in Kabul, HQ ISAF has been the dominant 
organisation, military or civilian because it had the military power, new ideas and the 
ability to implement them.  It is clear that both Richards and McChrystal worked to 
improve unity of effort and influence the political process.  General Richards, facing a 
chaotic political situation, was instrumental in advocating and establishing the Policy 
Action Group, a political structure intended to generate political momentum in 
Afghanistan to address the worsening insurgency.  This was in effect a war cabinet with a 
supporting committee system designed to improve coordination and unity of effort.  In 
the field, Richards‘s Afghan Development Zone Concept, a version of the ink spot 
strategy, was also designed to provide prioritisation and coordination of military and 
civilian security, governance and economic effects to deliver a political effect.  
 
Later General McChrystal would face the continuing challenge of delivering the military 
part of a comprehensive counter insurgency solution whilst operating with a fissiparous 
set of international political actors and a pressurised local partner who had questionable 
legitimacy.  McChrystal became the ―master integrator‖ but he did not overtly seek to 
become a "Templar" figure instead, respecting civilian political primacy, he took his 
place in the weekly cabal of international Ambassadors with the SRSG.    This naturally 
needed continuous political and diplomatic interaction and sadly this was not helped by 
the incoherent political guidance provided by the international community.  No one 
ambassador predominated and McChrystal essentially became the chief advisor to 
Karzai.
34
   But beyond coordination, both Richards and McChrystal both influenced the 
political process itself, in order to deliver political progress towards reconciliation and 
stability just as Jackson and Reinhardt had done in Kosovo and Petraeus in Iraq.  
 
So what?  The evidence analysed in this thesis suggests that achieving close politico-
military coordination is a necessary prerequisite to achieving political momentum 
towards some form of political settlement.  Ideally coordination arrangements should be 
mandated before intervention.  However practice suggests that this will not always be the 
case, thus theatre commanders and their political counterparts may have to navigate 
uncertain waters in order to deliver unity of purpose at the least. Care is clearly needed 
here in managing an ambiguous relationship
35
 and the military commander must know 
when to push and when to step back.  It would be helpful if doctrinal guidance were 
provided for these circumstances. 
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4. Four Themes for Revised Doctrine 
 
It is clear from the material presented above that doctrine is not yet honest
36
 or up to date 
on the challenges faced by contemporary commanders.  Nor is it yet a civil-military 
product.
37
  This is important given the likelihood that some interventions may be needed 
in future and the danger that politicians may shy away from these given the prospect of 
failure.
38
 With some exceptions, notably work produced by the UN and also by the US 
Institute of Peace (see Chapter 3), the available doctrinal guidance remains distinctly 
military against a distinctly politico-military challenge.  Much has been made of 
achieving unity of command.  This may be a laudable aim but is realistically only likely 
to be possible for single nation or Coalitions with small numbers of participants.  In the 
more likely case involving wide multinational actor participation, the operational art will 
revolve around achieving unity of purpose through a shared vision and integrating 
multiple strands of activity.  Achieving this will need dynamic activity and demand 
diplomatic skills, and in all probability statesman-like behaviour, of senior soldiers and 
senior civilians.  The following paragraphs identify four themes which need to be 
developed in updated Western doctrine for peace, stability and counter insurgency 
operations. These encompass: explaining the central importance of the political process in 
securing strategic outcomes; explaining the military role in supporting the political 
process; elaborating the politico-military relationship; and providing candid guidance to 
the commander on the difficulties to be expected if politico-military and coordination 
arrangements are incoherent.  Taken together, the implications of these proposed 
doctrinal changes are profound.  They imply that the military operational level, as 
currently understood, would be redundant. Equally a purely military strategy is no longer 
relevant.
39
     
 
4.1.  Explain the central importance of the political process in securing strategic 
outcomes 
 
British doctrine for stability operations explains the elements of a stable state
40
 (see 
Chapter 2) and identifies the requirement for a political settlement as part of this.  
Practice on recent operations suggests that this is understood. However the available 
doctrine does not really explain the central importance of the political process, or how 
commanders need to become involved in this to help enable progress.  The political 
settlement theme is taken up by emerging US military doctrine
41
 although this remains 
equivocal.  Future doctrine needs to be clear that the primacy of the political or peace 
process is a key organising principle for the conduct of peace support and stability 
operations and that the purpose of this is, ultimately, to deliver a political settlement. 
 
4.2.   Explain the military role in supporting the political process 
 
Whilst perhaps not invariably a ―statesman‖ in the sense suggested by Clausewitz, the 
Theatre Commander is an important political actor in his own right and should be used as 
a key facilitator for the overall politico-military campaign which should include 
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supporting the the political process.  Understanding and acting on political requirements 
remains the professional imperative for commanders.  In practical terms the application 
of military capacity to facilitate the political process and political outcomes is key.  
Assuming that adequate military means are available, there may be no better way to 
influence military mission success in post conflict environments.   
 
Here the military can help because, as General Richards explained to the author, they 
―have a unique understanding of this business and have developed campaign planning 
tools that allow solid analysis to lead to coherent multi-dimensional plans. Further they 
are trained and accustomed to taking timely decisions, and are not focused primarily on 
the processing and analysing of information‖.42  Some commentators have hinted that the 
―soldier-diplomat‖43 may be attempting too much here, but as General Dutton suggested, 
―those of us who are actually involved in doing things instead of commenting on them, 
have to move forward.  We are where we are.‖44 
 
4.3.   Elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of the 
comprehensive approach 
 
This thesis examines the idea of the comprehensive approach
45
 and suggests that its inner 
core should be a politico-military relationship in theatre.  Nevertheless at this locus, as 
McCuen previously pointed out, ―Unity of effort is however extremely difficult to 
achieve because it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles 
which have primarily political objectives...All the political, economic, psychological and 
military means must be marshalled as weapons under centralized co-ordination and 
direction‖.46   
 
In order to achieve this, the ideal is to adopt collaborative planning and decision making 
as exemplified by Crocker and Petraeus in Iraq.  At interview General Rupert Smith 
stressed the importance of a level where politics as a whole is fused, including the locals.  
He explained that this is the theatre, not operational level. Commanding at this level is 
best through ―partnerships‖ (using the law firm analogy).  Leaders need a shared vision of 
the outcome and achieving it. So in a law firm the role of the managing partner is in 
sequencing and supporting activities rather than giving orders. Individual players need 
only be coordinated to do their role as part of a partnership (for example a plumber‘s role 
in building a house).  This is economical, however the difficulty is making it work in a 
campaign because contributions are not from a single source politically. Also, because of 
national constrains you cannot disaggregate authority and responsibility. Therefore small 
fiefdoms become inevitable.
47
 
 
Lieutenant Colonel David Couzens, an experienced inter agency planner and doctrine 
writer, stated that: ―you cannot not plan collaboratively.  You have to get together to 
work out who or what the problem is (counter insurgency, counter terror, development) 
and then get a common understanding, even over what your differences are.  Otherwise 
you go forward in a haphazard incoherent way‖. 48  Colonel Nick Lindley, a former 
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assistant to the ISAF Deputy Commander, suggested a further problem for the 
collaborative planner.  ―It takes time to develop an understanding. If you kick a ball at 
several others they go everywhere. So the campaign doesn't work in normal sequenced 
way, therefore campaign objectives need to be broad because you need time to 
understand how to design these‖.49 These are interactively complex50 or wicked problems 
and the understanding of their complexity needs to extend to the local level.
51
   
 
A recent successful example of collaborative planning and decision making at the tactical 
level was provided by the final UK Commander of the Multi-National Division South 
East in Iraq.  At interview Major General Andy Salmon commented that he saw the need 
to understand and work with his political partners to further the political process.  His 
planning was iterative and it was important that it was open and transparent. This work 
became the basis of a ―joint interagency approach‖ which harnessed military processes to 
deliver all activities.
52
  All decisions were taken by a team of three: the General, the 
Consul General and the Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader, no one had primacy.
53
  
That said, the ―political ellipse had to be predominant, so it became a question of 
enabling the Consul General‖. 54   For the future, Salmon saw the need for the 
development of hybrid multi-agency skills and pointed out the potential problem with 
existing military chains of command given the requirement for an inter agency approach.  
Again, the notion of the military operational level is now in question. 
 
4.4.   Provide candid guidance to the commander on the difficulties to be 
expected if politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent. 
 
The case studies have shown that the International Community does not always fully 
understand the politico-military relationship or create the necessary structures and 
processes to facilitate it.  Doctrine needs to advise the military commander on the likely 
situation and requirement for extemporisation in the absence of adequate political 
arrangements or civilian capacity.  It is likely that there will be three scenarios.  First, a 
multinational operation with mandated and effective politico-military arrangements.  
Second a single nation or small coalition operation where politico-military cooperation is 
delivered by either mandating or cooperation in the field. Finally, and more likely, a 
multinational operation, with extensive international actor participation, but without unity 
of command or purpose over politico-military coordination.   
 
This last scenario may leave the military commander facing a political void, or at best 
uncertainty.  As General Dutton commented at interview, the international community 
needs ―a proper set of policies standards and doctrines, but in the shorter term you do 
your best in a very imperfect situation…although the military should not lead, if no one 
else is prepared to you should crack on‖.55  In these circumstances the commander will 
need to establish coordination mechanisms and derive an ―acceptable political bandwidth 
for military activity‖ against which to judge his actions against their potential to secure 
progress towards political settlement.  A number of factors need to be kept in balance if 
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there is to be productive military activity within a politico-military context. These 
include: coalition military; external political; local political and local military.   
 
As Brigadier Phil Jones, the former military adviser to UNAMA, explained, ―doctrine is 
not yet honest about the fact that the military must be ready to see and fill the vacuum, for 
example with construction work or even in the political domain‖.56 Here David Galula‘s 
observation springs to mind, "to confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent 
and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be 
senseless [although ideally] it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians".
57
  This 
situation also implies the need for a ―primary integrator‖ 58 who is proactive and takes 
responsibility for building the team but is not its leader. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, any temptation to allow the military force to become 
overweening and take charge politically must be strictly avoided. Political and 
intellectual primacy must remain with the civilian side.  Albeit guidance remains absent 
on the civilian side on how to understand the military component as a political actor 
beyond simply being an instrument of state power. Through doctrine civilian leaders 
should be helped to understand what can be achieved and also the responsibilities and 
imperatives that are important to military commanders.  Some decisions, such as over 
force protection or the precise application of force, remain for the military commander 
alone.   Enhancing doctrine to include this would help to address the absence of unity of 
command and the difficulties of achieving unity of effort.
59
   Two further issues merit 
further study.  The first is the application of the approach described above to UN 
operations and the second is to examine the preparation of potential senior civilian 
leaders for the politico-military aspects of their role.          
 
5. Proposals for Further Study 
 
5.1.  How might the successful elements of the politico-military approach 
described in this thesis be applied to United Nations doctrine and practice? 
 
The global scope and scale of UN operations indicates that the UN should be supported to 
further improve doctrine for complex peacekeeping missions and also those where the 
UN acts alongside coalition forces. The UN‘s role may become increasingly relevant in 
the multi-polar world as explained in Chapter 3.  The UN possesses extensive doctrine on 
complex peace operations which is, helpfully, written from a largely civilian perspective.  
What this doctrine lacks, however, is a clear connection between the peace building 
efforts of civilians and the role that military leaders can play as demonstrated in this 
thesis.  Therefore it is suggested that further study is needed on harmonising UN and 
other contemporary doctrines to ensure that the best available doctrinal practice supports 
the UN‘s own state building and peace building activities and also to better deliver a 
comprehensive politico-military approach for those circumstances where the UN operates 
with coalition or other partners. 
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5.2.  How should potential senior civilian leaders in peace and stabilisation 
missions be prepared for their politico-military role? 
 
This thesis has demonstrated some excellent examples of civilian politico-military 
leadership but also others where the point was completely missed.  Bearing in mind the 
absence of civilian doctrine for contemporary operations and the tendency for some 
civilian leaders to be unprepared for the politico-military aspects of their role, it is 
suggested that further study is now needed on how to better prepare them for this.  Here 
mention should also be made of host nation leaders who increasingly will have to take on 
decision making roles in the mature stages of stabilisation operations. 
 
6. Recommendations 
 
The following recommendations are offered. 
 
6.1.   Western doctrine for peace, stability and counter insurgency operations needs to 
be updated to:  
 
6.1.1. Explain the central importance of the political process in securing strategic 
outcomes.  
 
6.1.2. Explain the military role in supporting the political process. 
 
6.1.3. Elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of the 
comprehensive approach. 
 
6.1.4. Provide candid guidance to the commander on the difficulties to be 
expected if politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent. 
 
6.2. Further study should be conducted to answer the following questions: 
 
6.2.1.   How might the successful elements of the politico-military approach 
described in this thesis be applied to United Nations doctrine and practice? 
 
6.2.2. How should potential senior civilian leaders in peace and stabilisation 
missions be prepared for their politico-military role? 
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Appendix 1 - Glossary  
Complex Emergency 
 
UN OCHA sees a complex emergency as, ―a humanitarian crisis in a country, region 
or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from 
internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes 
beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country 
programme‖.1  This seems to centre the problem entirely on the humanitarian issue 
and restricts the available response actors to the UN family alone.  A broader 
definition might be that used by NATO, ―A complex, multi-party, intra-state conflict 
resulting in a humanitarian disaster which might constitute multi-dimensional risks or 
threats to regional and international security. Frequently within such conflicts, state 
institutions collapse, law and order break down, banditry and chaos prevail and 
portions of the civilian population migrate. Therefore international activities to 
restore peace could include political, diplomatic, economic, military and humanitarian 
efforts and the use of information to promote national reconciliation and the re-
establishment of effective government‖.2 
 
Counter Insurgency (often referred to as COIN) 
 
UK doctrine describes Counter Insurgency as ‗Those military, law enforcement, 
political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while 
addressing the root causes‘.3  US doctrine suggests ―Those military, paramilitary, 
political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 
insurgency‖. 4  Emerging NATO doctrine brings these together and suggests that 
―COIN is defined as the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, 
civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any 
core grievances‖.5  
 
Earlier UK doctrine suggested that counter insurgency was ―a generic term to 
describe the operations which forces may have to undertake when maintaining and 
restoring law and order in support of an established government. These operations 
will have to counter threats posed by civil disturbances, terrorism and organized 
insurgency, irrespective of whether they are nationalist, communist or racially 
inspired, or directed from within or outside the state concerned.‖6 
 
Failed State 
 
Mary Kaldor observes that Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State, has 
used the term failed states to describe countries with weak or non-existent central 
authority.  Kaldor also points out Jeffrey Herbst‘s argument that many African States 
never enjoyed state sovereignty in the modern sense – that is, ―unquestioned physical 
control over the defined territory, but also an administrative presence throughout the 
country and the allegiance of the population to the idea of the state‖.7  However these 
definitions lack mention of the monopoly of violence and the provision of services 
which seem to be key attributes of successful states.  Further analytical granularity, 
using social, economic and political indicators, is provided by The Fund For Peace 
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which maintains an index of failed and failing states. Their approach is to suggest that 
―a state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most common is the loss of 
physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other 
attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective 
decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to 
interact with other states as a full member of the international community. The 12 
indicators cover a wide range of state failure risk elements such as extensive 
corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on 
citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic 
decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, 
severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay. States can fail at 
varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over different time 
periods‖.8      
 
Force Protection 
 
―Force Protection (FP) aims to conserve the fighting potential of the deployed force 
by countering the wider threat to all its elements from adversary, natural and human 
hazards, and fratricide‖. 9  This challenge has increasingly become a paradox in 
intervention operations where a trade off has to be made between the absolute 
requirements of force protection and the requirement to operate ―amongst the 
people‖.10 
 
Insurgency 
 
UK doctrine Countering Insurgency offers the following definition, ‗An organised, 
violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to 
established authority‘. 11  The US military definition is ―An organized movement 
aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and 
armed conflict.‖12  Emerging NATO doctrine suggests: ―The actions of an organised, 
often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent 
political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or 
coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion‖.13 Interestingly, 
this draft NATO definition does not situate insurgency within a recognised state. 
 
Earlier UK counter insurgency doctrine suggested, ―…[T]he actions of a minority 
group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture 
of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the 
broad mass of people to accept such a change‖.14   
 
Irregular Activity 
 
Emerging NATO doctrine suggests that ―Irregular activity is defined as the use or 
threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or 
criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and 
authority.
15
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Peace Operation 
 
Originally (in 1994), a US ―umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; 
activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, 
peace building) and two complementary, predominately military, activities 
(peacekeeping and peace-enforcement)‖. 16   This was broadly intended to cover 
similar ground as the UK‘s peace support operations (below).  It is no longer in 
mainstream use by the US military but remains in use elsewhere as a catch all term.  
The Stimson Centre‘s current interpretation is helpful and captures the core element 
of activities likely to be undertaken by the United Nations, with or without partners. 
―Peace operations comprise peacekeeping – the provision of temporary postconflict 
security by internationally mandated forces – and peacebuilding – those efforts 
undertaken by the international community to help a war-torn society create a self-
sustaining peace‖.17  
 
Peace Support Operation 
 
This study will apply the peace support operation definition used in the current UK 
doctrine, ―The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations‖, which in turn 
applies the NATO definition: ―An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, 
civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and 
principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or 
humanitarian operations‖.18  The ensuing definitions of the other activities listed are 
as shown below. 
 
“Conflict Prevention. A peace support operation employing complementary 
diplomatic, civil, and - when necessary - military means, to monitor and identify 
the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, 
or resumption of hostilities‖.19 
 
“Peace Support Force. A military force assigned to a peace support operation‖.20 
 
“Peacemaking. A peace support operation, conducted after the initiation of a 
conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily 
diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military 
assets‖ .21 
 
“Peace Enforcement. A peace support operation conducted to maintain a 
ceasefire or a peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is 
uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. A Peace Support Force (PSF) must 
be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of 
the peace agreement impartially‖.22 
 
“Peacekeeping. A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire 
that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and 
compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by 
peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence‖.23 
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Peace Building. A peace support operation employing complementary 
diplomatic, civil and, when necessary, military means, to address the underlying 
causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a 
commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of 
peace support operations‖.24  It is interesting that the potential military role in 
Peace Building is somewhat caveated by the UK/NATO definition.  Whereas the 
following UN definition, taken from UN Capstone Doctrine makes no mention of 
any of the actors involved.  ―Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted 
to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national 
capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for 
sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term 
process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by 
addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a 
comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect 
the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the 
State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions‖.25  
 
Rheostatic application of force.   
 
Applying a rheostatic approach to the use of force means literally that what Chris 
Bellamy describes as the ―heat‖26  can be turned up or down. It suggests employing 
only enough force to deal with the immediate tactical problem at hand whilst 
remaining aware of the potential long term ill effects caused by using too much force.  
This requires an element of sensitivity and implies that the military unit is both 
mentally and physically prepared to rapidly adjust its posture and force levels. 
 
Stability Operations 
 
Stability could be defined as ―…a condition pertaining to a state where it has effective 
control and administration of its territory, population, and resources‖ and  
Stabilisation Operations as ―military operations primarily intended to increase the 
stability of a state‖.27  The US Army states that ―Stability operations are a core U.S. 
military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and 
support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be 
explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, 
organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, 
facilities, and planning‖.28 
 
State Building 
 
Francis Fukuyama offers a simple definition: ―State building is the creation of new 
government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones‖.29  In its ―Principles 
For Good International Engagement In Fragile States & Situations‖30 OECD argues 
for a focus on state building and suggests that ―priority functions include: ensuring 
security and justice; mobilizing revenue; establishing an enabling environment for 
basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment generation. 
Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens‘ confidence, trust and 
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engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding 
good governance and in service delivery‖.31 
 
Warfighting 
 
―The ability to collectively combine the full range of single-Service capabilities into a 
cohesive joint force that can conduct a campaign against a similarly capable 
adversary‖.32 
 
Warlord  
 
Warlords have become a key problem in failed states, ―…the term ‗warlord‘ refers to 
the leader of an armed band, possibly numbering up to several thousand fighters, who 
can hold territory locally and, at the same time, act financially and politically in the 
international system without interference from the state in which he is based‖ .33 
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Appendix 2 - Questions Used For Structured Interviews 
 
 
Two sets of questions were developed to prepare interview subjects.  The questions 
draw together the strands of the research approach and mirror the broad approach to 
case studies.  Interviews took the form of a structured discussion based on the 
questions using either Question List 1 (for military commanders and Staffs), or 
Question List 2 (for civilian experts), as appropriate. 
 
QUESTION LIST 1 
USED FOR INTERVIEWS WITH MILITARY COMMANDERS AND STAFFS 
 
A. THEORY 
 
The hypothesis for this study is that the relationship between the military strand 
and the civilian political strand in contemporary stability operations is all 
important and that military action should be designed and adjusted to meet 
(local) political objectives and the needs of the overall political or peace process 
and so shape political outcomes.  This is a professional imperative for 
commanders at all levels but particularly at the theatre level.  
 
1. Do you see it this way? 
 
2. Is the UK approach to the politico-military interface unique? 
 
3. Do you see any alternative approaches? 
 
B. PRACTICE       
 
Setting the scene   
 
4. Mandate.  
 
a. What was the mandate as you saw it?   
 
b. Was this translated into a ―peace process‖? 
 
5. Mission.  
 
a. What was the military mission as you saw it?   
 
b. How did you see this being married with the political dimension? 
 
6. Structures and interfaces.  
 
a. What structures existed within the International Community and with 
local authorities to facilitate joint planning and action by civilian 
political leaders (managers) and the military?  
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7. Views.  
 
a. What were your initial views on what needed to be done with regard to 
the pol-mil interface?   
 
b. What helped you to form these views – doctrine, training, experience? 
 
8. Direction.  
 
a. What direction did you receive from the political level? 
 
b. What direction did you receive through the military chain of 
command? 
 
What did you do? (…or were you able to do?) 
 
9. Structures and relationships.  
 
a. What structures did you or others establish to facilitate joint planning 
and action by civilian political leaders (managers) and the military?  
 
b. Were you able to establish workable relationships?  
 
c. If not, what were the obstacles? 
 
10. Planning.  
 
a.  Did you drive campaign planning with political objectives and the 
―peace process‖ in mind?  
 
b. What was your desired outcome in this respect? 
 
11. Campaign conduct.  
 
a. Did you adapt operations with the peace process in mind?  
 
b. How far down the chain of command did this have an influence?   
 
c. Did it work across different national elements? If not, what were the 
obstacles? 
 
12. Significant or defining events.  
 
a. What were they?  
 
b. How did they shape your approach? 
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What were the outcomes? 
 
13. Objectives.   
 
a. Did you achieve your stated objectives?   
 
b. Or did they have to change?  
 
c. What worked, what did not? 
14. Resources.   
 
a. Were there any gaps in external (civilian) resource provision in terms 
of the comprehensive approach? 
 
15. Multinational Issues.   
 
a. How did your approach work with multinational military partners? 
 
b. Did any of them have alternative approaches or views? 
 
 
C. THE FUTURE 
 
Recommendations for future action to improve the outcome of stability 
operations 
 
16. Lessons. What lessons did you take away from the experience? 
 
17. Resources. What additional or different resources are needed (including in the 
civilian domain)? 
 
18. Doctrine.  Are any changes to doctrine needed? 
 
19. Training.  What training is needed? 
 
20. Wider Utility.   Does the UK approach to politico-military cooperation at the 
theatre level have wider utility.  If so how? 
 
 
D. INFORMATION 
 
 
Recommendations for other sources of information 
 
21. People. 
 
22. Documents. 
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QUESTION LIST 2  
USED FOR INTERVIEWS WITH CIVILIAN EXPERTS 
 
The hypothesis for this study is that the relationship between the military strand 
and the civilian political strand in contemporary stability operations is all 
important and that military action should be designed and adjusted to meet 
(local) political objectives and the needs of the overall political or peace process 
and so shape political outcomes.  This is a professional imperative for 
commanders at all levels but particularly at the theatre level.  
 
Do you agree with the hypothesis? 
 
How do you see the peace process?   
 
Who is in charge?  (Can this be a double act)? 
 
How should military commanders support the peace process in practical terms and as 
political actors in their own right? 
 
What are the pitfalls of such military engagement from a political point of view? 
 
How should civilian political actors prepare themselves to understand and apply the 
military tool? 
 
How does the UN as an institution see these issues? 
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Appendix 3 
US and NATO Doctrine for Planning and Operating in Counter 
Insurgency and Stability Operations 
 
1. Aim.  
 
The aim of this appendix is to provide details and analysis of US and NATO doctrine 
for planning and operating in counter insurgency and stability operations. 
 
 
2.  FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency 
 
2.1.  Campaign Design 
 
FM 3-24 offers the helpful concept of "Iterative counterinsurgency campaign 
design".
1
 This is illustrated at Figure A1 below. A continuous cycle of activity is 
intended to analyse the environment and then unify the purpose of the available tools 
(these become the logical lines of operation).
2
   The design ―should reflect a 
comprehensive approach that works across all [Logical Lines of Operations]…[there] 
should be one campaign and therefore one design. This single campaign should bring 
in all players ...".
3
   
 
Having described operational design FM 3-24 provides an example (see figure A2 
below). This is sophisticated, yet it remains rather tactical
4
 because it leaves the open 
the linkage with a wider political context and peace process, for which there is no 
design.  
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Figure A1. "Iterative counterinsurgency campaign design". Source FM 3-24
5
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.  1
st
 Marine Division’s operational design for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom 11. Source FM 3-24
6
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2.2. Campaign Planning 
 
The organising method for turning operational design into activity, is to apply 
―logical lines of operation‖ (LLOs) to sequence activity in ―conceptual 
categories‖ 7  designed to impact on the attitude of the populace and increase 
government support. These categories are illustrated at figure A3 below.  The 
relationship of the LLOs to the whole is similar to the strands of a rope, which as 
General Mike Jackson and Stephanie Blair pointed out, are stronger when 
woven.
8
 
 
Figure A3.  Example logical lines of operations for a counterinsurgency. Source 
FM 3-24.
9
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Campaign Execution 
 
One tactical approach in FM 3-24  needs mention.  Where insurgents dominate, the 
idea of Clear-Hold-Build,
10
 has potential geo-political impact and also illustrates the 
requirement for politico-military coordination in theatre. The objective is to: ―create a 
secure a physical and psychological environment; establish firm government control 
of the populace and area; gain the populace's support.‖11  The obvious difficulty here 
is sequencing all of the civilian actors, the military and the host nation across the 
LLOs to deliver this outcome, particularly if all of the players do not show up.
12
  
   
To describe the execution of operations, FM 3-24 uses an apt medial analogy: stop 
the bleeding; inpatient care-recovery; outpatient care-move to self-sufficiency.
13
 The 
discussion of outpatient care-moving to self-sufficiency seeds the expansion of 
stability operations, ideally using indigenous forces and the goal being to transition to 
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the host nation. Over time, more functions across all sectors are performed by the host 
nation, with some help.
14
  
 
 
3. FM 3-07 Stability Operations 
 
3.1. Campaign Design 
 
The basic operational design is provided by the end state framework and here the 
effort to link military and civilian efforts ―creates a single model that forms the basis 
for developing lines of effort".
15
 Then manual describes work by the Department of 
State on post-conflict reconstruction essential tasks "the essential stability task 
matrix"
16
 which breaks down the tasks into "stability sectors" each of which are then 
discussed in detail (see figure A4 below).
17
 Within this there is no guidance for the 
general on how to relate his efforts to the political process
18
 and the overarching 
question is what links all of the tactical activity together? 
 
Figure A4 - An Integrated Approach to Stability Operations
 19
  
 
 
 
 
FM 3-07 provides a useful categorisation of tasks. Those: where the military retain 
primary responsibility; where civilian agencies likely retain responsibility, but the 
military forces are prepared to execute; and tasks which civilian agencies or 
organisations retain primary responsibility. These primary stability tasks are each 
discussed in detail.
20
 Again, in a section on support to governance there is no 
guidance on how to dovetail with political direction and how commanders should 
approach taking what amount to political decisions.
21
 Discussion of civil affairs 
operations at all levels hints at political imperatives but provides no guidance on 
supporting the political process or political primacy.
22
  
 
3.2. Campaign Planning 
 
The chapter on planning stability operations in FM 3-07 (chapter 4) lacks the 
incisiveness of its Counterinsurgency counterpart and repeats well known campaign 
planning material.
23
   The five ―stability sectors‖ and the five ―primary stability tasks‖ 
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provide ―a framework for identifying the individual tasks that exert the greatest 
influence on the operational environment‖ and are illustrated at Figure A5 below .24 
 
Figure A5: Example Stability Lines of Effort.  Source FM 3-07
25
 
 
 
 
 
The ―stability lines of effort‖ shown at figure A5 are then further broken down to the 
tactical (military) level, where most, but not all, activity contributes to the ―establish 
civil‖ security line of effort.  The resulting security lines of operation at this level are 
described by the pneumonic ―SWEAT-MSO‖26 (see figure A6 below). In a discussion 
of the decisive points, and relevant to the lines of development, political factors, such 
as obtaining political support from key tribal leaders, are briefly mentioned but there 
is no guidance on how to approach and coordinate this.
27
  This will be particularly 
difficult in a non-benign environment where civilian presence and activity will be 
restricted and or limited. 
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Figure A6. “SWEAT-MSO Lines of Effort, Objectives and End State.28 
 
 
 
4. Draft  NATO Counter Insurgency Doctrine AJP 3.4.4 
 
Emerging NATO doctrine draws heavily on the earlier British and US models in 
terms of campaign design and planning.  The preferred approach at the tactical level 
of ―clear hold and build‖ using ―offensive, defensive, stability and enabling 
activities‖ 29  mirrors FM 3-24. As suggested in Figure A7 below, this approach 
―establishes control over the population and areas so that [host nation] governance 
and internal development programmes can be pursued in a secure environment. It also 
supports development operations by preventing insurgent interference‖. 30  This of 
course emphasises the absolute requirement for civil-military coordination at all 
levels in order to contest the ungoverned areas and prevent resurgence of insurgent 
control.  Whilst the ultimate effect may be similar to the UN‘s peace building process, 
this US and NATO model does not address the specific requirements of the political 
process at either the national, regional or local level or how the commander should 
relate his planning and campaign activity to these.  The question remains where does 
clear hold and build sit in relation to this? 
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Figure A7 Clear Hold and Build. Source NATO AJP 3.4.4
31
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 --, "FM 3-24,  MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual," p 4-5. 
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